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GOD IN TRINITY~ LOVE IN CREATION 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis ittempts .to display vital conriections between 
themes not generally ~onnected. On the one hand, it considers. 
the notion of love and relation 1n connection with .God and the 
i~ea of Trinity. On the other, it ~ndeavours to show how the 
notion of a Triune God:of Love may be used to s~fegtiard an 
idea of hum~n be{ngs in which their d~pendence upon love and 
relati6nship is stressea~ Fundamental to this is the demand 
of freedom in terms of choice. This is shown to be a direct 
consequen6e of the nature of love, and to necessitate con-
si~erabie revisioh of ~nriventional doctrines 6f ·grace and 
providence. Throughout the thcsi~, great stre~s i·s laid on 
an eclectic use or sources to demonstrate the argtiment. 
The thesis co~~rises two ch&pte~s of o~tology, and 
three cha~ters of human concern. In the first ~wo, the nature 
of Trinity and Creation are examined fro~ a ~tandpoint of 
the philosophy of lo~ing reiation. Three negative forces 
are id~ntified 1n the sh~pe of Cartesian Solipsism, ·the 
Plato n i c phi 1 o s o p by of . Love , with it. s lack 6 f r e 1 at ion and 
its abstract view of the Good, and thirdly Nygren's theology 
of agape 3 which it. is held destroys man's integrity. Coilpled 
~ith his non-use of the Trinity, it a~so reduces.God ~o an 
abstract monad. 
Positive thou~hi 1·s taken from Van~tbne's Love's Endeavour 
Love'~ Expense, which develops a doctrine of God from a 
theology of Lov~, and this is taken into. the third chapter 
which considers the consequences for grac~ ~rid pro~idence~ 
A r~vieed portr~it of proviffence cohpled to a G6d who .is 
·neither impassi?le nor omniscient· is prOvided. The .remaining 
two chapters examine th~ consequenc-es of such theology for 
·man's own expectations eo~cerning. self-f.ulfillment an.d his 
obli~~tions .to others;· 
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GOD IN TRINITY, LOVE IN CREATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The Introduction to thi~ thesis has b~en written aft~r 
completion of the overall text. It may thus serve as a review 
of the work as a whole. This thesis ha~ be~n written chiefly 
with the exposition of an idea 1n mind. That idea was 
stimulated in the .author when, as an undergraduate at Durham 
University,. he read Canon .W.H. Vanstone's Love's Endeavour~ 
····· 
Love~s Expense. To date, no other theological book has made 
. . . 
'such a singul~~ impression· 6~ my mind; Although my thesis 
. . ' 
deals with many more authors than just·van~tone, I re~a~d my 
work as a broad expbsition of the ideas of hjs book ~oupled 
with som~ p6ssible. criticism~. In particular, I regard what 
I ~~ve w~itten is an ~ttempt to place V~ns~one's material in 
a wi~er theological/~~ilosophical cant~~. ·vahstone ·regards 
. . 
hi~ wofk a~ der~ved from his paris~ ex~erience and I tespect 
his.warlness for theology, and hence have deliberately·refus~d 
to brand his work with the name of any ''school''.· Nonetheless. 
it. has been a fascinating exerc1se and one which 1n a 
theological context is, I am sure, worthwhile, to discern 
links betwe~n ~anstone's idea~ and tbose of other theologfcal. 
. . . . 
movemehts. In particular I have ~ndea~oured to show that 
. . 
parallels ~x{st within.a very etu~enical theological spectrum. 
~he idea which is central to Vanstone is that the nature 
of love is the nature of God, and that from the nature of love 
Vl 
a doctrine of God is discernible whi~h can-cope··with the 
clas~ic problems of providence and theodicy·, and show that an 
evolving univer~e is in accord with the very riatu~~ ~i Go~~ 
It· was· the breadth of this achievement which· first :linpres·se·d 
me in r~ading ~anstone's book. In my own work, i ~a~e 
as~essed these issues and also developed some others. 
I have endeavoured to give great attention to what I 
belie~e to be the ontology behind the Vans~onian positi6n. 
This lS that the idea of love depends on the .idea of relation. 
Further, it is fun~amental that this idea is taken in~o the 
Godhead, hence the importance of the ~riniti. Vanst~n~ hi~seli 
recognises this. Nevertheless 1 the exposition of Trinity arid 
the requi~ement o£ relation for being is not the·core of·hi.~­
work and I·have found it useful to develop this mo~e ful~y. 
In a situation where the two sides of relation.need to be 
atcounted for, I have also felt it justifiable to att~nd t6 
the issue of self-giving and self-fulfillment in relation to 
. Jesus' ·own engimatic pronouncement that "one ·should "Love thy 
neighbour as thyself". 
When put togethe~ one firids that th~ u~e o£ love ln-
producing a doctrine of God also produces a doctrine df M~n 
in .which great weight is laid upon his free ch6ice with 
regard to response to God. Traditionally man'i f~eedom· 1s 
often seen as prejudiced by Qod's Soverei~nty. Thus· .it 1 s 
illuminating to study a present~tion which preserv~s the. 
sovereignty of God whil~t portrayirig his prov{den~e in ~uch 
a manner that it becomes the guar~ntor of the integrity of 
man's freedom, and indeed of the integrity of natur~ to develop 
within its own bounds. 
Clearly this is a very ·broad based study, and since, 
v ll" 
for personal· reasons, it has only b·een pursued to M.·A. level, .. 
of necessity some 1ssues have had to be skimmed.-over. 
Indeed the work--serves very_ much as an exposition of ·v~nstone 
. . . . - . 
within a broad theological spectrum and not as· a critique.·.· 
Reading Vanstone does raise v~ry many q~~stions, few ~f which~ 
aside from the issue of theodicy, ~re dealt with here. 
Positively speaking, great pos~ibilities e~ist for a th~ology 
of community and hence of the Church built around an acc~p-
tance of the portrayal of love and relation. Thi notion of 
in~erdependence coripled with the great responsibility f6r . 
corporate fulfilmerit laid at the door of the individual .1n 
his response to God by Vanstone ought to have great 
applicabil.ity to the notion of corporate obligatibns. 
Negatively, some very tricky questions are raised if t~e ·· 
questions of the Vanstonian nature of owniscien~e.is.pressed .. 
If God is aware of all that is but noi of all that wiii be.,· 
. . . . . 
how exactlj does this affeci his ~rov~dential guidance?. 
It would be necessary to d~velop a y~ry complic~ted 
argument regarding the act.ion of God within time,. b.ut this 
has not been attempted here. Even so, this th~sls.~ill., I 
think, still be found to be a very "fullu work. And if it· 
serves to stimulate academic.debate about·Vanstone's work 
and a renewed appreciation of the positiv~ possibilities. 
stemmihg from the idea of Trin~ty and love in relatio~ to 
providence and the human self, ·then I shall be satisfied. 
CHAPTER ·oNE . · 
TRINITY A~D RELATION 
The obje~t of this chapter is noi primarily to exam1ne 
what has prov~d ever s1nce the Patristic period to be the 
maJOr 1ssue 1n Tririitarian study; the numerical problem of 
how one can at the same time be three~ Iride~d the chapter 
will n~t corifro~t the doctririe dir~ctly and so-will ·not 
endeavour to provide an ·apologia devoted. to its ration·a,l 
coherence. Rather, following the method used throughout. the 
. . 
chapters, the ~rgument mo~~s fr6~ bum~n ~xperience towaids 
. . 
. . . 
the divine nature by analogy. This is not iritended to 
. . . . 
demonstrate the logicality of .the partic.ular_ doctrine. but 
attempts to show the practical use of ad.Opting ·the doctrine, 
that is the help it g1ves 1n understanding ·the human and 
more enigmatically the divine experience .• The role of· 
relation within human life has first to be established. It 
cannot be taken for granted in ~he light of what. may be 
called Cartesian. solipsism. Descartes' Cogito ·ergo sum 
sometimes fi~ed as ~ base text fq~ hu~an experience is greatly 
misleading in the context at relation for it does not 
. . 
~redicate relation~ Inst~ad relatio~ app~ar~ to be secondary 
to individual self~consciousness. Likewise in theistic 
thoughtthe Jewish and more especially the Gree·k philosophical 
inheritence is primarily monadic. .This cha·pter will endeavour 
to reverse ~oth influ~nces. 
2 
. . 
Cogito er~o sum has its p~ini, but onl~.the ~ost convinced 
pedant co~ld ignore the situation that the speak~r of. these 
words was himse'if the ·product of the physical interco·urse of 
. . - . . 
two·people~ Further in the mental aspect as "will now be : 
developed, Descartes'· c·ould ·not· have. reached such a c oncl us ion. 
. . . . ·. .· : . . . · .. 
without the use of a category of relation. Stri~tly speaking 
for Descartes' saying to be cor~ect in ~tself, ~baby tota~ly 
. . 
isblated from all htiman contact would, if nourished mechani-
.cally, be able, up~n maturiti to _reach his conclusions.:· The· 
absurdity i~ evident; relation is a necessity ioi hu~an.life· 
to develop, certainly in th~ bodily sense an~ arguably ·in· the_ 
mental sense. Mary Midgley ha~ recently devoted a paper to 
this line of·thought. 1 ·Although D~scartes is not ment~one~, 
her whole tenor is to estabiish that· rationality is. ~ot .an 
individual but corporate attribut~, and :tha.t excessive 
individu~lism is irrat~o~al. H~r partitular target is 
G.E. Moore arid the Humean.empiricist tradition. Her ar~ument 
is simple, that language, the -foundatio.n of reasoning; ·is 
social. To use a particular language is .to be de fact~.a 
. . . . . 
member of a given cultur~ and.a particular society. Spe:aking 
to oneself (or Descartes'_Cagita ergo_.sum) ~s secondary; 
. ·. 
initially speech is speaking to an object4 Reflection arid 
reasoning as solitari is strictly s~condary to reflection 
and reasoning as corporate, wher~in men learnt those abilities~ 2 
Midgley is thus.ena~led to accuse: ethical egoism as facing 
not. jUSt I emot ioni:J.l SOlitude I b~t ·, COrlC eptual SOli tude I·, 
leading to 'the collapse of thought' .3 Her coriclusion is 
that ~ationality is dependent_upon·an acceptance bf com~unity, 
. . . . . . . . . ' 4 
'so no co_!llmun~ ty, no. reasqn~ng . 0~, 'only a ~~cial _treirtg 
3 1:3 
could have a lang~age • ma:n needs fellows to find his 
own identity', and as an echo of our next source, 'Through· 
the Thou a ~an ~ecomes I' .5 
Without do-ubt a seminal recent work ·in this field has 
been Buber's I ~nd Thou. 6 This is a philosophical work 
devoted to establishing the rtecessity of t~e relational 
principle. Buber advo~ates g relational stance which s~arts 
f~om the I-it relation. This is where m~n relate to 6the~s 
or to things from a poirit of_view o~ knowledge. It is. the 
business relation in which possession is for personal 
adVantage. _Beyond this 1 Buber advocates respect for others 
including things as objects in themselves. This is Kant's 
advocation, at least fo.i people, of treating another '.never . 
. as a means but always as an end in himself'.7 .Rerein 
is Buber's I-thou relationship, in which the other is 
encountered in its very_ being and not as a means fo·r some. 
end of I. Buber then. extends· this princ{ple into the Godh~a·d. 
He adVdcates a form of mysticism by whiah'me~ parti~ipate.not 
~nly in the being of oth~ri but also in the being of God and 
6f material things. In the latter instance Buber cites the 
. . 8 
example of a tree.. All knowledge of the tree is in the I-it 
category, but ~n simply encountering· a tree and letting its 
being affect the I ~n its entirety, it becomes a you. 
Three spheres ~n the world .of relation are portrayed. 
There is life wit~ ·nature, ~n which I-thou has to· remain 
below language, matter is hot evide~ily self conscious-. 
Secondly there is life with men. The realm of language and 
self-consci6~s being having been entered, the .Thou can be· 
mutual. Finally ~here is life in the Sp{rii, thi~ ~s· within 
4 1:4 
the eternal Thou, 1n which· relation is without wo~ds - a 
myst~cal eieme~~.9 Buber's quasi-mysticism may cause 
problems both witb reference to the Godhead and to. thing~, 
. . . 
but the. key issue 1s established as th~ teq~i~eme~t f~~ 
relatiori 1n life and fcir irea~i~g .our 'objec~s' ·as ends 
like our own selves. Bubei'~ language· fo~ 'end' is 'thou' 
and this relationship is his formulation of·the Golden·Rule. 
·Walter Kaufman in his prologue to Buber' s I and Tho.u 
elaborates Oh the CO.nsequences Of. this work.·by showing the 
. . . . . 
variety of relaiidns wheieby !~Thou 1s deni~d. He cites 
five abuses of the I~Thou relation. There is the I-I 
.relation in which individuals a:re. totally dominated by their 
own ego.· Another group think more of others than themselves, 
but only in the way of knowledge, they 'tak~ an interest', to 
the extent ·•that the It within. a Thou fascinates them - I-It. 
There are thi 'en~husiasts' a~ a third category, who.take 
such an extreme inter~it_{n the It, that th~y destroy·their"I; 
for the sake of objectivity subjectivity i~ d~stroyed. In 
the domin~tion of the object "they kill themselves~ It-It. 
Some entirely iose th~ir individuality for the group 
mentality, We-We. While others in order to reassure them-
selves in ~- thr~atenirig Vorld de~eiop an us arid them crusade 
mentality. 10 ~ere are five ways of relation (and there.are 
many more) with no 'You' 1n Buber's sense. Howevir iri all, 
there i~ relation e~6e~ting the first_, the Cartesian I~I 
relation. Thus even if solipsism is sho•m to be .ri.diculous 
and relation to be the mode of being, not all relations are 
appropriate. Matiy relations abuse either the other or even 
oneself. Thus beyond establishing the necessity of relation 
for man's b~ing, the qu~stion of the proper form of relation 
1:5 
has. t~ be estahlish~d. 1~ ~heological term& this ~ill bec6me 
the question of the int~rrelation betwe~n self~love, oth·er 
love and God love to which separate chapters will be devote.d. 
It may be noted thbu~h that B~bet's wotk 1s its~lt an attempt 
to resolve the iisue i~ which t&e I-Tho~ yelationship 
represents a fundamerital harmonisin~ of the thr~e. On the 
other hand Buber does riot use a concept of relationship 
within the Godhead, th~ concern· of·this chapter. 
Th~ proper relation bet~een I .and ~hou can be.arialised 
1n terms of mutual need. Need whether a~plied to pe~sons or 
more specifically to God 1s oit~n se~~ as problematic. Of 
p er s o ri s , .n e e d i s o f t en h e 1 d t o b e , i n dee d o f t en i t i s the c a s e , 
that it reflects self-centr~dness. Whereas with God,· the 
inherit~n~e of the Gre~k doctri~~ of divine self~suf~iciency 
rules all considerations 6f h~~d ~ithin the Godhead to"be 
entirely inappropria{e. For the. Gre~k Philosophers~ need 
had 
was a sign of incompletion, men/n~eds .becauae th~y were 
incomplete. However, as with the discussi6n of lo~e,it 1s 
. . . . - . . 
essential to disting~ish between prop~r and falie needs and 
proper and fals~ loVe, i~ a roie is to be given to self 
fulfillment in men. Again in the.Greek scheme· God could.not 
lov~ because· love r~flected lack. Love f6r the Greeks is a 
form of need wh:lle Go.d riei ther needed nor lacked anything. 
This leads directly to the monadic schemes of thought which·. 
render the T~ini~y unihtelligibie. 
Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros which is discussed ·in. 
detail elsewhere may create many ·problems. Nonetheless 1 it 
is not hi~ in~erpretation of the Greek belief of Eros which 
6 
1s normally held to be in error. His analysis of Gr~ek .Eros 
makes clear t·he problem cone erning need and God that has be·en· 
outlined. Plat~,speaks of love for the divine, but here love 
is only the expression of man's lack, 'Man loves and desires 
that whith he ~acks ~rid has not got' . 11 The Supreme Being 
however has all and needs nothing, and thus his only relation 
to lo~e is to be the object of love. The essence of tbis 
view is that 'The bea~ty of the Divine Self sets all thirigs 
.1n move~ent toward~ it, but the Divine itself is ~nmoved, it 
lS 
. . 12 
absolute rest'. In ~lata's wqrds, 'A God needs not any 
convers~ with meri' .13 This thought is the origin of what is 
held t6 be problematic i~ the Greek view, the lifelessness 
6{ the. G~eek God. It· is as if activity and life were all 
~igns oi restlessness and lick and that utter immutability 
is the goal 6f ~xistence. The qu~stion rema1ns to what 
extent does the G~eek God live? Is the future for mankind 
pro~ised.by this scheme, ·a form of contemp:)_ation similar to 
the Buddhist Nirvana .in which the key t; bliss is the loss of 
self-consciousness? 
The simple answer to the problem 1s to respond by 
condemning the Greek view altogether. Instead one could 
argue that if there is a God and granted the existence of 
creatiori, then .the. creation is simply the expressi~n of God's 
need. Th{s though 1s to destroy 'God', s1nce ·OUr exist~nce 
becomes the condition of his existence. ~his the Greeks 
6or~ectly perceived w~s impossible, for if there wa~ a God 
who was riot a demiurge, his absolute separation from the world 
in th~ sense of contingency had to be saf~guarded; This the 
Greek vie~ of Eros and impassibility saf~guarded, thus th~ir. 
7 1:7 
·. 
a1m by comparison with. other contemporary religious syste~s 
was laudable. However~ in iealing with one problem theY. 
created another~ that ig how is relationship to ·God to be 
~onceived if he is static and motio~les~i It is against 
this view that the success of the doctrine of the ~rinity 
must be judged. For not only does it introduce the peculiar 
category of human existence, t~at of the personal~ into the 
Godhead, but in s:o doing it deals with the problem o·f need. 
T hi s is · b e c au s e within t he . Go d head it s e 1 f , r el at ion , n e e d , 
and fulfillment exi~t in fruition - three person~ liviig 1n 
the fullniss 6f t~e communioh of one nature. 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the develop-
ment of this th~~~. Initially this will be done by citing 
theologian& who have felt cpnfidsnt to develop 'need theology' 
in the context of their discussion of God. The astonishing· 
. . . 
featuie that will become evident is the ~cumenical nature of 
this tradition with Anglican, Catholi0 an~ Protestant repr~-
sentatives beirig ~ite~. A start will b€ made however with a 
Jew, by returning to Buber. Incidentally, Buber has provided 
a TritiitY of ·relations, the I~it, the I-you of pe~sons, and 
in the third part of his book the I-Tho~ of the ete~nal 
person. Buber notes how the relationship of men to Go4 has 
been charatterised as one of dependence (S~hleiermather) or 
creature feeling (6tt6), ~hile .this is correct he ~eels it 
. . . 14 
to be ones1ded. · While the pur~ relationship 1s o~e of 
utter dependence,it is also the altogether fi~e and rireative 
one. From this assumption .Buber writes:. 
That you .n~ed God more· thari·anything, you know at all 
times in your heart. But don't you know algo that. 
God needs you - 1n the fullness of his eternity,· 
you? How ~oul~ man exist if God did not need 
him, and h~w. would you exist! You need God in 
. . . ' . . 
~rder to b~, an~ God needs you - for that which 
1s the meani~g ~f_your iife. · 15 
Echoing the tragic theJr.e to be ahal~rsed 1n Vanstone, he 
.. - . 16 
writes, 'The world is not divine play, it is divine-fate•: 
Buber. of c~urse doe~ not use the language of Tri~ity 
~nd so to the 6harge that- in. using such language he is making 
eGo~ ~ependent on m~n he lacks ~ forceful answer. He does., 
howev~f. o£fe~ the comme~t, 'How would man exist if God-did 
not. need t: i:trl? ' The. very fact that nen .sre·, Beans that if· God 
::c s , t h e ~1 u n 1 e ~ s t. h e c r e at i o I:: 1 E a ~n e r e w h i rn , n e e d mu s t e n t e r . 
Noticeably, th~ Greek~ did not portray creation in such terms 
as GOd's a~ti~e role 1n c~eating man, for had they done so, 
t~ som~ eit~nt ihey ~auld have admitted a degree of need in 
God .. Need thcn~.gh 'may· v.e.ry in degre-::: fr.om a sense of s-t,:rict 
neriessity to ~imple good ~J.easure~ a sense of shared req~est. 
. . 
Christians at~ ~~~sumabiy happy ~o say that God requests our 
response t~ his initiative a~d equally well at all times 
intend to deny any sense of strict necessity. Nonetheless, 
. . . 
the d~gree to 1-1hich God needs us is generally glossed over 
·End it is. this that 1s ~eirig examined here. 
Th~s far ~en have been held to be relational. If created, 
this als6 testifies to a.relational desire within God. The 
. . . 
Trinity has ~ee~ introduced iri o~der to safeguard th~ 
. ~- . . 
~eiationship between men and God ftom any ne~essity on G8d's 
part. A .balance has to be struck between God's inv~lvereent. 
and genuine concern in creation and his independenc·e in being ~ 
it 1s en.article pf faith that God was before the world w~s. 
9 1:9 
It is po~sible that ~ deeper appreciation of 'need theology' 
~ill c~me no~ j~st from a consideration of cr~ation but·.from 
the accept~nce of the divine nature as ~ove~ The character-
Isfl.tion of the .divine human relationship as one of n.eed 1n 
lo~e is clearli ~~~n in.~he sermons of Cardinal Hume.l7 
Significantly, ~nd in tune with the method of these papers, 
Hume starts fTom the analogy of human. relationship. It is. 
t6~ nature 6r love that -for two pe~pl~ 'the~e is in each of 
~hem~ a wanting of the other, a needing of the· ot6er' . 1 8 
This l.S true Hume holds of both marriage and friendship. 
Fio~ this Hume goes on to write 
There is -surely deep in the heart of each one of us 
a wanting and a ~~edirig of dod, and that want{ng 
and n~eding of God in us is only there hecause h~ 
himself warits and ne~ds us. W~ could never begin 
to love God . .· if he had not first lov.e.d us. 
Why God .~hould want and ne~d us is a.mystery. But 
it is true: otherwise he w6uld not have created us 
and lif~ ultimately wou~d hav~ no meaning for us. 19 
In the .succeeding se~tences Hume ties this purpose of God .to 
his. nat~re. as ·love, bein~ one of utter tx~stworthiness and 
constancy of good intent. Hum~ thus regards it as accept~ble · 
to introduce need bet~een.God and man, but h~ does this not 
from ontological ne~esiity but out of the nature of love~ 
He accepts· he cannot offer an explanation but that it is so, 
~he sheer existence of creation teitifies. Hume has not 
used th~ Trinity here, and had h~ done so, albeit it may· be 
inappropriate in thi~ settirig of a se~mon, he could perhaps 
have given more of an explanati~n ~nd warded off possible 
criticism. By adopting the~ Trini~y he could have held· that 
the Godhead, being a community of three persons in one loving 
natu;e, l~cking nothing and indeed living in the very fullness 
10 1:10. 
of being, which out of this fullness and not from riecessity, 
created for the sheer joy of sharing j6y itself. Having 
~hough embarked on.this road of creation, once started there 
~ari be ho abandoning of the work of love .. Whil~ there was 
no object of love outside the Trinity there was no· need 
outside the Trinity, but having once created an object ~f 
love outside the divine b~ing, havi~g once created anotber,· 
love cannot abandon the beloved ~nd need thus immediate~y 
finds its place . 
. The word~ of Bonhoeffer concerning ·Christ in Gethsemane 
r~veal this 1n a d~amatit way. He wrote, 'as Jesus asked in 
Gethsem~ne, C~uld you not vatch with me one hour? That lS 
. . 
. . . .· .· 
. . : . . 
a reversal 9f ~hat the ·religious man expects from God. Man 
. . 
is ~u~~oned io sh~r~ in drid's suiferings at the hands of:a 
Godles~ world'.20 ·God's nature being love and as such having 
entered th~ cr~ative process, it is love'~ nature that it 
cannot be a passive onlooker, So God desires or needs a 
~esponse from man ior the frill fruition of his work. From 
. . 
the iimple co~sideration that man's nature is relational, 
th~s when applied to God has opened up a range of deliberations 
to be considered throughout this.w6rk .. These include the 
nature of love and relation both within man and God~- This 
leads ihto the n~ture of creation, how God on the basis of 
love. ahd relation works .. ln it. ~bus the question of Grace 
and Providence needs to be attended to, with great stress on 
~an's fie~dom c~n~equent upon the nature of love. Finally 
the discussiori will have to involve Creation's end, the 
pu~~ose fot ~hich God intends this communion~ This le~ds 
ll l:ll 
naturally into consideration o~ the role of self-fulfillment 
or self-love and .converseli the role of lo~e for others, the 
paradoxical considerati~n ih~t Christiariiti comma~ds love. · 
The present. chapter i::; .devoted· to laying the groundwork, 
. . . . 
by safeguarding the concept of a relatio~al lo~ing" .God wanting· 
communion with his cr~a~ur~s, and. allowing:himself to be 
dependent o~ our free response. Its importance can be 
illustrated bY an an~lysis oi Canon Va~stone's wdr~ .. 
Consideration of Va:n:3tone 1 s work occurs ·throughout th.is· thesis. 
Here .his use is as the fourth, Anglican, author,· mentioned 
earlier who has developed 'need theology'. ·unlike. the other 
three authors mentioned previously, his 1 need' theology is 
. . 
ex~licftly safeguard~d by a ~6~tririe of relati6n~ within God, 
though it may ~e assumi~ th~t-it is so ~with Hume ·too: 
Vanstone's book may be said to be representative of 'need 
theology'. Hi~ analysis o~ God i~ developed directly from· 
an analysis of love which stres~es the· need for r~sponse for 
love's fruition ~nd the nece~sity of th~t response being 
free to be genuine. 
From this is developed a whole theology 6f·~rea~iop in 
order to safeguard these dem~n~s. This involves ~cceptarice 
of evolution - there lS to be no 'God of the Gaps''· instead 
.t~ere is a portrayal 6f God pot as cosmic director, but as 
cosmic artist working in c~njunction with his material. 
Out o~ these t~o factors appears t~e notion o~ the triumphant 
or tragic ou~co~e t~ God~s plans dependent upon mah's response. 
The only safeguard .is God's .limitless abili.ty to love ·ln 
kenosis. (This will be d~veloped in detail elsewhere in· 
this the$is
1 
particularly 1n the chapter 'Freedom, Grace and 
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Providence I.) What has been said is sufficient to irrdicai;.e 
that of the theologians so far c:l.ted who have s·tressed the 
importance ·of ou.r r_espo~se upon the b·eing. of God,· it is 
Vanst6ne's work that 1.s th~ m~st sy~t~m~t~c~lly. dev~loped~ 
. . . . . . . 
Here too the Trinity 1s introduced s~ecifically:to co~piemeht 
ne~d theology, 'Trinitaiian theDlogy asserts that God's. love 
for his creation is not the love .that is born of "emptiness"' 21 
The Trinity is used to safeguard ihe prior·and.6o~plete. bei~~ 
of God. In this attempt to account for these ·theologies 
of lpve, it can thus be appreciated why.a sta~t 1s being 
made with the Trinity . 
. Ati eclecti~ method 1s be:l.rig ftillowed·in tir~er to derive 
.. 
from the historical tiadition material which demonstrates 
. . 
the anthropological valUe of an ~doption ~f th~ n6tiori of 
Tr.ini ty. Ours 
certain trend but~ free ranging excavation irito·auth6rs,from 
the Biblical period ·to date» ifi .order ~o es~~blish. the 
. 
significance of the Trinity for .safeguarding the con~ept of . 
human relations. 
Four th~ ologi ans ba ve be en seen so far, whose .writing· is 
of contemporar~ interest as is ~oisidered eise~here but with 
three authors who~e w~rk starts out on a slightly uneven 
. . . 
note open to the criticism of ~aking Gqd ~epend~nt·upon man. } . . ·. . . . 
It is thus opportune to note some other theo.logia.ns who have 
appr·eciated th~ problefu of fuaking God dep~ndent upon man_ and 
. 22' ~ start wil·l be made with a Catholic, Geach. He starts by 
noting the problem inhe~ited from the Greeks 6f a God who 
.cannot love b~cause .lev~ ~epresents chang~. and need> and God 
is 6hangele~s a~d n~~ds fiothing. This is seen a~~6rding to 
Geach {n Spinoza's c6mment to t~e effect that h~ ·who loves 
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God c~nnot desire ~hat God sh&uld lov~ him {n retrirn. This -
is because after the Greek pattern) Spinoz~ thinks of .love 
1n terms of an access io ~oy for ~he lover from thinking of 
the beloved. Thus1 ~hile one who 16ves God will have great 
Joy in thinking of God) the unchangeable God c a·nnot ·p~ 
supposed to have great joy in thinking of the one ~ho ~eves 
,: 
him. · Geach. notes how Spi.rioza holds that God's true lover 
could not .·wish ot-herwise) since to do so would be to w:Lsh. 
change in' God and thris God would n~ .longer pe God~ Geach 
furthe~ holds that this is the view of.Augustine) Anselm 
and Aquinas. Against this ~ch6o1,Geach._notes the coritrary. 
doctrine 1 which would ~old th~t Go~ n~eds creatu~es i~ order 
23 to love. _This is the danger t6 which our eirlier quartet 
have· exposed themselves. ·It is. at .this point that Geach 
introduces the notion o~ the Trinit~ and si~nif{cantly f6r 
compar1son with the other theologians he t·ies.this doctrine 
·. . . . ) 
into the notion of charity - the theologic.al virtue of love. 
By placing Tririity at the heart of Charity Geach .is 
. . I . 
able to make the relation :oi love vi~ble within God an~ so 
avoid, either a ioveles~ G~~ or st{ll ~orse a God -who with· a 
desperate need for an .outlet of l·ove has to _use men as a. 
vessel for the return of his own love ~ the charge of· cosmic 
solipsis~ that will be_made of Nygren's work. Instead,God 
becomes a fullnes~ of corporate commrinion, who lacks nothing. 
and only out of thi~ fufln~s~ does God cr~ate. Geach 
de~elops hii discussion ~y reference to McTaggart's Some 
Dogmas of Religion. In this McTiggart raised· the question 
of whether a freely creitiv~ God can be a person) since 
. -
pr1or t9 c~eation1 outside himself there is nothing·and 
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th~refo~e no other to relate to and ~o God cannot be personal. 
. . 
. This is exactiy t~e problem strict monotheism t~~es ~nd also 
tbe problem for Greek philosophy committed to a unitary 
concept of the Good, that solitary being cannot be relational 
and therefore· canno·t love. Indeed can it live? Geach in 
··response to Mc~'i·aggart ·grants that he is right, relati-on is. 
essenti~l to being, others are ne~essari, -b~i fhat· McTaggart 
.J.s wrong t~· exclud·e God· from this category because ··in so doing 
he has ignored the'·essence of-~rinitarian doctrine. Within 
the Trinitj th~ full life of· love. can exist without the 
necessity for ~ther beings~ The Godhead's being complete 
in itself is safe~uarded by th~ ·Trinity, for without the 
. . . . 
possibility of ~enuine r~lation within God; he_would become 
a·lif~less monad. The Trihity becomes··the supreme teitim6ny 
to the basi~ of being· in relation in love. The effect or 
this comm{tment is that t~e T~inity has to be seen.not as 
ah also-ran tacked uncollifo?:"tably onto conv_er,tional doctrin_es 
.of God. Rither the Trinity exposes the "deeply problematic 
nature of conventibn~l monotheism. Our assumptions need 
rev1s1on, in the light of the requirement for relation, 
life and love, it is monadic th~ology that has·tci be 
questioned not Trinitarian. 
Geach 1~ thus able to write 'if God is iL fact three 
persons ~hose life 1s mutual love, then this is. not tte .way 
God h~ppehs to. be . · .. it is the way God eternaliy arid 
necessarily is, even if to our minds the nec~s~ity is in 
this life obscure' . 24 To contemporaries the Trinity is 
often seen as an erubarrassi.Tlg additi.on to the sinple gospel 
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conse~uent upon the addition of Greek Philosophy.:· Noihing· 
could be furth~r from the tr~th. For the Fathe:rs the Trinity 
was the supreme discovery of the prc~esi bf Re~elati6n 
; . . . 
initiated in ~h~ Incarnation. Only the T~in~ty ex~o~ed the 
depth~ of the rationale of Incarnational th~~lo~y~ that the 
Godhead is himself relation in love and-that this is· the 
high~st category of being. Th~ immense effort e~pended by 
the Fathers 1n the development of the Triniti wai in ordei 
to come to t erm.s with the experience. of. Bevela t ion and . ..-as 
not the conse~uence. of the adoption of Greek. Philosophy, 
. . 
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Christian doctrines. In Geach.'s e~es.the pr~b1~~s that have 
.. 
come to be associated with the Trinity derive from:a radic_al 
co~fusion arou~rl the word 'one' as an expression of~ 
di~ine attrib~te. The problem is tha~ iwo sens~s t~:ih~ 
. . . 
word 'one' ~ay be discerned. Thi~ is the distinction 
between ~uality and quantity. There 1s un.ity in nature -
q_ualitative, and unity in number - ~-J.antatitive. The problems 
. . . 
with the TrinitY only arise when the stres~ is lai~ on the 
latter and not the former. The latte~ is inimical tc 
the Fathefs' formulation, who stressed the ~uali~~~ive 
element of nature, yet it is inv~riablY this latter that 1s 
the object of criticism. 
It ii noted by Geach to~ this erro~ may _be seen 1n 
Descartes' Meditati~ns, fro~ whom he ~ftotes that ihe -·~~~ty, 
simplicity ~nd inseparability of ~od.'s attributes·are 6ne 
of the chief p~rfections I conc~ive him to hav~' • 2 5 For 
Geach, it is-monadic philo~o~hical pre~u~positioris 
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concern1ng the nature ~f Cod, particularly the de~and f6r 
oneness in number~ which create~ the proble~s McTaggart 1s 
c6ncerned ~ith 1 and not Christian doctrine .. In t~rms of 
. . . . 
natur~, characte~ and quality tbe~e is only one God, but 
thisonene.ss, unity ·of character~ is in three persons ·s·hared 
in its entirety .. Thus, as Beach stresses, God is love 
bec~~se the thiee ~erso~s eteinally love each other. 2 6 From 
. . . . .. 
this material Geac~ belieVes he can present a rational 
argumeht to the ~ff~ct.that a monistic God could not be iov~·, 
.which may well be an effective answer to the.question whj 
. . . . 
the dr~ek philosopherS could not allow·their God to love . 
. If it is granted as he has argued, that love is relational, 
. . . . . . . .· .· . 
then· a monistic God could. not be love. It ls not logically 
. . 
po~sibli fcir a unita~y b~ing t6 be reiational except in a 
form of ·divine solipsism which could hardly be described as 
The p o s it i on · c e i ng adopt e d i s t hat 1 o v e · r r i z e s t l~ e 
~xistenrie of ~nothe~ e~en befo~e it is lo~e of the Good,(in 
.. 
onself or another) ~hich it ass~fedly is. Furthermore as 
Geach.notes, the Christian would conten~ .that Revelation's 
message is that God is not such a solitary self-lover. It 
1s an .even greater falsity to suppose that God need create 
beings to fill his need for 1·ove. Such ati error can only 
6ccur wh~re the Tiinity is neglected and it 1s akin to the 
. . . . . 
situatio~ :in whJ..Cl1 lonely human beings take to loving d·o·gs, 
that is the .~rojecilon of one's own need upon a lower level 
of being .. 
From this staidpdint of the priority of the Trinity 
demanded by the lOving nature of the Christian God·, Geach· 
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goes on-to note how it wa~ to Israel that God was revealed 
. . 
as love, and he. then.treats:of th.e question of.love and. 
·self~fulfilment 1n dod and:man, the question ?f ·th~ role of· 
.self-love which 1s dealt with elsewhere in. this ·stud~. 
Geac h has thus put himself . into the· posit ion· of contending;. 
that love as a cosmic force, if it .is to be more than·· 
indiyidual affection~ has to be the nat~ie of God. Only 
thus conceived ca~ love b~ int~lligible and ~his will. invoive 
multiplicity of being with1n the· Godhead~ rn· exactly the 
same posit:i:on stand.s the Roman Catholic moralist, Berna~d 
Hu • · ·& 2,7 arln 0 • ·The link that Geach made· between the·Trinity.and 
the natuie of God as love is preserV~d. HHr i ng' s anaiy.s is 
starts from the viewpoint that· since .God the Father .an.d ··th·e 
Son ~t root are a communion of love, so ·huma~ co~mun1on ~i~h 
ihem is ~bout love.· The N~~ Testament in~~ir~tion for this 
-,.,rould ~e derived from the· wealth· of Johan.nine material. 
John's gospel is well known for its ~ommeri6eme~t with Logos 
doctrine, which commentators ~ave promptly ~~lated.to Greek· 
philosophy. 
Sust as the Logos theme ought hot.to be iinored, nor 
should John's Love theme. Seen thr~ughout the gospel the 
theme is prominent 1n ~he farewell discourses and e$pecially 
in the analogy of the . . 28 v1ne. 
disciples ha~e to abide .in Jesui' love as· b~anches.of a v1ne 
tended by the:vinedresser in the :shape 6f the Father •. The 
key verses expressing the theme of mutual cbmmuLion irt love. 
are, 'As the Father has ioved me; ~o have I l.oved you, 
abide in my love. If yo~ keep my commandm~nts you wiil 
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~bide iL my love, just as I have kept· my Father's command-
mSnts and abide in his love•. 2 9 That John was aware·of.the 
embryonic I Trinitarian'· character of th,i s mater~al was 
indicated 1n t~e previous chapter ~h~~e Jesus says, 'If you 
love me, you will keep my con:.mandments. And I will pray 
the Father and he ¥ill give you anot~er counsellor to be 
with you for ever, even the Spirit of Truth'. 30 
This theme -of 'abiding with' in John, or in the Synoptic. 
presehtation of 'being with' Jesus, forms the b~sis ~f the 
Christian belief of the believer's comm~riion with the 
· to~~inion within the Godhead of L6ve.31 It leads to a 
radical change in the perceived status of man before God. 
Thus immediately aft~r the analogy of the vineyard conies t.he 
presentation of the new commandmen·t ·to 'love .one another· as 
32 
.I have lcved yo~'. The cch~equerice of the bSliever's 
obedience ~esUlts i~ .Chriit'~ saying 'No longer do I call 
you servants; .. but I have c~~led yo~ fri~nds; for all 
that I hav~ heard f~om my Fathej I have n:.ade known to you' .~3 
Goergen's study of frier,dship 1n John makes clear that this 
deVotion must involve JOY and sorrow for both parties and 
t·hat :bE:tween the disciples and Jesus and between each other 
there must be total self giving, 'Greater lov~ . 1. 34 
A~ a reiult of obedience in lov~, the soveieignty of· God 1n 
power over men that categorises them as serv~its is changed 
into friendship, the sharing of being in respect. The moral 
status of God is thus different when seen as ~overeign power 
ot 16ving creator and this distinction will be expanded upQn' 
later. The citation of this New Testament material ~er~ 
does at least giv~ sam~ backing to the thought of the. 
. l 
i 
I 
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theologians that are b~irt~ considered, It shows that the 
qu~stion of beihg as relation i~ love and donsequehtially 
of ·multiplicity in. th~ Godhead does have a New Testament 
foundation. 
This then 1s ~he thought t~at HHrlng will be drawing 
upon. He not e s t he s e t !' e ri d s to t he .e f f e c t that it. i s 1 o v e , 
self giving, meastireless and sacrifici~l that impelled the 
Son ~f God to be~ome broth~r, friend and mast~r, and that 
the disciples can only·be such by participation i~ that 
·style of love. He wr~tes 'Only 1ove for Christ Himself 
- . . -
makes us his dis~iples and imparts to Dur f~ith and hope the 
. . . • I ~ ') 
fullness of po~er unto salvat~on~ J, The imp6rtan6e of the 
introduction Qf the priority of Jove and obedienc~ to Ch~ist· 
will be seeri throhgh6u~ tti~ vork,for it is thi safeguar4 in, 
the considetation of the.role o~ ~elf. To the charge that 
. . . 
Christianity is just· 'heavenly self~shness', ·the Christian 
cari respo~d that whatever. he rec~ives i~ by way o£.joyous· 
gift and not earned merit. Wh~tev.e~ role he ~eceives,· i~ as 
gift from Creator to 2teature a~d thus love o£ Chtist is 
prior .to all ·else as· the ,proper response of ·the· creature to 
the gift towards him· cif t~e Cr~~tor's S~n. HHring himself 
notes how Jesus used the friendship theme ant quotes 
36 John 15:15. . It is in. commentary upon the Johannine material 
. . - . -
that Hkring introd~~es 'the Trinity, 'the prof6und com~unica-
tion between the jather and the Son· is in the et~rnal 
dialogue o£ love. in the. Holy Spirit.'37 
The weight that HHring giveE to the Trirtitarian theme 
can be seen from the provision of a beading entitled 
'P~~ticipation {n the Tri~ne Love of God'~ Three linked 
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themes are apparent, Chiistoc~ntricity, Trinity and Love. 
This is ~hewn in his writing, 'To be in Christ ·and in the 
covetiant of his .love means to be incorporated in the life 
of the Triune God. Only iri Christ do we h~ve access to 
the mystery of the life and love 'or the holy T~in{ty'~38 
This is taken as the springboard for a di~cussion on the 
nature of love and its ~elation to the Greek Eros whi6h 
is ~roperly discussed elsewhere 1n our work·. Al~o, sin~e 
Hiring's work is primarily etticai there is no·ontological 
deVelopment presented. in his use of the Trinity, rather it 
is simply utilised as a kind of she~~ anchor. This is not 
surprising, what is important to note is that the Trinity -
the'life and love within God, ·is taken as· the root for his 
discussion. 
Of ~ll the theologies which plac~ a Trinity center~d 
around love at their heart, argtiably the most famous is 
that· of Au~tistine. ·rt is also notewor~hy in that the 
centrepiece of the· argument stems from fh~ ~nalbgy of 
human love. Bearing 1n mind what has been said concerning 
the Greek philosophi of Eros and its implacabiiity to the 
notion of love within the Godhead, it ~an be seen how radical 
in its context Augustine's thought is, despite.the problems· 
subsequent generations have encountered with it. Augustine 
. . . . . 
does what the Greeks had proved una~le to do., to construct 
ihe life of love within the Godhead ahd credit m~st ~e given 
. . 
for his intent iegardless of opinions concerning his fu~thod. 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
The problem yith the latter is debai~ble but in. commeritators' 
is b~ his · · 
eyesjgenerilly taken to/ inadequate pneumatology, that 1s, 
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the ~anner in which the Spi~it becomes a function of the 
. . . . . . . 
pers6nality of ~he cither two pers6ns of the Trinity, this 
again becoming apparent iri his use of the human analogy. 
That his int~~tion is .to provide three persons in 
the Trin:l.ty is definite. 39 He writes explicitly, 'Thus 
we speak of thtee p~rsons, -~ . ~or is any one Person of 
the t~ree in any res~ect _less than the Trinity itself•. 40 
The pr6blem is that on the ~ne hand Augustine knows he is 
speaking ~niirely of a ·mystery, in which the introduction 
·of a divine· 'person' in a hum!3-n sense .1s problematic: 'Just 
a~ by means of ofir voi~e~; which produie a physical sourid, 
the names~ 'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' can only be 
uttered iri separation, divided by the intervals of time 
. . . . 
,bccupi~d by eacih name. As they exist in their own substance 
·. . . • . . . . ·.41 
the three. are a unity.' · .On tte 6ther hand he is 
adamant that .wh~t is need~d for life is relation, multi-
pliriity in unity~ heQce ~i~ comrnit~men\·t~ the Trinity, 
. yet he· realises tile exp~rience or' the. Godhead must not be 
read directly out of human life. With th~ Holy Spirit, in 
wh~ch lin~~istically the apparent connection to a person 1s 
nowhefe near so evident as with the Fat~er and the Son, 
Augustine i~ clearly uneasy as he writes 'It 1s no easy 
g~estion ~~~t~er the Father 1s ·the source of ...... ~,ne Holy Spirit', 
·42 
an un~~se th~t is ap~arent ~ls~whe~e in-the same passage. 
li~n~e the imp6rtance of Augustine's use. of the htiman analogy, 
fot it is the third category of love between the lover and 
the beloved, which while in the human exper1ence could not 
be called a person is such in the divine according to. 
Augustine. This 'Holy Spirit is the inexpressible commun1on 
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as it were of Father arid ~b~' .43 Whil~ 1n man this quality 
of communion i~.Lot a person in its~lf, it becomes so 1.n the 
sheer harmony of ihe Divine -in Au~u~tine's.opi~io~. 
The use of the hu~an analQgy is limited because an 
image of the Trinity is bein~- s6~ght 1n one man, whereas the 
Trinity is oneness 1n three persons~ .So he writes: 
while a Tri~ity ~f.~en ·cquld nbt be ca~led on~ 
man, in the case of that Trinity-it is call~d 
one God . . · .. Nor again is the Trinity,. a 
trinity in the way in which ~in, that i~age of 
God has thr~~ elements b~t is on~ pe~son .-
In that image of the Trinity the three elements 
are of th~ m~n, they are not the man~ whereas 
in the supreme Trinity itself of·~hich this is 
the image, the thr~e are not of one God but 
there is one God, and they are .three. Fersor1s · 
not one. 44 
Th~ problem is -always that of p~tceiving the ·personal 1n the 
third ele~erit of the 1mage ofcthi Trinity vithin man, that. 
1s the exper1ence of love bet~een the lbver ~nd.the.beloved, 
or to use AugustiLe's other ima~es there js foun~ irr one .man, 
. . 
mind, love, and knowl~dge ind memory, 
. . . .. . ' . . . 4 5 
und~~stand~pg ana w1ll-; 
Ncne the less using this image Augustine h~s piesented a 
str6ng tortrayal of the Trinity to whi~h men can identify. 
. . . . . 
Certainly the love of which Augus~irie sp~aks would be 
alien to the ~opular meaning ~ttached.to:love today, ·for him 
it js attachment or commitm~nt to the Good and not ju~t 
isulated individual affection, 'What ts· this charity . 
but the lovs of Good?'~ 6 Ho~evei, _the commendaticn of 
.relation as the root of bei.ng ±'n a commitment to a supreme 
valu~ lS inescapable. Of love he writes, 'And what is love 
then, but a kind of life which links~ or seeks to link some 
. . .· •. . 47 
two things, the lover and the loved'. ~his 1s the basis 
23 
for ascribing personality to the Holy Spirit, Ho~ever 
inadequately it. __ appears in a human life
1
the love itse;lf 
between the lover and the beloved has the vestiges of a 
. . . 
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personal life and Augustine's thesi~ is ~hat in the Godhead 
t hi s b e c o ::n e s a p e r s on a 1 . 1 i d~ in a 11 i t s f u 1:1 n e s s . · 
As has been remarked before it 1s not the purpose of 
this study to tackle the onto-logical problem of the 'l'rinity 
although an idea of the problems Augustine might rais~ has 
been meritioned. Indeed the altogether larger questions . 
might ~e posited why three? It certainly is not ·propos~d 
to answer this·altho~gh Augustine would have point~d tc 
his analysis of love as threefold and the withess of 
Revelation .. What is established 'though is tha~ ~he Fathers 
of the e~rly Ch~rch, 
of mariy pr~s~ntations) sa¥ _that 1n relation. to Gt~ek ·thought 
the apologeti~ need Yas to explain-th~ ~cssibility of 
relation 1~ the Godhead and that the impe~us for .doing this · 
was tbeir experience of the N~w Covenant. ~he sheer 
revolution inherent in this undertaking is difficult. to 
appr~ciate to those brought up in Tririitarian liturgy an~ 
tieological Trinitariari deba~e~ but for their cont~~pcraries 
the Patristic -d~velopment of the Trinity was the ~ost -radical 
development in: theistic.-o~teil()gY since the. appeanuice of 
monotheism. 
the freshness. of Patristic thougtt, that in .their ·fo.r:rtulation 
of ~~ing within the Godhead, in the creatiori Df the ~oncept 
of the life of the Trin~ty sometbirig utterly nev was being 
p~ovi~ed, this stress 6n·relation as the root cf being. 
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Furthermore although the variou~ Fath~rs used a galaxy 
of t~rms 1n whi~h to ground this relation~hip, whethet in 
. . 
Z6gos ~or phusis, et2.~ love is also portrayed as the core 
b£ this ~elationship ·and 1n Augustine is u~ed as the central 
1mage. Augustine's is the radical development in using ~ 
term so ~uch at odds with the inheritence of Greek Philosophy 
in ~elation to the Godh~ad,.but one i~ which the threef6ld-
ness and life are r~adi~~ apparent. Gregory Nazianzen hy 
contrasi lays th~ stress on causality, on begetter~ be~otten 
aLd b~getting,althbugh in this one maY posit a link to the 
.. · . . . . 48 
creat1veness of love. It has to be appreciated·that the 
Patristic development of this doctrine. has tb be experimental 
ahd tha~. th~· i~mediate adoption of the concept of love lS 
not to be expected, for this concept would only cause 
great~r pr~blens iri relating the ±rinity apologetically 
to Greek thought: In this context it has t6 be remembered 
that Augustine is one .of the later· fath~rs. F~om a different 
period cif churrih history a doctrine of the Trinity founded 
in the nature of God in love can be irovided whose indebte~-
ness at the same ~ime t~ the Fathers is evident. Reference 
is being made to the seventeenth centuri Anglican divine, 
Thomas Traherne .. · 
T~aherne'~ Four Cent~ries are a form. of mystical· theo}o~y,. 
• mystic~l in that the end that is constantly ~eing invoked is 
one of beatittide in love b~tveen man ajd God. In addition 
love is constantly invoked by Traherne as the way to perceive 
the wo~ld.49 Th~ological 1n that a treatise en route is .. 
~rovided of the ·doctrines of the church and alsQ of mitters 
of practical ethics such as the question of neigh~orir.iove. 
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Once again as 1n Augustine, although there are d-ifferences· 
from him, it must be emphasise~ t~at Traherne's identifica-
tion ot God and love 1s not an identification with vacuous 
·sentiment. God. as love is supreme and inexhaustible good; 
He is supremely dedicated to the glory of His cr~ature and 
hence of Himself. Traherne writes 'For if God is love, and 
love be so restless a principle in exalting its object: and 
. . 
so se6ure that it alwayi prom~teth and glorifieth and 
exalteth itself thereby, where will there be ~ny bounds 1n 
. . . "'0 
ou~ exaltation?'J The notion Qf God as love ~s being used 
to guarante~ the. end o~ the one w~o ~s cre~ted; God cannot 
cibandori his creature' because this wo~ld.be to ~b~ndon the· 
n~ture· of himself - love. Traherne's lov~ theology is very 
close to VanBtone's in the sense of love's self-giving to 
the creature and toe 1n.t~e use of artist imagery. For · 
. . 
Vinsio~e the imagery of God as arti~t is greatly devclop.ed~5l 
For Traherne 'God is the· greatest and di-irinest Artist', 5 2 
whose. expression is in creation' I In making bodies' love 
could not express itself, or art ·unle~s . 
Ac~ording to Traherne, love is God's creative acti~ity 
dire·:::ted to the good of the cr'eature' and it perfe~tly 
expre~ses His own nature. God's lo~e makes the creature 
joyous in discovering his own c~eated glory and t~e gl6ry 
of Goa, 'Th~t you are a man should fill you with joys,· and 
make you to overflow ~ith prai~e~' .54 From God being ·love 
key ter~, 
sprinss a creation ethic in which Beatitude is a·/ for 
'The object of love is infirtitely exalted. Love 1s infinitely 
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delightfui to its object, God . 
love ~nd you being the end . 
~ manifests himself to be 
ar~ evidently· its obiect.'55 
(This very positive a~sessment of creatureliness and of the 
·world will be expanded in ournext chapter, "Creation Ethics".) 
To be noted here is the perceptio·n of love's relational 
natu~e, -man 1s.the object, the beloved of God's purposes. 
Traherne then gi~es a consideration of s1n, righie6usn~s~ 
~~d justice, an ~naljsis of the Fall's consequences after 
an a~alysis of_creaticin's intent. From this he provides a 
consideration of Christ's ~ork and this leads to the matter 
of especial concern,· Trinity. 
The model that 1s taken bj Traherne· for the Trinity 
has clear r~ference to the th~ee-fold. im~ge of Augustine 
and it can ·be read as. a d~veloped exposition of the Saint's 
writing sol~ly f~om the sta~d?oint of _a mystical love 
theology~ That this lS_ the case is put clearly in the 
sent~nces wiih which Traherne's conside~~tion starts: 
nod by loving begot his Son.· gor God is love, 
and ~y lov{ng; He begot His love. He is of himsel~, 
~nd by loving.He is what He is, INFINITE LOVE. God 
is not a mixed and compounded Beirig, so that His 
love is one.thing and Hi6self anothei. 56 
God's nature 1s for Traherne supremely only one thing- love. 
F o ~ him that 1 s t h e in t e r p r e t a·t i v e c at e gory from w hi c h a 11 
other attributes must be derived and related. The nature 
o f 1 o v e is a c t i v e an d n 6 t p a s s i v e , ' Be i n g t her e for .e Go d i s 
all Acti .57 .This as the Greeks ~hemselves perceiv~d ~as 
utterly at v~riance with the nature of their God. The 
Greek~ saw love's activity as the expre~sion of lack, and 
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. . . 
that fuliiilment sjm~ly leads to r~st~ Love ¥as seen b~ 
Pl~to a~ a. functiorial virtue serv1c1ng the high~r cat~~ory 
of th~ jor~s~ truth, beauty, go~dness, etc. Thu_s ·'love .. 
lS alwa~s th~ lo~e of something we lack',58 it lE a middle 
~iriue bi which m~ti can .love tr~th and beauti~ but not lov~ 
l~ve. 59 Fr~n this in the Symposium, Plato gives what has 
·beer.:: regarded as his. highest expression of religious 
consciousness . . . . . 60 . -the VlElon of-beauty. Although thls lS 
a gloriotis appiecia~{oh of the triumph of goodness it 
remains pr~judiced when compared to the work of Traherne 
being studied. ·.This i_s beca'..lse the ·personal is strictly 
secondary t9 ~he idea and seems to be subsum~d in it. 
Trahern~t~ .lo~~' which is certainly a living categori 
together with the pe~sonal, is not a feature of the Pl~tonic 
pre~ent~tion, sin~e the notion of life, that is change, 
within the G6~head is iiimicabie t~- the Platonic n~tion of 
perfectiorc. This is the preble~ that the ~hristian _Trinity 
tackles, that of providing life within. the Go~head without 
prejudici~g God, change withoui loss 6f immutability. 
. . . . .. 
Traherne interprets this category of being within the 
Gbdhead solely in terms 6f love - something utt~rly 
~nacc~pt~ble to any of the Greeks for whom love had to be 
parasitic and secondary. 
Hence in the Traherne passage now being ·consideied, 
Gbd's bein~ :love i~ primary a~d this·love ~ar from serv1c1ng 
the Platonic forms is the summation of them. Thus Traherne 
~rites; 'But by loving He is infinitely righteous to Hi~self, 
. ~~- j 
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and to all' and 'Had He bot loved, He had not been what He 
now is, The Go~-of Lov~'.6l Lo~e~s being p~imary is manifest· 
. . 
in:its lively patur~ and hence the Trinity. Th~s, the 
heading of Second Century 39, 'God by loving begot His Son.', 
lea~s to the beading of ihe next, 'In·all L~ve ibere {s a 
.love begetting, a love begotten~ and a love proc~eding'. 62 
This is the Augustinian model, stressing the liveliness 
. . ' 
within the Godhead, 'Which though they are one in essence 
subsist nevertheless in three several manners. , 6 3 ·· Traherne 
accepts t~is human analogy by notirig 'So that i~ all Love, 
t[).e TrinitJr. is .clear'. 6 4 ·That the mysti"c'al rather than 
the philosophical -mind find~ the Trinity easier to compre-
bend, possibly because tte nature of love is experimental 
~nd not analjtical; 1s s~en in 'Where Love ·i~ the Lover, . 
. Love streaming fro~ the Lover is the Lover; the Lover 
streaming from himself, and existing in another Person·', 
followed by 'This person is 
. . 65 
the Son of God'. 
The message is repeated thai the Trinity, that is, 
the specific threeness of the relation within the Godhead, 
is derived from the·nature of love, which is the nature of 
God: 
In all Love th~re is some Produc~r, so~e Means, 
and some End: all these being internal .in the 
thing itself. Love loving is ~~e Producer, and 
that is.th~ F~tber: iove produced is the 'Me~ns., 
and ~hat iE the Son: For Love i~ the means by 
whi6h a lover lov~tb. The Eid of.these Means 
is Love: for it .is love by loving: ·~nd that ii. 
the Holy Ghost.· 
Traherne presents th~ classic th~ee per~ons 1n the o~e nature 
stance, ~ut where he goes fuither than many lS ln tying 
·this one nature entirely ibto the natur~ of love. Trahern·e 
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i~ maKing the link at the. very de~pest level between love 
and beitig: 
Fb~.by loving Lov~ attaineth itself ~nd being 
That·Love is the.end· of itself·, and that God 
lo~eth .th~t ~~ might b~ Love~ is as evid~nt t~ 
him~that ~o~sider~· spiiitual ~hings, ~s the 
Sun. Bec~us~ i~ is imp6ssible tbe~e ~hould be 
a higher end~ or ~ better'piopose~ ; .. vh~t 
furthei ·can ~~ proposed then the. fuost blessed 
arid periect life? ... by bein~-t~ve God 
receiveth~· and is the End of·all~ . 66 
There fbllow ~ever~l passages devot~d to the sheer JOY of 
love, in whi~h.th~ relatiori~l and liveiy asp~ct of love 1s 
tied to Beatit~de. Here c~n be read such comments .. as,. 
. . . . . 
'For Love i~.the most .delightfuL of all.employnents, All 
theobject~·of Love.ar·.::· deiightful to·it, and Lcve 1s 
delightfill .to al: its ob~ect·~··; 6 7·a.nd, 'Love lS so divine 
and perfe~t i thing, that it·is worthy tci be the very end 
. . . "8 
and being of the D~i{y 1 ~c "1.1 ;~f'p s-'-e...,s h_ _J_ -.- - w "" utterly from 
· . 1 o v e a n:l ~o; h &. t · 1 s not 1 o.v ':' · :l i e ·s , ' E y L o vi n g a Sot: 1 d. o e s 
propagate ~nd beget aid 'God is. present -oy Lo-v-e 
alone . . By Love alone He liveth and fe~leth in o~her 
persons ·~ by Lo~e alone at~ain a~cther self' .. 7° rhere 
is no escaping t~e great vitality and ~armth of Traherne's 
presentation, which accct:nts too for the ac6ompanying 
positive evaluation of the ~ororld., 'So that whosoever loveth 
all ~ankind~ be ·enjoy~th all.the goodness of God to the 
.whole world: ·. ·, with all whom lie. is present by Love, 
which lS :thebest mannerofp:cesence that is.possicle:'·7l 
The c~itic may ~e~haps still ask 'Why' and Traherne 
may di sap~oint him ln not p:covid.ing a "proof" .. There 1s 
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much here that is presented rather in the lirie cif statement 
than argument. It has to be made clear that for every 
Chr.istian who has taken ·rove as his final catego~y there· 
are othets who have taken ~he Zog~~·~hethe; as·~'ihe ·word' 
o~ as 'reason', and ~t{ll otheri ~hci ha~e ~pted f6r ju~tice 
In this· 
work it ii riot in~ended t~ enter the~e ontologicil debates 
ai to· whether love is aciually primary or wh~ther God is 
actually Trinity, rather it i~ intend~d to assess some o~· 
the issues thai are raised if a: Trinitarian God ~i lo~e ·i~: 
assumed. ·This chapter is preparat~ry in that it does 
instance the very considerable body of.opin:lon.r~aching into. 
the roots of the biblical tradition that does ~upport s~ch. 
a position. It shows too that the adci.ption of· such .a· 
. . . 
. . .·. 
. . 
p o s it ion i s c on s o nan t with a commit ni en t t o a r e I at i on a l 
view of life, the itress on persons as .ends ·that is not so 
readily ~isibie 1n Greek ph~losophy. The ~doption of a 
. Trinitarian God of love, it is held 1 tives strength in a · 
manner not otherwise avail~ble· to those who hold to ·the 
. . . ' . 
supreme importance of the personal ·and to the role of love 
1n the fulfillment of the person
1
by hoiding that this itseif 
1s the supreme character of being. 
From this viewpoint the 1ssues are raised of how men· 
respond to .this love and its activity in th~ worl'd. Since 
this is an ethical stuay this leads· to-the issue 6f self 
love~ as ielfishness or as a justified~~e~ire for self~· 
fulfiliment, and to the role of univ~rial or nei~hbour love, 
for ci~arly our adoption of.this starice is,to iay love is· 
more than. mere seXual preference for indiv.iduals .t.hat 
··-· -· 
.. -: .. : ~ .· . 
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Stendahl makes it out to be.7 2 This ~s th~ questi6~ of.love· 
as Commandment. On God's side by contrast the q.l!-estion has 
.to be fQced of how does a G~d relate .t6 ~ii 6re~tu~es; - ~~ 
. . . ·. - . 
many of the models hitherto used stressing God's Wiii··and 
power, ~is omnipotenc~, omniscience a~d impa;sibility :in·. 
. . . . .. 
fact accord with the natu~e of lov~? Thus the adoption of 
love a~ the fundam~ntal explicat~v~ category of b~ing may 
well lead to a reassessment of conventional do6tri~e~ of 
God arid thus the issues of the chapt~r Freedom~ Grace _and 
Providence. Prior tQ this,consideration must .be· given to 
_the actual int~pt of creation, _the end a lovi~g God- ~esires, 
CreatiQn Ethics. 
As a foretaste of the ~ssues to b~ tackled 1 it is 
~ppr~priate t6 ~onsider Trahe~ne's own consideiatipn 6f ihe 
bala.nce between universal and -self-lov.e since this .is :a:·n 
assessment directly consequential u·pon the adopt ion of a 
world view in which r~lation, Triniti and ~he ~u~reme ·value 
of love are assumed.· As will be seen ~n the chapter on 
Self-love, the adoption of _love theology in ielatiori to the 
. . . 
Trinity' l~ads to an ideal bal~rice b~tw~en self arid·otb~r : 
concern. That is, love ·bein~ by its nature other 6oncern, 
. . . . . 
it . a l s 0 g i ve s j 0 y and . f u l f' i ll me n t :t 0 t he o"t her '. and 
entitles him to consider himself. For the bel6ved will_wish 
the lover's own joy to be complete, as the lover ~ooi d~sires 
the beloved to .be joyful: This is. precisely _Traherne 's· own 
position,. 'By loving others you live in ot~ers .to receive 
"t I 73 .-~ . The 'it' being the _end ~f Beatitude, when all will 
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be .fulfilled in love, 'For according to the mea.sure of your 
lbve to others ~ill you be happy in them . •· The. more. you 
love men, the more d~lightful you will be to God, and the 
more delight you will take iri ·God, and the more you will 
enjoy Him. ,7 4 Proper self-love "is thus extolled as the 
creature's proper end in enjoying the' blessings of. the 
created world, 'A man should prize the blessings :.,hich he 
knoweth.'75 S~lf-16ve is proper as th~ creatures response 
to God in his world, while 
It is true that self love 1~ dishonorable~ but 
the~ it is when it is ·alone. And self-endedness. 
is mercenary, but then it is when it endeth in 
oneself. It is more glorious to love oth.ers, and 
more d~sirable, but by n~tural ~e~ns to be attained. 
(That is ~ia ~proper estimation of self RNF). 
That ~6ol (Self-love ~NF) must fi~st be filled, 
that shall be made to overflow.. 76 
It is ~bsrird in Traherne 1 s eyes no~ to love on~self for 
that is the sti~ulus. to love others; wben self and other are 
all seen 1n God~ f6r 'God by rational methOds enabled us to 
. 
love oth~rs ~etter than ourselves, (but) . · . Had we not· 
loved ourselves at all, we could never have been obliged to 
·1oveariy thing. So that self-love is the ba~is bf all ·love. ,77 
Self-love is thus proper when seen as a gift. of God to 
the creature and enables a prop~r estimate of life to occur 
'So that ·God by satisfying my .self-love, hath enabled and 
~ngaged me to lo~e others.'7B This will all be developed ~n 
detail later but here it ~nable~ the practical consequences· 
of Traherne's commitment to this ontology df love t~ be. 
estimated. In that it centres around relation and the 
question of the fulf~llment of ends for perscins, it clearly 
relate.s to the .pattern .of life wit~in th~ ~rinity~ where~y 
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the m~mbers ther~of are both devoted to one another yet 
perfedtly seif £tilfilled --'~ecause He is Love~ nothing 1s 
~ .. . . 
more glorious ·than His seJ,f-love. '79. ·This relates back. to 
the discussion already· had on the question of need· a:nd 
mutuality in ~el~tionship~, both iri tod.~nd man. That 1s 
the viewpoint that the natur~ ot love is.such that it is 
impossibl~ t6 speak of a monadic God of Love. Outka in 
his review of agap.e - God's l.ove, tackles .this question of 
the rol~ bf mtituality, is _it esseritial to God's love and 
if so 1s he dependent upon men? 80 Outka notes how agape 
1s generally ~ha~act~rised._as a love independ~nt bf the 
subject's ·particular. feelings;. poss-essing constancy and 
being un~l terable. · I·t· is thus a regard for a human bein"g> 
whether ~y God. or maniby virtue of hi~ existin~ ~ the theme 
of men as ends 1n themselves.· On the positive side this 
means that the offer :of agape is not wholly dependent upon 
the other's reaction, God does and men ought to love one 
anothe~ regardless of respbnse. On the negati~e s·id~ the 
danger of this typ~ of_argument 1s that if the love is· 
given rega~dless df ~esponse, what account o£ the ~eality of 
the other is being offered? If the response of the other 
does.not aff~ct agape, he is loved nonetheless, does this 
not pre j ud:i.ce the· int egr i:ty of the . other? This _quest ion 
Outk~ addresses~ 
. . 
Howev~r,.first· an excursus intended to _illustrate .this 
problem of agape in practice, and to posit· the possibility 
that su6h a problem only arises ~here the doctrine of the 
Trinity has not been used .. The subject taken, who will be 
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encountered at several places in tb s st~dy, 1s An~ers Nygren, 
in. his greatly -~nfluential work Agape and Eros. Nygren 
stresses that· agape J.S '.spontaneous r. and .'.uncaused.'. He. 
warns that this is not to say it is arbit~ry, on the contra~y 
it is God's nature, rather it means it has.absolu~ely· rio .. · 
reliance on human merit. 81 But to say (as all would agree) 
that agape is not dependent on human leg~l merit is not. io 
say that human b~ings have no value in themselves~ Yet 
. . 
Nygren cons.iders tha~ t~e only ground for buman valu~ might. 
be works of merit. ~hese are rejected by Nygren ~nd rio 
·other. ground for 'ca.u.s ing' God' s· agape is then allo.wed. In 
other words, .nothing whatsoever on creation, Outka'B agape 
as love ior a being qua existent is replaced by' Nygren•·s 
agape as God's simply loving. T h u s . he i s . en a hl e d t o w r it e , 
'Agape is the direct oppo~ite of that love whi6h is. called 
out by the worthiness· of its object . The man whom God 
loves has not any value in himself. His v~l~e consist~ 
• • · . I 82 • 
s1mply 1n the fact that God·loves hlm. Th1s may be 
right in the narrowest sense of contingency_, in that mgn . 
. . . . . . . 
does not have eiistence independent from God's sustainin~ 
grace, but in Ny~ren's use the possibility of ·the harcio~isa-
tion of sustaining grace with the notion o£.valtie inherent 
in human beings 
1 
by virtue of their creation by Godli.s·· not· 
allowed. 
Nygreri denies this option 1n ~riting, 'that the i~ea of: 
the infinite value of the human soul· is not a.basic 
Christian idea at all .• ,83 Is riot such l~nguage fundamentally 
~isleading b6th to the nature of Tri~ity·and Cr~ation, e~en· 
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if 1n the narrowest sense a meaning can be allowid? In such 
a 1 i g h t r e ad ~ ' I-t 1 s not that ·Go d 1 o v e s that w hi c h 1 s 1 n 
itself ~orthy·to be loved, but, on the contrary, that which 
is in itself without .value acquires value by the fact that 
it is th~ object of God's· love'. 84 This it 1s contended 
takes no·account of creation. While men were not, clearly 
they had ~o value, but one~ they were (cie~ted), ·then it 
becomes impossible to write 'that which is in itself 
without value'. It seems to be a contra~iction in terms 
for Nygren to posit a created being being in existence 
without value. Indeed it migh{ be said to be a form of 
radical dualism, a form of Gnosticism,· something which . 
Nygren would be it p~ins to deny_ to be sure. The argument 
is simple. It is heing said, to say 'it is' of created 
beings is to give them value and this- Nygren 1s d~nying. 
Clearly ~ certain theology Df th~ Fall is influential 
for Nygren, thus 'When man has f~llen a~ay from God, he is 
wholly lost, and Of no value .at all; ,B5 However, in addition 
it is argued that the non use of the Trinity accentuates 
the disa~ter. Agape is not_seen by Nygren as relational. 
Sine~ ther~ is no use o~ the Trinity, the essential nature 
of respons~ and reciprocity of love mentio~ed in Vanstone 1s 
. not apparent in Nygren .. Hence Agape becomes. simply .a one way 
force outward from God which does not encounter the human 
~s a real i~dividual, - ~e 1s simply a vessel ·for God's love. 
. . 
Indeed a portrait of a di vi.ne Narcissus appears· who uses 
men to love ·himself since he lacks relation in ~imself. 
Nygren would no doubt regard this a~ perjorat~ve. · Hovever~ 
he is at great pains to ~mphasize the utt~r independence of 
36 
God's agape from man's own love. Thus 'Man's .... s_el·f. g~ v~ng 
to God is ~o mo~~ than_a response; . . it is but a 
reflection of God's own love•; 86 or, 'He has notQing·or: .. 
his own to give; the love which he shows his neighbour is 
. . 87 
God's agape in him.' . 
How precarious a poiition Nygren's is, be~omes a~parent 
when he considers the New Testament material which itself 
come~ close~t to the message of the Triniti. Thus in 
considering John,who on the one hand presents-agape as the 
relation bet~een the Father and .the Son and on the other 
extols agape as the love between the brethren; Nygren is 
88 
most unhappy. He concludes that ~he 'Johannine concep-
tion .may be said to .mark . . the tra~sition .· in which 
the Chri_stian idea of love i~ determined~.not~ by pure agape~ 
but by eros and agape As gygren himself asks· 'If· the 
love of th~ Father foi the Son is the pattern 6f all agape~ 
it is impossible to avoid the q_uestion: ~How can agape retain 
its natuie as essentially 'uncaused'? '.The Fa t!1er. 
himself loveth you, because. you have lov~d me. and. have-
. believed'. In result, the Johannine conception of A~ape 
begins to take a somewhat hesitating attitude, between 
. . 90 
'caused' and 'uncaus~d' love'. 
Herein is the nub Qf the debate. Nygren com~lains that· 
John's perception t~at recipro~iti ~nd ielation is. th~·.nattir~ 
_of love-within th·e.Godhead prejudices Nygren's co-nception·. 
of God's uncaused love. He is right, it does, but rather 
than admit the ptobiem for him~elf, there is hi~ condemna-
.tion of Johri as a fatal mix of eros and agape; Thus where 
the New Testament. reac~es the point where the rol~ of 
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relation 1n love both withi~ God and consequently in the 
relatiori to man:is highlighted, here Nygren condemns it by 
. . . 
his demand for 'unc~usedness' .. Nygren has no role for 
relation to play in. his. concept of Gop.'s uncaused love, 
thus the Triniti far from revealing the r~al nature of 
being in love is a problematic enigma. Consequeritly the 
opportunity Nygren has for establishing a. conception. of 
agape's pToper relation to men.as real beings is nev~r 
develoPed;' instead their own independent existence is 
prejtidiced. The free response. that 1s usually held to be 
vit~l in any relation of loye i~ of no importance to Nygren, 
'Man's'l~ve to God, in the Christian sense, .must be a purely 
the6centric love~ in which all human.choice is extluded. 
because God's 'uncaused' lov~ has overpo~ered him and 
constrain~~ hi*, ~o that he can do noth{ng else than l~ve 
God·.' 9l In the analysis of love which this ·chapt.er adopts 
this view of Nygren's must be condemned a?· not being love 
at all .. Using .the analysis. of Vanstone and Oman ·seen 
elsewhere in·this work, founded upon a relational and 
herice Tririitarian ~iew of love, the role of a genu1ne and 
free response of man to God is vital ~o the nature of ag~pe. 
This is the moment to return td Outka whose discussion 
on mutuali~y is .on just this point~ Outka notes·hbw ·the 
l~ck o~ a role for tesponse ~nd reciproci~y i~ evident in 
other writers an·d he cites Reinhold ·Niebuhr.9 2 There ·is .. a 
lihk here .bet~een thos~.who stress self-sacrifice· as·~ll 
and self~love as fatal and those to whom response 1s 
unimportant, this it is contended is to .dest~oy th~ self 
·(for which see chapter four). Dutka notes ho~ the critics 
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. and 
.have res~6rided with the stress. on mutuality,/he cites 
D.D. Wiliiams ~~om ~e con~ider l.n the self-love ch~pter;93 
Outka sees .that .for ·these c·ritics, ideally, mutuality is-
more than th~ calc~lation of reciprcical advantage. 
Kierkegaard and ~ieb~hr may t~nd t~ r~g~rd.~elf-love as 
using the other as ~ means of self-aggr~ndis~ment but 
exc~ssive self~iaerifice is paradoxically doing just the . 
. same. In loving relationships~ the other will be best 
served by ~ pro~er e~tim~tion nf one~elf and.ihdeed the 
other will desire in lo~e the lover's own happiness. This 
l.S the message ot ·T~ah~r~e whi.ch stemmed f~om a beli~f l.n 
. . . l· . . . . . 
. . 
a God who .in hi~self perfectly exemplifies the balance 
between sa~rifi~i~l ~n~ seif-iove united in joy, hence the 
{mport~nce of the se~f-love issue to this suudy. A diiemma 
l.S thus evident: lovs demarids.-fre~ response, Y~t if ~osited 
of God, this makes him ciependent on man.. As will be evident 
elsewhere in this work, it l.S held that t~is dilemma_, the 
tragic element of creation l. s the gamble. that God as 'love 
risks l.n creation. Tbis i~ particularly the point of the 
Vanstonian analysis. ~oneth~less a distinction can be 
used which helps to e~s~ the dilemma, although it also 
points ~o the poignant elemerit of the tragedy. 
This di~tinctio~ is t~at between ·availabilit~. and 
mutuality and.its purpose is designed both to pr~serve the 
freedom oi ih~ lo~ers,:whil~ iri God's ca~e freeing him from 
b~ing contingent upon the creation. Hence the necessary 
prior condition for iove's e~istenc~ is availability. God 
always seeks to love his c rea_t ion, He is always a Yailable. 
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However response l.S not al-.vays· offered, mutuality· is not 
·always pr~sent~b~t this l.S not to say God is not lo~ing~ 
Love to be love l.S not dependent upon resp6n~e-tho~gh t~ b~ 
fully fulfilled it l.s. Love l.S a complex whi~h c_ari ~e 
s~en on at least these two levels of recipro~ated and 
and 
unreciprocated love. The latter is certainly lov~,/in God's 
case it is still a complete co~cern tor the-fate of·the 
other. However it b~comestragi~. Love that 1s unreciprocated 
will still be love>that .is concern, but tragic iri.that it 
lacks the o~erwhelming joy of fulfillment in the response·· 
of the other, Thus in offering B relation of love, wheth~r 
bet~een men themsel~es or men and God, t~e lover of~e~s the 
beloved.~ certain power over the lover. Tbis i.s the·essence 
of the 'need' theology of Hume, But,er and Bonhcieffe·r. It 
1s developed at length 1n Vanstcne. It is clear tp him 
that the love. of God as r.rclch as of men. must co·nforn t-o.· 
this reqriirement. Th~s God has bestowe~ ~ power ·over· 
himself to Creation - this would be utterly inimical to 
Nygren'~ agape, that it should be in·any mannef dependent.· 
upon man's response. Vanstone writes of 'the ppwe~ over· 
itself which love gives to its object ~ay b~ . . the 
power to make angry (the Wrath of. God ~ RNF 94 ) ~ or to 
make glad . .. the power o{ affect~ng the on~ who· lo~es. 
. . 
It creat-es a new vulnerability. in the one who 1-ov·es 
Whete there i~ no such surrender or· gift oi ~ower the 
• • I 0 5 fals1ty of love 1S exposed. ~ . 
The power of a love ethic and theology 1s ·founded both 
1n philosphical reflection such as Vanstone provides upon 
. > . 
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t~e nat~re of loye, and in theol~gic~l reflection upon the 
. . 
.· . . .. 
. Christian ~cure~ material seen in Augustine, Traherne ~nd 
. . . . . . 
. H" .. 
· an.rtg. The philosophf~l~ads t6 the adoption of persdnal 
. . 
·and. communal categories. for life linked by love .. The 
. . 
.the6lo~y sees thi~ ~s th~ paiterh 6f ·absolute being itself-
the Trinity~ The traditioris that hiv~ been invoked are 
both old an~ nev. It is ce~tainly not a 'new trerid'. It 
is ~ignificant in this respect that it has been felt 
possible nat to mehtion .Flet~he~ and Situati6ri Ethics. 
This certainly doei see itself as a 'contemporary' et~ical 
and theol6gicai expre~sion of the love ethic, .indeed it sees 
itself a~ the ethic of love. 96 There is no intention of 
. discussing. Fletcher ln de·pth. Thi"s lS because he presents 
his work ~s i 'tak~ it or leave it' option.97 His book 
c~~not 0hter into ~ialogue wiih others .and lov~ 1s turned 
into such a totally all embracin~ category that the impr~ssio~ 
is gi~en .that to deny Situation Ethics is {o deny. love in 
Fletcher's judgecie~t. Thus he.i~ ~urpri.singly polemical. 
Here there is rio wish to ~ake love so precarjousli depende~t 
upon one ~articular method. In~tead an effort has· been 
made to link t~in themes of relation and Trinity within 
love through is wide a variety of sources as possib~e. 
. . 
Where thi~ studi db~s t~ke-a conteriti6us stand is in the 
affir~atipn th~t ihe disiin~tiv~ness of C~ristian theology 
. . . 
and ethic~ l{e~ in its placing love ~t the.rooi of being, 
thus empha~izi~g personal and relati6nal nature. 
It i.s contended that love ~s the root of being forms 
the heart of the revelatio~ in Christ and leads to the 
. . . 
radical doctrine of the Trinity. Although contentious, 
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such a stand js hardly ~ovel~ JacQues Maritain, a classic 
representat{ve .<?1 Catholicism, makes this clear. He speaks 
not of love ~but of chaiity, ¥hich teim preserves Grid's. lov~ 
from association with senticentality~ He h~ppilj ~dopts a 
v2ew wher~in Be~titude, ~nothe~ very tr~ditional term, is 
s e en 5. s t h e end o f man , t hat i s t he ·1 o vi If g r e 1 at i on . b e t vT e e n 
·God and man. Here perhaps erie may identify the key ~s to why 
historically spe~king,it is the Catholics who have ~e-ered to 
a metaphysi~ of love while ~rotestantism.has Yeered to a 
metaphysic of reasori, for Maritain links such a metaphfsic 
of love clos~iy into t~e experience of worship, ~evotion 
and p:rayer. Thus he claims -~or Christianity that grace 
enabl~s.m~n to liv~ th~ li4e of God and that the my~tic~l 
~·. 
tradition ~itnesses to. this apparent extravagance; 
Beatitude is thus ~utual love and it is c~rt~inly not 
Nygren's unidirectional agape. ~t respe~t~·the genuine 
integrity of the iLdividual hunan per~on as created, 'becaus~ 
-God thus.wished it, (and)·.~eeded our. love as the·ir{end ~eeds 
. . : : . 1 'oS the love of h2s fr2end, who 1s another se f. ~ Maritain 
s~es thi~.as manifest i~ the Old Testament, 'I love those 
who love m~,99 and fully maniSest ih those Johannine 
v.rith which 
passages pr~viously cited, I Nygren ~as most uneasy, 
. . I 
.'He who loves me ~ill be loved by my father 1 100 •· ln 
Christianity, Maritain holds:that the whole moral lif~ ls_hung 
upon this'ch~rity vith the_double precept to love God and 
neighbour. This. stress on charity was a scandal to ancient 
philos6phy yet it is fundamentai, because in Maritain's eyes 
it speaks to th~ 7hole man ~nd not just to the intellect ~n 
the manner of the rational ethiqs of Aristotle, the Stoics 
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arid the Epicureans. Maritain presents the: clai~ that the 
Christian love.~h~ol6gy alone appeals to the highest part. 
.. . . 101 
of the .wbole. man. He cites Aquinas .as perceiving this· 
difference ~n his comment that the new law carr~es the 
. - . 102 
p~ecept of God into the heart.-
work of the 
Conversely the/recent Pr~testant author N~wlands' 
on the subject reveals the di£ferepce in stress.l03 
D~s~ite the title of the book, it treats only half of the 
subject. It is a worthwhile study of lov~ i~ action, and 
becomes·a review of Christ's work, but it has·very little 
consideration of the ontology of love, ·i'ts pasEivity. Thus 
compared _with the Catholic provision of a beginn~ng in the 
Trinity and an end in Beatitude, there is only a· middie,; 
Christ's r~~eemirtg work for men. A lo~ oi strength i£·. 
thereby lost, ~n that Trinity 1s but briefly covered~ and 
Eeatitude not at all.lOh The focal point of Christian 
thedloiy is said to be the Goipel of God ahd men's approprla-
tion thereof.l05 What is actually said ~oncerning the 
action of God ~s acceptable but in what is ~issing funda-
mental ~ssues are ignored. It is those issues of the natare 
of men and of God, :and of their commun.ion •rith one anotr,er· 
wt~ch are the coniideration of thiE study; Stemming fr::Jm 
this has been a consider~tion 6f t~e basic structures of 
being provided by this chapter. 
con~ideration will .be gi¥en to the ~atuie of ~ct~ai crea~i~n_, 
man and t~e end intended for hi~, ~nd the relati6nship 
between this end and his ~resent state, qr his evolution and 
also stories of the Fall. 
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CREATION ETHICS 
It will probably be clear to the reader that this author 
is not comLiited to autonomous ethics, in the sense that 
e~hics tan be derived from its~lf withou~ any ieference to 
othe~ categories, Rather, it is h~id that particul~r 
ethicai stances are controlled by adherence to particular 
world ~iews. · Everi tte supporters of ethical autonocy are 
bdriditioned by this,·~ it is just that their world Vlew is 
fitted aro~nd the de~and for et~ic~l autoncmy .. In the 
Christian ~ense it bas teen~argued that the joctrine of 
Trinity and of God as lo~e has -a definite effect upon eth~cal 
vieT,rs~ The same mu~t be sai.d Of tlie doctrine of creation 
.and this can be. seen at several ievels. ~ At the simplest, 
it is .. reasonable that one 1 S beliefs conce:::-nin.g :10W the 
world ie, its nature~ ar~ reflected in one's ethital stan1-
.. point. Note the introd~ction oi 'beliefs', the ~ctual_facts 
of nature a:::-e not the subject per se but man's perc~ption of 
those facts. The wrirld view that ·conditions an ethical 
stance is not itself nec~ssarilj 'fact' but is a particular 
. . 
compendium of perceptions doricerning the world itselt (bo~), 
and ideali concerning 6ne's urider~tanding of that world 
(why) • Thus doctrines of ~reati6n are ~omplexes compo~ed of 
'how' and 'why' co6ponent~ and in this conceptual mix have 
their effect on ethics. In ttis manner positive and negative 
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assess~~nts of man's nature lead to diff~ring·ethical stances .. 
This is the qti~stion of the Fall which ex~rcis~s ·very con-
siderable co~trol over theological ethic~; biffer~ng 
perceptions of' the nature of this matt~r ~e~d to .very 
di~ferent ethical stances. 
Doctrines of the Fall have traditionaliy be~n varied. 
However, in the last 150 yea~s a n~w factor having a very 
dramatic affect on Creation Ethics has ha~ a particular 
influence upon the doctrin~ of the Fall. This ·is the rise 
in evolutionary theory. Without wanting to ~dept any 
particular viewpoint ~oncerniag the • + • .co. SCleDvl.~-lC 1 f E. C t S , .. 0 f 
evolution, the broad principle will be· .adopted ¥ithout. 
argament that in no straight f6rward setiSe ~an· the Genesis 
tto~y be regarded as factual. It may co~tain "iigniii~int 
truth~ for man's ielf understanding but as historic fact·, 
for instance th~t the1·e l·rere once only. t'fi"O pE;ople, ·AdaiL .an~ 
Eve, it will not be accepted. Instead \he ethical cons~-
quences of the adoption of a theology of ~reation which 
enbr~ce~ the basic principles of evoluti6n will be ~xamined. 
That is a commitment to man's being part ~f a_ wider Wb~le, 
the world, ~hich is not itself a static ~yste~ btit ~ d~namic 
organism. Consideration of the issu~ will th~s occur on two . . . 
fronts~ the acceptance of man as ·an evol~ing orgarii·sm, and 
the effect of that acceptance on the ethiial consequences 
of creatioti; arid the consideration of hd~ ~hi~ ca~ ·be tied 
into the theological understanding of man's ~nd, his purpose. 
. . .· 
~his ~ill involve study of th~ concept of Beatitude. 
A start wili be made by a presentation of what ~ill 
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be taken as a base text on the ~ubject. Already studied ~n 
the previous chapter this will be the recent work bf Canon 
Vanstone, the particula1~ Irterit of which is to present a 
dev~loped study of Creation Ethic.s ~~ilt around the basic 
prelliise that God is iove. In so doing Varistone tackle~ 
both the theological-and evolutionary issues. Vanstone 
effects a remarka~le harmonisation between an acceptabce 
of evolu~ionary theory and the consequential- ~evelopment 
of a particular tpeology of creatio~. Vanstone had been 
brought up in the conviction that tte church exist~d 'to 
. 1 
the glory at God.' . This notion stems fro~ the tradition 
~~com~assing Beatitude_. In adopting this notion a~ the end 
of man
1
Vanstone ·::..s allying h:i.Jr.self to the-particular tradi--
tibn that man'~ end 1s the glo~y of God. Further exponents 
of this traditior will be conside~ed in due course, for it 
" 
lS a· tradltion of great an-:.iq_uity.c. [~spite :his l~Om::nitme!:t 
to such· a .,demonst::-able tradition, Vansto~e discovered 1n 
his own ministry that_ he was. findi1:g it increasingly 
difficult-to interpret often mundane and trivial work as 
servicing the. 'glory ·of God!. Vanstone had been brought up 
:Ln an atmosphere in which, firstly, t~e visible Church was 
closely identified to.the idea of the glory of God. Secondly, 
he had in his o~n pirception, in hi~ upbringirig, be~n able 
·to 1' t tl' .·, 1 3 · lYe up o · ns 1nea . Two fa~tors though bro~e t~is 
spell. for him. Or the one hand the ~ppearance of t~e ~e~fare 
state had re~bv~d what Vanstone had seen 1n his fither's 
ministry as the church's pione~ring role in caring. Allied: 
to this on the other hand came the groi-rth of re:igionless 
L.,... 
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Ch~istiariity associated with Bpnhoeffef and Tillich, which 
seemed· to disassociate the glQry of God from the ~ark of the 
institution. 
For Vanst6ne this discovery that he co~ld no lori~er. J . . 0 . 
identify the grand concept of the glc·ry of God vith muc·h · 
dhurch work pr6voked a crisis which led to a revaluation 
of the doctrine of creation. In short he was led• to iee , . 
God's cre~tive activity in the whole of human experience 
! 
an~ .this .had for him a profound effect on the nature of 
c~eation and of God's acts. Thus: 
Whiie I tould b~lieve that God is glori!ied in 
some sublime expression of human cireativity, I 
f6und it less easy to believe that He.is glori-
fiei in a.freshly painted wall. 1t was at this 
humble a~d even .trivial level of 6reativity 
that the new Church lived. 4 
Vanstone also saw that the distinction 1n activity between 
church and secular work was provlng hard to maintain. 
Hence 'The typical choris~er i~ the C~~rch w~s a perso~ 
alr€ady i"nterested. in. music.' 5 If God .ras glorified .by 
I . 
his ~reati~h it had to be in much more th~n the church 
activities Van~t~ne witne~sed, for in his experience_he 
.could not see a worthwhile contrast between the church and 
the .environment it ser~ed. The escape from this dilemma 
Vanst6ne fbund in acc~pting the continuity between sacred· 
aqd· sec~lar and by re-evaluating the s~cular. This 
. . . 
re-evaluation of tte church's relation to the secular .in~ 
~ . 
Varistone's own ex~erience led di~ectly to the: re-evaluatioh 
I 
of the doctr~ne of .... ~ crea.v.LOn. Vanstone wri tesl 'This ·truth 
could be expressed in religious terms by saying that, 
.I 
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whatever else the church was, it was cert~inly a part of 
the creation; arid therefore that it must sha~e whatever 
impo~tanc~ might be~ong to ~r~ated things i~ gene~al. ' 6 
At the.time V~nstone. began to see this ~ositive ~ink 
betw~eri chu~ch and cr~~tion, there .was in the outside world 
ari increasing concern for nature and ec616gy. Vanstone 
began to see in his own work a ~arallel to the work of the 
. . . . . - . . 
co~servationists- he felt the~ to be ikindre~ spirits'. 7 
Although ~ot develop~d at iengt; in his book in.the philo-
sophical senie~ it certainly is in the theological, by th~ 
realisation that man is _6nlj a part of nat~re. It ste:n.s 
from th~ Bibiical injunctions 6f ste~ardship, and Paul's 
. . . . ·. . 8 
therr..e ·.of c·eat·J.on' s renewal. · ·After generations in which 
mail· has tended to' dist~nce himself from creation, t:!'lus 
-allo~i~g unb~idled exploitation, the ~ealisation i~ growing 
that not or:.ly dc·es man depe:~c on it for his existence and 
. . . - . 
that if abused it r~coil.:; on man, but ~hat' this who·leness 
is part of G~d'~ order. In philosphic~l te~~s the old 
position was repre~ented .by Kant's assessment of meri ~s 
. . . 
intelligents, being.tbe only e~ds iri themselves a~d the 
:r'est of creation .ranking as means; 'eYen those externals· 
whereof .the existence iests not on our will but depends on 
n~ture have ~~ ir~a~iorials; a relative value only ana are 
u~~d.as means and lnstr~~en~s· for our behoof, and are there-
fore called th~ngs, Vheieas an intelligerit is called a 
person. ,9 This may seem to gJ.ve car~e btanche to the 
unscr1.4pulous ·for abuse.· Aga-inst this may be pitted the 
current ~ritings of such as M{dgley in which man is tied 
much more firmly into nature. A return ~ill be made 1n 
detail to Midgley for she provid~s a:phild~6ph{~al ccmple-
reent to t~e idea~ of Vanstone. The~~ trends· tan.~~ .see~. 
to illustrate the tussle be~weeti.the bre~k Platohisi· 
intellectu~l heritage in which man is frinda~e~t&lly a~ 
alien, marooned in a hostil~ worl~ ~nd the Biblical tradition. 
o f c re at i b ri . 
Vanstone thus faced by the disiroporticn bet~~en the· 
triv:Lal a~C. the sublime·being all of God, perceiyed that the 
first s{ep had to be an identification betw~en church and 
creation in or~~r to give meaning to so~etim~~ trivi&l 
church 'activities. There.then occured an incident whict 
~uggested to Vanstone the mec4anis~ ~y wtich G~d could work 
in creation. Fr~m this '"as to spring. the :l.nspira,t'ion f~r 
. . 
a doctrine of God ~econciled to evoluiion;- s~~fe!jng .~nd 
the demand for human freedofu. Vansin~e ~ad: been .asked by 
. . 
t~o children to suggest an activity for them .. · Ee suggested 
that they made a landscape model. This. they took qp 
without much enthusiasm but soon thej bec~me totally 
absorbed in their work. In watching the development. of 
their absorption in their task, ·VanstOl1e sav an· analogy to· 
the creative process in God. In the growth cf this ·~ieation'. 
the end could not b~ precisely ~or~seen, th~r~ wa~·-only th~. 
. . 
inspiratio~ of a vision. Progress· had to .be: step ·oy step 
in which e~ch new cbnst~uction wa~. full of ·po~sibilit.ies;· 
Each step involved a risk of failure or dissa~isfnction, 
there ~as no guarantee of success. The furiher theccreative· 
act went the more precarious ~nd teL~e it-becam~. Thus, 'A~ 
the model grew and became of greater value, eac~ step 1n its 
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creaiion became of greate~ moment and was tak~n with greater 
inte~sity of ~are. Each item that was pl~c~d seemed to . 
possess greater power to make ~r to mar' . 10 
Three themes. can .be disceined here which are tent~al ~o 
an uriderstanding of Vanstbne's creatiofi doctrine~ There 1s 
the notion that creation involves. risk, it cannot ·be 
rigorously predetermined. · This 1 s c l·early. allied to an 
acceptance of evolution as is the notlon of the ever··lncreas-
1ng value of the grow1ng complexity of the cieation. 
Secondly, as it becomes ~ore valuable, it be~om~s still 
~ore risky in its tragic pdssibilities. 'Irlie third the;:ne 
inhetent in.and to·be seen throughbut Vanstone's work is 
the idea that creation involves rendering the creator vul-
nerable to what has been ~reated - giving ihe creation a 
'power' over the cr~ator. The rationale for this comes· 
from two ~ources for Vanstone: the nature of· artistry ·and 
the nature of love. The imag~ ot these children&' creation 
is the image of ~n artist or a craftsman as Vanstone makes· 
explicit in writing that: 
·One could say that the activity of creating 
.included the passivity of waiting-- of waiting_ 
upon one's workm~nship to s~e what ~merged 
from it . in such activ{ty, the cre~tor 
gave to, or buiit into, his workmanship. a 
certain power over himself. 
Since he at ~nee creates it, yet like all artisis ~pes not 
~redetermine it but·works with the nature of the. material,.· 
th~t material has it~ o~n power in relation to him. If the·· 
artist ~ho works with matter is 1n this ~ituation, the God 
who works with living beings 1s still more so, since his 
relationship is one of lov~, ana fundamerital tu·love 1S th~. 
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respect of the fr~edom and rights of the other .. Thi·s theme 
Varistone mak~s evident in the next chapter where he writ~s 
that 'Where love is a~thentic, the lover gives to the object 
of his_ love ·a certain power over .himself - a power which 
would not otherwise be there'. 12 Vanstone se~s in the 
evolution of creation, its risk and uncertainty, its waste, 
the -inevitable expression of the nature of lov.e. Hence 
'love proceeds b~ no assured programme', neither a parent 
bringing a child up to independ~nce, nor a God and his 
. 13 
creatJ.on. _ 
It may be said that-Vanstone happily identifies three 
themes. The true rtature of love in his ,presentation is 
identified with the true _nature of artistic creation and 
the two are combined in the nature of God's .creative 
abili~y, which is thus enabled to come. to terms with 
e~olutionary science because it is in th~-nat~re of the 
artist to res~ect and_work wiih the nature of the subject 
matter. tove is ~lso hatmonised with the ad6ption of the 
love theme to the demand of men's freedom, Thus art 
safeguards matter, and love man's moral autonomy. God, 
man and creation exist together bi shared participati~n 
and not domination. Suffering is explained as the inevitable 
consequence o~ r~specting the individuality of creation. 
Sufferi~g is an integral part of-both love and ~rt~ Thus, 
'The precariousness of love's activity appears equally 
cleatly in the field of artistic creation' . 14 --'Pr~ccirio~;-
ness' here is Vanstone's ~~rm for the ~spect of God which 
ailows uncertainty to occur f6r the sake of the othe~_'s 
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integriti~ and 1s willing to run the risk of being hurt 
~tselj,. Thus for Van~tone th~ essence ·of the artist ~nd of 
. . . 
. Go~ i~ that Jhe is'always stretching his powers beyond their 
.. known lim~ts'.l 5 The artist. to be.creative ~annot work 
~ithin hi~ iimits,~if h~ ~o~~ he 1s merely a manufacturer. 
He has always to stretch himself to go beyond his limit, 
and in this 'his work-is precariously poised betweeri 
sue cess and failure, between triu~ph. and trag·edy' . 1 6 The 
orily iafeguard for cr~ation lies {n the sheer ability of 
God, for ·'we see the· greatness of the artist precisely 1n 
his power to win back control·, to use that which had gone 
astray as an element within a new and larger whole'. 17 
~ . . 
Vanstone·e~plicitly ~akes the artist his model of 
. . 
creation under his· considerat:lon of the kenotic charac.:t~·r 
of God. Kenosis - seii~gi~ing, is the ~~ry ~ature of love 
and of creative art. 18 Thus the riature of creatiqn, its 
development and its pain are e~plained by Vans~one in his 
identification· of God and the artist. He ~pe~ifi6ally 
construc~s theodicy around the notion of the artist giving 
i~dependenc~ to his creation which ihvolvei ~ genuine and 
. . .. 
. . 
intentional :ignorance on the creator's part. This posits 
th~ pDssibility of evil, security lying only 1n the artist'~. 
ability t6 recreate from misfortune, but. 
the piinci~le does not im~ly that evil is willed 
by the Creator, either f6r its o~n sake or as a· 
m~ans to a ~reater good. The artist. doeB not will 
the mo~ent ~f lost control; nor intend it as a· 
means to the completion and the. greatness of hi~ 
work. He does not will the demand which that 
mom~nt ~akes upon him - the demand to redeem it 
and to save his work . .·his will is to over-
come the pro~lem. 19 
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From. the viewpoint of God this provides· an explanation of 
God and of his actions compatible with a universe whf~h ~s 
pe~~eived to £ollow no predetermined course, ~n which 
genuine random.riess and creativity a~pear along with 
pr6digiou~ waste~ yet one in which an upward pattern of 
progress is discernible. 
Vanstone's.picture of God readily fits scientific· 
conceptions 6f the evolving world. From. man's view~oint 
~~tters are not so.satisfactory. Although Vanstone safe~ 
guards m.anis independence~ to the extent ~hat man may hurt 
. . . 
his o~ti creator, and although the demands of the n~ture of. 
a loving relationship are made pre-eminent, in terms o.f 
~he6dicy man is ~imply urged to 'b~lieve its all for the 
besti. Vanstorie endeavours to disasso~iate himself fro~ 
Iva~·Karam.azov's suggestion that God vills suffering for· 
·greater good. He accepts that· if God did, it woul~ be 
immoral. He allows on~y that God grants ~he possibility 
of e~il as a consequence of the nature of love and art ~n 
creation. However Vanstone still writes that for the 
children of Aberfan the final triumph will be when 'the 
6hildren themselves understand ~nd are glad to have so 
'd d . t d d' d' 20 feare an wep an ~e . What ~s changed from I¥an's 
scena~io ~s that this God now suffers all the pa~n himself 
yet even so ~ould Ivan have bee~ satisfi~d with the last 
qu6tation? 21 
Ivan's. position is that it is intolerable. for one 
inrtocent to suffer for a greater good. Vanstone's answer 
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·is that God has not willed this suffering, that creation 
could n6t be otberwise if_th~ freedom of matter apd me~ is 
to be respected and that all.~ill be j~stified'~Y ~he· r~sult~ 
Can Iyan be ~atisfied by the clai~ that God did n6t 
specificaily will evil·, that. its existence 1s a pos·sibility, 
consid~~ation of which 1s inevitable given th~-demand .of 
freedom for creation's me~bers, and that the nature of 
.Vanstone's kenotic God is considerably differen~ from that 
contem~orary to Dosttiyevsky1 Vanstone's work _in our· ~sti-
mation is a remarkable attempt ~o cope wi~h the. issues.· of 
love, creation, freedom ana evil. Noneth~less scm~ spac~ 
will be dev~t~d h~re to its problems, which might be sum~ed 
up by saying, 'what right has love invoiunta~ily to place .. 
the bel6~ed in this highli fiaught situation?' 
If God's being love is stressed by Vanstone, partic~larly 
love's respect for the freedom of men, there remains the 
problem t~at ~en have no choice in their c~eation. Men ar~ 
born whether. they like it or not into what can be a frigtheri-
ingly horrifit world. Is volunteering· men for death· and pa 1n 
an act of a loving God concerned for their freedo~, even one 
so totally invol~ed in tbeir pain as Vanstone's Gbd? At 
another more conventi6nal l~vel, Vanstone's p6rtiayal has 
igtiored the clas~i6 doctrine of the Fail ~hich ~xplained 
evil in terms ~f m~n's culpability~ Mariy may. be enti~eiy· 
happy that Vanstone chbse to i~nbr~ the Genes~s storieB 
of man's culpability, but in so doing,- Vanstone becomes 
very weak on the. whole ide~ of s1n and man's responsi~ility. 
Sin becomes lack of responss in sharing with God's. 
creative work, 'evil is the moment of 
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control jeopardised and lost', · evil .and s1n ar~ not 
depicted ~s the··wilful wrongdoing .of many Christian 
cbaract~ris~tion~~ 
F~o~ Dost~y~vsky~s Ivan, criticism can be develqped on 
two fronts; Firstly, fr6m the viewpoirit of the chapter 
headed '~ebellion' there is· the critique of the presence of, 
' innoc~nt suffering in God's world. ~hat.right has God got 
. to 
involuntariiy/inflict ~his world upon us? 2 3 Secon~ly 
. . . 
from th~ viewpoint of the ~hapter headed the 'Grand 
Inquisito~', Dostoyevsky raises an 1ssue which only becomes 
th . . t . . . . 24 . . e more pert1n~n when read 1n conJunctlon w1th Vanstone. 
That is the question ofwhether man can cope with t~e 
~anstonian c6nce~t of freedom? For to the Inq~isitor it 1s· 
'precisely this gift of freedom that 1s intolera-ble. For 
the·purpos~s of Vanstonian ·criticism the second maJor 
questi'on ~f the 1 Grand Inquisitor 1 , th?-t of· creation for 
damnation takes ana new light~ 2 5 While Vanstone would 
l 
doubtless ag~ee that classic theologies of creation for 
damnation are ~bhorrent, it might be argued that in his 
acceptan~e of evolutionary creation with its prodigious 
· wa~te, h~ accept~ a new form of the old argument. Vanstone 
portrays a G6d so heavily involved in his creation that 
fro~ men an equally irivolved response is demanded. Ivan's 
question must be ~hether man can really cop~ with s~ch ·an 
intensity of love and commitm~nt? ·For the Inquisitor has 
perceived that ordinaril~ men cia~not cope wit~ freedom let 
alone freedom with th~ divine, 'for nothing has ~ver been 
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more unendurable to man .and t6 .hu~an society than freedom!' 
The Inquisitor ~eacts igainst the elit~, 'And why are the· 
rest, the weak ones, to bla:me.if they were not. able to 
endure all that the mighty ones eildu~ed? Why: ·is the wel:).k 
soul to bla.me .for bein~ u:nable torecelve gifts .so te:rri·ble? 127 
That Dostoyevsky feels this awful dilemma 1s graphically 
portrayed in.reading 'that it was no.great mo~~l felicity 
to attain complete coritrol ov~r his will and at the same 
time achieve the conviction that .millions of other God's 
creatures had been created as a mockery, th~t they would 
. ·. . 
.... ~ . . 28 
never be able ~o co~e with the1r Ireedom'. ·. 
Ivari's thoughts are not presented to destroy Vanstone's 
argument. So far as we are c~ricer~~A ·~{th the issue of 
. . 
theodicy as fu~dametitallycoti~ o~ belief in·a good God, one 
must move beyond the real~ of stritt logic into ·that of 
mystery and faith. Logic alone cannot ~nswer this question. 
Thu~ it 1s possible to side with Va~stone whil~ still 
wishing· to own up to the· enigma of freedom: developed in 
This 1s to say one will beli~ve in such and such 
while still see1ng gre~t problems inheren{ in th~t ~6sition. 
~ur position is simply to av6id adoptin~ any one viewp6int 
'enthusiastically'. Vanitone.'s is a uniquely powerful 
viewpoint· facing evolution and s~if~ring with the concepts 
of love arid freedom, but in s6.d6ing a demand 1s made .1n 
terms of human response t~ ~od 1 s self giv~ng act that many 
would find extrem~, to perceive the loving God at the heart 
of every Aberfan. Ours is no wish to deny this but to 
si~~ly drive home th~ fact that it 1s a dilemma of extreme 
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proportions. vlithin Dostoyevsty himself this equivocalness 
i~ evident. F~r he speaks no~ oniy ~n Ivan but .in Alyosha 
too. Hence in the chapter 1 Reb~llion 1 ,.Alyo~ha does gi~e 
ari answer to Ivan's objections, 'yqu said. just rlo'"• is-there 
a being in the ~hol~ world ~ho ;ould or had the right tn 
forgive? But there is such a being, and. he can forgive 
everything . ~ beca~se he ga~e his.i~nocent blood for all 
and for everything. • 29 Such ~ ;emark is ~11 th~ more signi-
ficant when read 1n the light of V~nstone wher~ the note of· 
the suffering of the innocent fbrgiver .is maae a permanent 
mark of love. 
In the 'Grand Inquisitor', Christ patientli and silently 
endures the tirad~s of the Inq~isit~r w~~ berates -~im for 
t~is paradoxical notion of freed6m. Tlie paradox is apparent 
too, .in Alyosha's reactio~ to ·Iva~'s sto~y of ·the 'Grand 
Inquisitor'. He says to Ivan, 'this is &J;surd!· Your poem 
lS • • J d • l • ·_ . ' t I 3 Q 1n pra1se of esus an not 1n 11s dlBparagemen .. It. 
1s apparent also in the conclusion to the sto~y, 1n whi~h 
Christ's only response .to the tirade of the Inquisitor 1s to 
kiss him, whereupon, he is released by the old man, o~ whom 
Ivan comments, 'the l<.:iss glows in his heart, but the old man 
sticks to his idea' .3 1 'It is a~ well to read Do~toyevsky 
~ith this sense of gmbiguity, that he writes after ali fron 
the standpoint of a believer and si~ply to set this against 
. . 
Vanstone, not as an .argument ag~inst Vanst6ne's argum~nts, 
but as a reminder that the freedom and the vision of the 
Suffering God of.whi~h Vanstone speaks, ·are not 'easy'· 
answers to the problem. They are to be received not so 
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much intellectual~y as expe~imen~ally. Indeed this 1s the 
whole drift of -Yanstone's._writing, that his conclusions 
have been reached at the: end of a life in the parish and 
not the universit~: Rene~ his e~amples ~re d~rived_.fr~m 
· ~ctual expe~i~nce, 'Through,th~ ~xam~le of human lo~e,·I 
h~ve argued that the lo~e of God must be infirtitely m6re 
costly, mor~ precarious and more ~xposed than it is commonly 
represente~ to be' .. The ~ook's radical character d~rive~ 
. . · ... 32 
directly from it's appropriation of human analogy. As 
H.A~ Willia~s commented in the ini~oduttion,~~ 1s 'theology 
. ~ritten 1n blood·' and-perha~s. it cannot be fully 
asse~sed outside theti33 
Acceptance bf ~voltition Jn ge~~ral terms.b~t ti~d to 
. . . . 
theology was.·vanstor,e's purp.ose.· !:4ayy Midgley ·.,Tas mentionej 
. . . . . 
earlier as ~roviding a phil~sophit~l eo~~~ntary 6n this 
theme. ~er writing is interest~ng in that iith6ugh writte~ 
from a hun'anist stance there· is :much of C()nsequ:ence to ·the· 
. . 
Christian do~trine of the Fall -w~ich was found to be. lacking 
in Y~::,nstone. She gives great ~~terition to t~e pe~tinent 
problem of the great wilfullness of.men's ~rongdoing. Thus 
despit~ her accepta~ce of evblutiori, man's wiong doing is not 
inadequacy in development, out it is: something he is :resp.ons-
ible for. Her point is that in a ~6rk .6evoted to restoring 
man to h~s place amidst the whoiene~s of the material.woild, 
the wrong-do{ng that man ~erpetiates is -on ~n .entirely 
-different lev~l from th~ suffering perpeirated by 6t~er · 
animals. She wishes to revise the generally a6cepted notion 
58 2:16 
that man 1s advanced ari~ civilised, whereas the animals are 
primitive ~nd '~estial·', where these t~rm~ are no longer 
scientifiri ie~ms fo~ i~ates of i~tellectual capacity but 
terms: of moial· judgement. As she notes .towards the end of 
her book on this t~~me, there is confusion ~etween technical 
a b i 1 it y and mora 1 s : ' What 1 s supposed to be that good about 
cleverness? Being dlever 1s not obviously so much more 
i~pqrtant than being kind, brave, friendly ... 
Regarding the animals she ri6tes how 'bestial', ori~inallj 
simply an adjective - pertaining tc beasts, is now a term 
of strong mor~l condemnation. She notes ho~ wolves were 
flayed· alive 1n :r!!.ed.i eval France, for. they v:e.re. regardei as 
cruel beasts and she ~sks the question, do wolves flay men 
alive<:· The imme~s~ difference ~he perce1ves between the 
animal kingd6m and oui·own is that th~ ani~als in g~nerai 
the· 
only kill o'ut of /necessity· to eat, and that the iC.ea of 
m u r J e r ' t li at i s k i 11 i n g ~r 0 u r 0 \Tn f 0 r !l 0 n e 'c e s s it y l s 
. . 35 peculiarly human .. She notes a television documentar"'s 
. . .J 
comment on shaiks, that 'these are the wo~ld's ~ost vicious 
killers'~ -this in spite of the fact that sharks only kill 
iri hunger and self defence, and that meri kill far ~ore 
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sharks than sharks men. In ~er eyes· it i·s man who is the 
mindtess murderer~ v1c1ous and sadistic, re~ealed cnly too 
w~ll in the enthusias~ for bloodsports. Sh~ is ied to the 
conciu~i~n that ani~al~ are more rational ttan men in a · 
particular though more re~iri~ted manner,. in that our 
rati~nality may have a broader range but it has a capacity 
for extreme capriciousness and . . 37 arb1trar1ness. · 
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Midgley then enters into.~ discussion of ·Ed~ard· ~lson's 
Sociobiology and the problem of the :• selfish' gene. This 
reveal~ a further interestin~re~ers~l of generally accepted 
. . . . . . . 
notions, that is that ~h~ problem 6r selfishness is a 
<. 
peculiarly human one. ·Thus tt~ egnist position can in fact 
Only be posit~d of man, and not of animals. in general, so 
it seems incumbe.nt upo·n man to.· justify his egoistical ·s7,ance 
if he caQ. According _to Midgley in ~ociobiology the s~heme· 
1s that of an enormous cost benefit analysis i·n ·which non-
payi~g action~ are ultimat~ly ·st~~nat6ry for the progress: 
of the 
.. 
spec1es. \.J il 3 0 n him s e 1 f ask s t h e q.u e s t i 0 n ' c an a 
species surv1ve if it indulges in non-paying activities? 
Ho~ever with Midgley while the Luman world may struggle to 
justify altruism, t~e animal w~rld in fact depends on it~ 
. . . 
to the extent that within each species a far ~reater d~gr·ee 
of m~tual care is evident than {n the-~uma~ race. It might 
be labelled an egoi~m of each species, .honeth~less compared. 
. . 
vith human behaviour the behaviour of e.nimals is still· far 
more ordered ~n~ ~ithin each species dedicated to .the preser-
. 38 
vation of the_whole.- Forth~ ~ur~6ses of th~s chapter 
what can be learnt from Midgley the humanist is that it is 
possible to use the noticn of evolution, firstly, to place 
man wholly withirr.the creation, and then secondly, to show 
that the ~adical difrerenc~ between m~n and the bther animals 
is that his iriteliigence·d~es not ob~iously better him 
morally. Indeed Midil~y is r~ising the ·~roblem of the 'Fall'. 
Hers, a st~dy taking evolution into account, acce~ts the 
p~oblem why and where did man acquire a capriciousness and 
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horiifi~ brutality, a pleasure 1n inflicting.paln, that 1s 
lacking in the Giber animals? 
It was ~ugg~sted:~hat ~weakness in V~ris~one's oi~er-
vr1se poi{el·ful portrait of· a theology allied to evolution 
. . 
was his l~~k ~t a ~~nse of fall a~d human responsibility. 
Both Karamazov and Midgl~y make· this question real., Vanstone 
face~ a ciuestion needing an ani~er, that is whether·man is 
not far more horrible thaD Vanstone allows,_ arid how r~spons­
ible is he for ~he horriblen~~~? Vanstoriets ~cot text for 
an answer to the qu~~tion ot evil was treated as aL example 
. . . . 30 
of physical evil - Aberfan. / He does not ertdiavour to 
tackle an example of ac~te mor~l evil wbich.is what 
Kara.mazcv does.·· D~spite. this. Var;stone holds that. us1ng 
. .· . . . . . 
Ab :., . . .·. . .. I · 40 . er~an he" 1s answer2ng van .. In so far as th~· ~ictims 
are batt innbcent sufferers this 1s the cRsi, b~t- Ivari's 
o -vm ex amp 1 e , being a c.a s e of acute m orB: 1 e v· i=. ; r a i s e s t 11 e 
la:r·ger question of responsibility and forg'iver.ess .. Ivan 
. . 
faces God with the problems ~f creatures iri his own 1~age 
being mindless tortu~ers. In the fa~e of such horrific 
agony, Ivan holds that the perpetrators of such suffering are 
·' 
unforgiveable: 
A'n d finaLLy I do not want a ruot her to embrace the 
tortufe~ who had he~ child torn to pieces by his 
dogs! She has no right to foriive him, she. ian · 
forgive hirri for herself · ... but she has no right. 
to forgive hi~ for the sufferings of her tortured 
child. · 41 
Albeit Do~toy~vs~y gives an 'ans¥er' thr6ug~ Alyoshi to the 
effect that Christ alone has this. power of forgiveness, our 
paint must be that Vanstone whilst citing Kara~azov does 
riot ftilly encounter th~ pro~lem Ivan raises. 'lanstor.e 
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tackles innocent suffering at the level of physical evil 
. . 
alone, lvhereas ·Tvan lS more concer.ned vith innocent suffer.ing 
. . . . ·. . . . .. 
in relat:Lon to. appalling mor~.l evil .... Nidgley sho:•:.rs .that 
~qu~lly from the ~i~~point oi th~ huma~ist philosopher 
. . 
a c c e p t in g e v ol u t i 0 n j u s t a's van~ t c ri ~ d 0 e s ' the p r 0 b 1 e Iil ·l s 
as a~·Jte, that senseless human evil ·has ·to be accounf.E:·d :!~Or 
1n men, and this Vanstone leaves unanswered .. 
The great problem that is being faced and to ~hich at 
. . . 
prEsent there is cert~i~ly no ~holly. sa~isfac~~ry. ans~er, 
1s to reinterpret the F~~l 1n accordance with the th~ory 
of evolution. Tr~ditionally the Fall ha~ gained .its str~ngth 
1n making nan resporisible ~or his wrongdoing, ~y its literal 
acceptance of tbe G~nesis story. Tte geriiis of thii was 
man's cons~iousne~s .of pfimaeval bli~s and his deli~erate 
. . .. 
rejection thereoz. Ge~esi·s ~s ~i~pl~city its~li, ~an knew 
what was at stak~ 1n ji~ rejection~ Ho~e~er to dd justi2e 
. . . . 
. . . 
to evoluticn such a sim~le pictire has to;be removed. There 
never was a moment ~hen .man clearly kn~w all th~ i~s~es 
involved in the ~ejection of Cod, when. he knew what he was 
. ~ . 
doing and did it 1n the rejection ~f the Almightj. Man's 
self-consciousftess has j~en ~edns 1n the making and it 1s 
not easy to know when.to start positing moral responsibility 
of man. It 6an at least B~ ~aid that even if· the start is 
unkriown· t~e very fact th~n ~a~·is .a~ate· cf moral ca~egciriei 
. . . . 
·now is significant. enough for· man to b·e responsible. 
. ,. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
Evolution makes it difficult t~ identify the sources of 
man's r~sponsibility a~d Vanstone is just one author who· 
w o u J. d s e em t o h a v e fa 11 en at t h i s fen c e· i n hi s . non d i s c us s i on 
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of moral evil. 
The hints ~f. an answer may be provided by Midgley artd 
others. Midgiey it vill ~e reTiembered ac~epts both evolution 
and the issue 6f min's moral responsibility. Eer first 
move was to show how despit~ the fact th~t men and animals 
are p~rt of the same evolutionary process, man in his 
developm~nt·has ~eVeloped a capacity tor extreme nastiness. 
An illogical elemen~ has enieied into mankind's existence. 
Sh~. is no more successful thari others in identifying the 
moment·when thi~ happened but sh~ does illustrate some 
. . . . . 
fEctors involv~d in its development. Her anaiysis,as that 
of two other authors to b~ cited,involve~ an eleme~t crucial 
to tbe line of thoug~t in this work; th~t of the·question 
of tbe role of relation and ir:tell igence r)c.:.s a cJ·{8. factors 
such as love. Philosophical Egois!!l·together with the 
practic.al probl~m of selfishn~~s are attacked in Beast and 
Man with th~ con~ent alr~adi qu6ted cor:tr~~ting cleverness 
¥i~h kindriess ~nd friend~hip; This is further developed in 
. her pa~er 'The Limits of individ~alisn' .. Here she argue~ 
t~at the Social Darwinist's form .of evolution which accepts 
coTipetiti~~ness an~ self-centr~dness as natural is a 
twisting of the. tacts to suit their own demand. 42 
There is nothing n~w in this, as w~ noted 1n chapter 
~~~, Descartes could be blamed·for encouraging concept~al 
. f.;oli tude. Read in context Coai~o Er~o Su~ is set forth·in v v . 
order to 'discover the distinction between the ~ind and the· 
. . . • · 1 t · 1 43 body or between a th1nk1ng and corporea h1ng . 
. De s c art es ' o p p o s it i on t o t h e body an d h i s i n her it e n c e of 
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the tradition that saw rnan as ari unforunate trapped by matter 
is clear, and. seen in remarks. such as,- 'But vrhat is a man? 
~ . . . . . . . . ·. . . 
Shall I .saY ~-rational anim~l? Assuredly not . ,44 .Or, 
'it is plain .I am not the-assemblage of members called th~ 
. . . . . 4 5 
hmr.an body~' He is happy tn exalt the mind and the 1 It ..L. 
over th~ whole person a~~ the ccmmu~ity~without which either 
could not exist. In _her paper 'The Obj~ction to Systemati·c 
Humbug' this 1s a theme Midgley develops' at length, that 
to stiess ~be intell.igence and the individual leads to 
)l (; 1 s 
egoism ~nd unconcern for others.-- This/ in theological 
terms sin_, although suet language is not. employed by_ 
?-1 i d g 1 e y h e r s e l f . 
No partic~lar ~oment 1s identified, but what is suEgested 
by re~d1ng Midgley is t~at in han's diveloping self-conscio~s-
ness, j~st as this besto7ed on hi~ great capacity for 
advancement via thought, so 1n enabling him jtist to see 
himsel::,, it created. the :possibility of ~eifishl}es:::.. The 
ici~ntific progress .of self~corisciousness developed the 
mor~l issu~ of selfishness. The issue was compounded_by 
the stfess on the one issue, the factor of intelligence 
which 1n its development 6ade self-conscitiusness possible, 
while 1n itself n~t. ~eing a positive moral factor. Thus 
self 6o~sciousness cou~led ~ith intelligence gave man the 
. . 
ff~e choibe to exer~1se th~ easy option, to consider just 
. himself r~~her th.an his rcile i~ the world· ana the species 
of which he is a dependent part. Evo~ution's·bestowal up~n 
man of self-conscious~ess and free ~toice in intellig~nce 
.g1ves him the option lacking to the other animals, of 
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considering only himself as one ego. 0 t her s p e ·c i e s 
although lacking human intelligence nonetheless do h~ve a 
'programmed' alt~uis~ towards members of th~ir ovn specJ.es; 
and do not in~~lge J.n 
. . of which 
the horrific ~ruelty/men have proved 
capa.ble. That man finds hi~s~lf in this position is 
testified to by man's being aware that better possibilities 
exist. Hii sense o£ inade1uacy ctems from his awarenes·s. 
that be. has not done as well as he would have l~ked. In 
otitli~e fo~m this is offered a~ an account of. a 'Fall' 
reconciled: with a~ evolutionary world view, but which 
still· en~bles man to be held morally respo~ii~le, and ~hich 
·.could usefully have been appropriated in a worh lihe Vanstone Is· .. 
Euber. in I and ~hou· sugges~s a similar divide between 
.~n I-it ftnd an I-thou relationship. ~t will be remembered 
that. the first lS the relationship-of use, while the second 
treats tite you as ~n existent ln its.::lf. Buber regards 
~rimiti~~ man ~as speaking) ~he basic wo~d I-you in a. 
natural, ~s it weie still unformed manner, not yet having 
recogniged himself as an I', sJ.nce 'even in the primitive. 
function of ccgnition one cannot finrl any cognasco ergo sum 
. • · I 47. . 1 ( • 
of even the most naJ.ve kJ.nd. . On~y as man eva ves, a&aln 
no ~ne ~oment can be 
--~ 
identi:ied), does ielf consciousneDs 
develop: 
once the I of the relation has emerged and has 
become exiitent in iis detachm~nt, it someho~ 
etherealizes and f~nctional~zes itself . 
once the sentence "I see the tree" has been 
pronbunced in_ such a ¥ay that it nc longer · 
relates a relation between a human I and a 
tree You but the perception of the tree object 
by the human consciousness, it has erected the 
crucial barrier bet~een subject and object; 
~he b~si~ word I-it, the word of separatiori, 
:-_as. been spoken. 48 
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Thus a process o~cured in pri~itive man by which the It. 
relation appeare~ and it formed·~ sart of Fall: 
. . . . 
The~ you believ~ after all .. in some paridi~e in the 
primal age of hu~~~ity? E~~~ if it. was· a Hell 
. unreal it w~s n6t. Piimal man's ~xperi~nc~s 
of encounter were scarcely a ·matter of tame d.elight; 
but ~ven viole~ce ~gain~t a being one really con-
fronts is better than ghostly s6licitude for face-
less digits! From the former a path Jeads to God, 
fro~ the l~tt~r only t6 nothingness. 49 
Euber accepts ~ proc.ess in evolution hy which men. l~psed. 
The opporttinity for the 'Thbu' telation was lost and re~laced 
by the poorer I-it relation in which the. I uses the 'it' 
rather than respe~ts it as 'y6ri'. The sa~e process ls 
repeated in each one of us according to Buber in.our infant 
life, for 'the prenatal Life of the ·child .ls a pure natural 
association'~ the child_po~sesses a basic drive for relation 
yet still it falls into ceA~ing to regard_'iou' but creating 
'it' in its devel6pment.5° Intelligence thus enables ma~ ~n 
.. . 
Buber and Midgley to exerclse a cboice to take the ea~ier 
though more disastroris option of regardin~ 'you' as 'it.'. 
·Exactly the same theme_·it may be contended lS seen 1n 
a third author, the novelist D.H. Lawrence, in Lady 
Chatterley's Lover. Here it 1s h~ld, a maJor. theme ls the 
destruction of the buman pe~sonality that comes through the 
. . 
. . . 
exaltation of mind, and.the for~ettiig of relation.and of 
the whbleness of man. Haggart's. 'Intioduction' goes to some 
length to make this point. He notes Lawrence's commitment 
to marriage ~nd fidelity, on wholeness in man's life, against 
. I 
which intelligence seeri in indtistrialisation i~ the great 
threat; H~ writes that, 'here Lawrence is insisting that 
. . . 
ii we· re~ar~ man~~ a.mechanical ~nit in a mechanical 
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society . . then we cut off some of the spiings of life -
arid so make rel,tionships of_ integrity and wholeness even 
.. · .. ·. . 1 
harder to arrive at I. 5 . ·. ·.Lawrence Is the~e is' exactiy that 
of Buber and Midgley that .'life -is only bearp.ble when the 
. obs~enity only comes 
in when the mi~d despises and rears ihe bodyi~~ 2 · Clifford 
(wh~ther maimed or not} ~nd his friends share a· view 1n 
which 'sex was merely an accident or an adj~n~tj one of the 
. . . . . . . 
curious obsolete, o~ganic proces~es ~hich pe~sisted in· its 
. . . . . . . . 
own clumsiness but was ti~t reilly necessary'. 53 In 
Lawrenc{an terms int~llig~ri~e misused mak~s men r~gard 
their wholeness, th~ir sexual aspect much as Adam regarded 
his nakedness. Selfishnes~, a purely m~nt~l vi~w ·of life 
an d t h e 1 a c k o f a · ' t h o u ' · r e 1 at i o h ~ a r e 1 inked w i t h c e a s 1 n g 
to tegard oneself as a ~hoi~ being in ~o~munity . 
. Accordinglytheresu1t is_that, 'Hammond. . with a 
~ife and.two children~ but much mote clpse~y connected with 
54 
a typ~writer' believed in ~the life of the ~ind : . all 
hinge~ on the instinct. fo~ success. That 1s the pivot on 
which al~ things turh' • 55 _The succeedin~ ~ages show 
La;rence deli;ering a rei~~tless attack on the 'Bolshevism' 
of the mind.· The character Dukes says, 'there's something 
wrong with· the mental .. life·, radically .. It's roote·d in spite 
~nd envy, envy ahd spite.~~6 'Real kn6wledge comes 6ut of 
the wh61~ corpus of the c6niciousnesss out of ybur .belly ~nd 
your penis as m~ch as out of your brain and mind . The mind 
can only analyse and rationalise .. . to criticise and 
. . 
.· .· .... ~7 
make a de~dness'. · 
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The last three authors of whom only Buber is a theist~ 
show how .it is possible in accepting evolutiort as· f~ct.arid 
rejecting literal interpretations still to possess a:v~e~· 
of th~ ~orld in which ~ c6ncept o~ the Fall·, ·~hether termed 
such or not is ten~ble. All three share a belief that in 
the employmerit o~ ihtelligence ~an has made a .fundamental 
mistake. It is riot that int~lligence itself is wrong, but 
that in the growth of self consciousness men become .aware. 
of the possibiiities of short cuts, of taking apparen~ly 
easy options, of rega~ding 'I' orily and to hell with.the 
rest. Intelligence as Midgley noted, instead.of ~ervin~ 
mora·l categories becomes the category· in itse·lf ·and·exalts 
the 'I' in itself~ Cogito ergo sum. Lawrence•s· message 
. . 
was exactly the same, that the supreme elem~nts in lif~, 
compass1on, tender loving care for another are.igtior~d: 
'All the gr~at word~ it seemed ~o Co~nie were cant~lled for 
. . . 
her generation: love, joy, happibess ~ ~ All that remained 
was a stubborn st6icism', the.only exception being th~· 
desire for money, 'Money, success, the bitch goddess 
that was a permanent necessity' .58 
Both the humatiists La~rence and Midgley perceive that 
a recovery of the value of love, no~withstandirrg differences 
1n their perception of it, was fundamental to .the recovery 
of human whole.ness .. ·As has been noted, ·Vanstone's analysis 
revolves around Gbd as love. This from an ethi~~l stand-
point is ihe subject matt~r of our work. Thus in order to 
.· . . 
. . 
pe.rceive what from the Christian sense the value· o·f love· 
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might mean in a human context, it 1s important to consider 
amongst the other 1ssues bf self ~nd n~ighbpur lo~~ the end· 
for which a loving God creates ·man~ To hav~·an infling 6f 
~hat mari is intended fo~. m~y· help in the· un~er~iatidin~ of 
how man coriducts himself now. Two comment~· from Midgley 
may serve to ~irect the way. The first must .~e read with 
Vatistone'i strictures concerning love's essential demand 
for the preservation of human freedom in mirid .. It might· 
seem a throw-away comment in its context but it co~tains 
much of signi1icance for the. position adopted in· this work, 
that evolution is to be reconciled to the notion oY ·Go~'s 
creating free beings.· Midgley posiulates a revision. of 
., 
Genesis to the effect that 'th~ Lor~ wanted free ser~artts 
r·and. therifore so devised ~voluiion-th~t it was bo~nd.·~o 
produce them' .59 There may ~eli:b~ m~c~ mor~ t~~th ln 
. . : . 
this comment than Midgley may wish to allow, for in outline 
this is the d~ctrine of Vanstone. It thus needs to be held 
in the back~round of a discussion of m~n's end, and of tb~ 
fuean~ to that end. This sense of God being c6ncerne~ fbr 
men out of love for them.as ends, out of a widei ~cenario 
than pure mental life is d~veloped in. the sec~nd 6f 
Midgley's comments. She has b~en attacking the exaltatiori .. · 
of purely mentai life, and thus the Fl~tonist ~iew of'God 
as'pure mind . She grants .that Christiah{ty h~~ ~etceived 
. the necessity for a wider portrait tb safeguard.man's 
w·holenes.s. Hence it is an achi~vement 6f Christianity to. 
define God as love. Interestingly she then qudtes Tr~herne 
as perce1v1ng thi~, and its effect upon man being that, 
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'God did infinitely fot u~ when he mad~ us want like ·Gods, 
that. like Gods .we might be satisfied . He wanted the 
communication of his d{~in~ ei~en6e ~nd. persong ~a-enjoy 
•t ,60 1 • 
It 1s Trahern~'s ~bnsideration of the end of· man that 
shall now be examined. This is not.eworthy in his development 
of this th~me from p cDm~ittment to the"notion that Qod is 
love, and consequently fiom an atceptance of the goodn~ss 
of the ·material world: ''I'he end for which you were created, 
1s that by piiiing all that God h~th done, you maj enJOY 
yoursel~ and Him in Ble~se~ness'~£l -His use of Trinitaiian 
doctrine 1n his theology of· love has already be.en noted. 
Traherne's message ai~ho~gh r~p~~~ed ~n many different 
manners 1n the Centurie.s is at its ro.ot very simple. Love 
1s such that it sim~li has tci be 1n its nature the essence. 
of God. If it 1s his nature, __ then so it ought- to be in his 
creatures. Thus their end is to live the life of ·love 1n 
i t s f u 11 n e s s . T r a h erne w r i t e s that , ; Love 1 s s o d i vi n e an d. 
perfect a thing, that it 1s worthy to be the verY end and 
being of the Deity', and 1n the same breath he· speaks of 
the created soul: 'By loving a:· Soul does propagate and 
beget itself . above all by Loving it does attain 
itself . 
.·. . 62 
Till they love they are desolate. ' From 
the same· pa~sage it 1s interesting to note an aspect of. 
Traherne that might seem odd in reiation to the assumption 
made aborit the passivity of mystical -theology, 
certainly ~ow Traherne is·{o be cla~sified. 63 
which 1s 
. It is also 
sigtiificant iti being allied with a pnsitive appreciation 
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of the world, _it 1s his identification of love and ~c~. 
Thti~ in the pas~age ~orisidered the final line ran, 'Till 
w~ beco~e ther~fo~e all Act as God 1s, we can nev~r -rest, 
nor ~v~r·be sati~fied' .. ~Traherne's concept of Act refers 
to a lively s~rise of a~or~tion and worship to judge from 
the ~iblical quotaiions he cit~s in support.64 
The main theme of Traherne in the context of this 
chapter must be his link bet~een a positive theolog~ of the 
~nd oi man and of the ~ole of creation consequent upon the 
adoptlon of a love theology; The world as God's creation 
gu~rantees that since all in it mtist be honoured as Gbd's, 
ihi& ~afeg~ards the self's own rol~. 'The world doe~ serve 
yo~, not only as. it is ·the place and receptable of all your 
.ioys, but as it i~ a great obligation laid upon all mankin~, 
and ripon every person 1n all ~ges ~o ~ove you as himself. r65 
Despite living in an age much harsher than today, Traherne 
celebrates the. joys of the mat.erial worl.d ·throughout his 
writings: .'As· the wor-ld serves you by shewing the greatness 
of God's lbve to you, so doth it serve you ~s a fuel to 
·fom~nt and increase your praises' .6 6 Favourite phrases to 
be found in connection with cre~ti6n in Traherne are 'their 
creator's joy' and ~the greatness of his bounty', and so 
can be ~ead. 'The heavens and the earth serve you . 1n 
shewing Unto you your ~ath~r'~ Glory' . 67 Acceptance of 
the world's joys is enjoined, for 'Objective treasures ate 
always delightful: and though we travafl endlessly, to see 
them ail our ;wn is infinitely pleasant' . 68 Yet 1n the 
same breath.Traherne 1s careful to link gift and giving. 
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He accepts specificallj our 'desire to have all alone in our 
private pqss~sa~on; ~oupled with 'the com~unicative humour 
. .. · .. 6. 
~h~t i~'in us'~ 9 Thi~ ena~ies hiTh as ha~ ~lready beeri 
· discusse~tb. re~olve·the· confl~ct between the self and the 
·other from his understanding ·of the nature of· creation, its 
essential goodness in the hands of God. 
In ~his the key to perceiving the world aright 1s to 
understahd the nature of love ·in reference to God. · One 
cannot a~oid requoting_ ~Love is the tr~e means by which 
. . . 
th~ world is enjoyed . . There are ·many glorious 
excellencies in the mat~rial World, but -~ithoui Love the~ 
are all abortive ~ · . Love in the end is the glory of the 
. 70 ~orld ~nd the Soul of Joi'. . Traherrte is expliciit con-
ce~ning t~e end t~ which this love l~adi~ for, 'To sit 1n· 
the Throne of Pod is the ·~o~t supreme ~state that can. 
befall a c.ieature. It is promi~ed in the Revelations. But 
few understand ~hat 1s piomised thei~ an~ b~t f~w belieye 
. t i 71 1 .• There is an essential ~ink between this future state 
and the present worl~ wh~ch echoes· Paui's Romans 8; Traherne 
. . . . 
writes ~hat 'To sit in the Thio~e of G6d -is t~ inhabit 
Eternity. To re1gn th~~e is to be pleased with all.thing~ 
in Heaven ~nd Earth fr6m everlasting to everla~ting, as if 
. . . . 
we· had the sovereign dis'posal ()f them'. 7 2 -The. Throne of 
Gbd.is defined as, 'Tbe Omni~resence therefore~ and the_ 
. . . . 
Eternity of dod a~e 6~~ Th~one, whe~ein we are to reign for 
evermore. His irifin{te and eternal Love are the bOrders of 
it' .73 Traherne's mystical hope is that human life will be 
fuifilled as it· was intended to .. be by participation in the 
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life of God whi~h itself embraces the totality of heaven and 
earth. The ho~~ ls sustained ~y the overwhelming conviction:. 
of the essential goodness of the world as an expre~sion. or··· 
love's creativ~ activity, which allows for a positive.~~ses~~ 
ment of the possibilities of such matters as self love which 
in other analyses a~e·often problematic. 
The theology of ·love Trahein~ adopts lS thus the control 
for his analysis of the world, with its stre~ 6n the dignity· 
of man as a creature, and the importance of our response. 
Hence he can write of 'The Supreme Architect and our 
Everlasting Father, h~ving made the world, this most 
glorious hous~ and magnificeni Temple of His divinity' ;7 4 
and then. of 'that fot infinite reasons it was best that he 
. . . 
(man) sh6~ld be in a changeable estate and hav~ power to 
chaos~ ~hat he himself listed: For he may so choose as to 
become one Spirit with God Almighty', .and 'By chodsing a 
man may be turned and co~verted into love'·. 7 5 Such thoughts 
relate t6 two of the 6ther authors considered in this study~ 
.Positively they relate to Vanstone, the link to God as 
artist already having been commehted on in the previous 
chapter. At this point the.link can be seen in their ~h~rin~. 
6f the position that love demands choic~ and therefore·qf 
the supreme necessity to safeguard choice ~nd freedom: It 
. . 
shouid be obviotis how Traherne.witb his high regard for the 
material world .complements Vanstone;· It is argued that. ~his 
is due to their sharing a common theolo~y of love which 
makes cre~tion val~able, and of their desire to s~e love .as 
a genuine communication of being in.which respect bj the 
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Creator for his o~n c~eatio~'s integrity is fundamental. 
Negatively the ~onsequenc~s of an adoption Qf a differerit 
. . . . . . 
theolo~y Qf love upon.trea~ion ~ari ~e ex~~ined by a ~t~~y 
of Anders Nygren's woik. 
. . . . . . . 
Comparisons with NygTen have alread~ been.made~ with 
respect ~o the consequences of his the6logy of love upon· 
the doctrine of the Trinity. It has been argued that the 
. . 
non-use of the T~inity refl~~ted ~ th~oiogy bf ·love wh{c~· 
did not stress relation and the need for individual inte-'-
grity, whereas a positive deman~ tor the integrity of the 
creat~re is at the heart of Vanstone arid Traherne. They 
believe this to be the case becahse dod's wo~k would· be 
lost if the creature's inte~ri~y·w~s-pr~judiced. In their 
doctrine of love t~e control i~ the integrity of the lover's 
self. With Nygreh the con~equ~n~es Of the adoption of a 
. . 
different control in his theology of: l·ove upon the dqctr1ne 
of creation are evident. In Nygren's case' his cbntrol ·is 
the Piotestant conceptiort of the sovereignty of God, and· 
the doctrines of sin and fall. Nygren makes the nature of 
Agape centre around the comment of Jesus', 'I came.not: to 
call.the righteous bui sinner~' . 7~ 
The idea of 'si~ners' i~ fundamental but Nygren 
develops it in such a mannei through the notion of fall 
that men cannot ~ave the ind~pend~nt reality _Traherne and 
Vanstone value. _Nygren~s exegesi~ 1s t~ilored to iit the 
argument. Thus he takes Mark 2:17 at face value and accepts 
that 'the righteous go empty ~way' ,77 this though is 1n 
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order to allow God's sovereignty to dominate. ·.since God 
.takes' the initi-ative _in pouring his love out on sinners, 
. . 
man in :his right~ousness may not play a role 1n salv:ation. 
. . . . 
Th~ probl~~ h~r~:is that Jesus 1 comm~nt wag. 1r~n1c, ~the 
righteous were iri' fact sln~ers identical io ev~ri one else. 
In othe~ words s1n as a univer~al condition> ~o the 
netessity for all to be of grace, which can b~ interpreted 
in .a very aifferent manner to Nygren's~ Nygre~ presumably 
kn6ws of th~ ironic nature nf J~sus 1 ccimment, but his pur-
pose is to destroy the claini of independ-ence _that the ·idea 
. . . . . . . .. 
of righte~usn~ss s~ggests and ~6 reinYorce his op1n1on of 
. . 
humans as sinner~, who are entitled to nothing, iather 
than as creatures given an i~d~pendent dig~ity. 
The theme ls made cle~r u~der Nygren's headin~ 'Agape 
ls Creative'. A l~ngthy ~ubtation is woith~hile to 
illustra~e the differen~e between Nygr~~ and the position 
of Traherne and. Va:nstone. He writes: . • • 
It is not that God loves that wh{ch is in. itself 
worthy to be lov~d, but ori the 6ontrary, that 
~hie~ in itself._is ~~thout value· acquires value 
by th~ fact that it ~~ the nbject :of God's love. 
Agape is the direct opposite of th~t love which 
is called out by the worthiness of its object 
and so may be s~id to be ~ recognition of the 
v a 1 u e and . at t r a c t i v en e s s o f it ~ o b j e c t . T·h e 
man whom God loves has not ariy value in him~elf. 
H~s.value consists ~i~ply in t~~ fact that God 
.loves him. . 78 
In one sense this c9uld· b~ interpreted alongside Van~to~e 
to mean· that the creature· is ~holiy c ontin.geht every .moment 
upon God the Saviour, his value is a gift, man is not an 
eternal existent, ·he is ~reature: However this is not how· 
Nygren applie~ this~ and herein is th~ ~ignificance of 
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'that which iri itself is without ·value acquires value .1. 
Vanstone could ,not &ave w~itten this because.in existin~ 
the being ·~as ~alue as ~~6reature. ~ygren has the notion 
of the being's ~xisting ~~~th6ut value' as a sinne~ and 
then being given valu~ by Agape.· The result is that 
Nygren in~not ascribing any value to creation, ~nd opting 
initead for ~view of the sinner's existence as wholly 
withdut valu~ and fallen, reintroduces the problem of 
avoids . 
dualism~· This Va~stone/in .his accept~nce of the creature's. 
value by virtue of his existing as a creature. 
Thus for Nygr~n man is a beiQg with no independence 
or rights,. he has no freedom he is simply a being_ for God 
to act upon,5° 'Agape starts from the con~iction of man's 
. . . 
own worthlessness. Wh~n man has f~llen away ffom God, he 
is wholly lost, ~nd of ~o -value at all' .79 Nigren's co~-
cepti6n o£ treation, s1n and fall is wholly diffejent from 
t~e Vanstoniari/Trahernian pos.ition. It create~ a new· 
dualism 1n which th~ slnner remains in existence, inde~ 
pendent of God's gr~ce and thus worthless. Man's integrity 
is thus destroied and a sheep and goats mentality created. 
This position results from a refusal to c~~sider any 
altern~tive between his own view and that ·of the Greeks 
he opposes which opts for· 'the idea of the infinite value 
of the human soul' .So Taken in its own terms it is ·agreed 
with Nygren that the l~tt~r is not a Christian idea but 
then it is certainlY not ~rahern~ 1 s or Vanstone's either. 
They stand. for an option re!arding Creation which makes 
the independence and integrity of even sinf~l man of vital 
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importance to the p~oper fulfillment of God's Cre~tion .. 
Men's value is ~holly derived from God as creator, but by 
vir~tie of bein~ in exist~nce~e~en as sinners they m~st .as 
objects of love d~stined for loving. communion with God·, 
r~iain genuine fr~edom of choice. In a creation, to exist 
must be to be of valu~, fbr Nygren to have valueless 
.. , 
existence in creation is a conceptual contradiction. ·They 
appreciate,..as Nygren does not,..that the condition of fr·ee-
. . . 
dom is the e~~ential God-given component of humanity·: 
., 0 Adam . 
. All other-things have· a riature bounded 
. . 
within certain l~ws; thoU only art loose from all and 
~ccording to thy own council in the hand of which I h~ve 
put ~hee, ~ayst chobs~ a~d prescribe what nature thou wilt 
t o · t h y s, e 1 f . We have made thee· neither heavenly. nor 
ea~thlr, neith~r mo~tal nor immortal, that being the 
honoured forme~ and framer of thyself, thou mayst shape 
. . . . . . . 81 
thyself into what nature thyself. pleasest~~ . 
D.D. Williams ~pecifi~ally condemns Nygten for his 
a~titude concerning God's love and human ·free~om. He. 
cannoi ~ccept Nygren's stress on love's '.uncaused' nature, 
that is that it does not relate to the value of the beloved. 
He writes of Nygren that 'love is meaningless without 
. .. . . . . 82 
causal::!.ty.' . • Williams' position is drawn both from an 
app~eciation.of the value in creation and from t~e· scienti-
fi~ perception of cau$e and eff~ct. Ee is concerned that 
ldve should maintain a freedom that 1s compatible with a 
degree of causality, so spontaneity as freshness rather. 
than arbitr~rines.sis acceptable alongside tausality. This 
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p~sition accepts that man is a comple~ composite creature, 
who 1s acted up~n by external forces, but w~6 nonetheless 
has an innovative capacity to alter,~i;c~~st~nc~~.· F6r 
Williams the future is .not fixed, ma·n has to create .it in: 
. . 
- . . . 
conjun~tion with riat~ral farcies and the ~piri~ of Cod, .and 
this returns us to V~nsto~e's ideas on Prbvidence whicih 
are to be. studied presently. 
Behind the positive thought of Vapston~, Traherne 
and Williams lies ·imago_dei theology. This is an an~ient 
tradition built around Genesis 1:26 and of particular 
importance in the Orthodox traditi~n .. However it is 
explicitly u~ed by both Trahern~ and Wi~liams.. The idea 
of being in God's 1mage 1s associated generall~ ~ith~the: 
notion of choice~ Man, like bod, is ·cap~ble of free choice, 
. . . . . 
hence its appearanc~ in these authors and it~ distavQur· 
with those who distrust fteedom. ~raherne w~itei that 
'the image of .God ~as not seated in the featuies ~f your 
face but in the liniaments of your Soul. In the knowledge 
of your Powers, Inclinations, and Principles the ·kndwledge 
of you~self chieily consistet~' . 83 Williams devot~s a 
heading to the issue. 84 · He h6lds that the idea. of"m~n made 
. . 
1n God's image 1s wholly Biblical an~ gr~rits that tbe. 
crucial question i~ what happens to the image. in face of 
. . 
S1n. he notes the Catholic answer to th~ question using· 
the distinction-of Irenaeus between tselem and _demuth• 
within the text of Genesis 1.85 Tselem st~nds .f6r t.he image, 
that is the endowment of meQ with ~eason and dominion, their 
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likeness to God i~ respect of being able to choose, being 
rational; These .faculties although warped remain sub-
stantially intact such th~t natural man can ~ecognise his 
predicament arid chose to turn .. to God. and be saved. Demuth 
stinds for th~ similitude, that is the graces of faith,. 
hope and love, for in the Fall these are held to be lost 
entirely. This sche~a form~ the iround plan for the 
Catholic posit16n of grace completing nature. Man to be 
saved required God's act, The independence he has, cannot 
in itself save him, but it can allow him to perceive his 
situati~n and to choose whethei he will accept God's·aid 
to redeem him. 
Such a pd~ition 1s clearly helpful to a theolog~ like 
Vanstone's which stres~es the freedom of man while wishing 
to retain the role of grace. It a·lso has its application 
to th~ Augustinian/Pelagian contro~crsy in reconcili~g ~oth 
elemenis, which s~ould be remembered in reading the next 
chapter.86 As Will~ams notes, this position was inimical 
.to the Protesiant Reformers, the consequences of which have 
already been s~en in the remarks concerning Nygren. For the 
Reformers, according to Williams~ not only was the similitude 
lo~t but the whole image of God was ieft 1n ruins. The 
Reformers feared th~ Catholic. confidence 1n human reason and 
determined that ~race mtist be over a~l and so ~rected what 
this preseE.t study m.ust regard .as the false oppositi.on 
between grace and man'.s free will. In thei~ v1ew the. image 
of Goa was the 'original righteousness' ~ith vhi~h God had 
endowed Adam and th{s original right relationship h~s been 
·lost in its entirety in th~ Fall. 87 Williams mak~s the 
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interestin~ point that both systems lose man's ·relation to 
love. In the Catholic, the loss of the similit~de leads 
to the loss o~ the three theological virtues in~luding 
that of love. Granted this problem, the Catholiri sc~e~e 
does preserve man's fre~dom in a manner the Pro~estant 
does not. Williams himself dev~lops a· new sense for the 
imago dei~ He does not wish to regard it as .a ~pecial 
quality (ihe nat~re) but by his applic.ation 6f process 
theology, the·imago dei is to stand for the relation in 
which ~an lS created with his neighbour before God. It 
lS to stress man's personal qualities including love, and 
it. thus ref~rs n6t to a· static ~o~c~pt of human nature b~t 
to a dynamic persohal view of life in which love·is the key. 
Imago dei is the form of creation for a life fulfilled in 
. . 
love, aL~ sln becomes the failure .to realise the life of 
love. 88 
It. would b~ impossible to discuss Proc~ss Theology ln 
detail her~,. but by quoting Willia~s it is possi~le to see 
how important traditional themes are, eveh if modified. 
Willi~ms thoughts on the imago dei together .with the 
classical formulations of it are of importance' for Vanstone's 
theology -of love together with its stress on men's fre~dom. 
Likewise as.will be seen Wiliiams stands akin to Van~tone 
in his d6ctrine of God. Indeed comparing the two raises 
the iht~resting ~uestion, as to wh~t extent does Vanstone, 
who eschews particular positions, write as a process 
theologian? A theme 9f equal traditional importance to the 
imago dei, and which like it has undergone current 
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rewriting and is ais~ of i~portance to a theology of love, 
is th~t of Beatitude. In this case it is Traherne who has 
. . . 
provided the link between a commitment to love on-the part 
of Dod towar~s man, and man's final ena 1n a life of blis~. 
In Ja~que~ Maritain, a C~tholic author, the stress on 
Beatitude as th~ life ~f l~ve has been examined ~o illtimi-
nat~ Jesus' sAying that 'today thou shalt be wi~h m~ 1n. 
paradise'. With such a rich concept of the after life the 
problem of regard and of.self centered ethics appears,--
h~nce Maritain will be exa6ined in m6re detail in the 
. so 
chapter bn 'self love'. / Likewis~ Moltmann (developed 
elsewh~re) shows a renewed Protestant commitment .to the 
joyfulness of m~n's e~d iri its relation to God's glory. 90 
Under the broad heading o~ Creation Ethics, this. 
chapter has exa~ined ihr~e headings in connection ~ith 
the criterion. that God is love. Those·headings.h~ve be~n 
the idea of God as an ~rtist 1n creation~ ~he problem of 
the Fall and th~ qu~stion -~f man's end. The three•are 
related s1nce their reconciliatiori is required if an ordered 
view of c~eaiion 1s to be achieved which takes sc1ence and 
particularly evolution into account. The image of God as 
an artist in Vanstone's portrait enabled an identification 
to be made bet~een God 1 s a~tivity and a creation with a 
degree of ~rder, th~t is not one of sheer raridomness but 
o~e of scientific causal£ty, yet a creation .. that is not to 
be determined either sc~entifi~ally 9r theolo~ically. The 
image of God as artist was also seen to be comp~tible with 
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the idea of God ~s love, 1n that it allowi the lover to 
respect the ini~grity of the beloved, God with his 
creation. Such an evolving image alia aiiowed the hop~ ot 
Beatitude,the thought that the end of ~an 1s·ribt in utter 
disjunction from this world's experience. 
This world is thus of great consequence for the 
hereafter. This thought was l{nked t6 Biblical traditioh 
particularly in Paul, to Vanstone, and e~pecially to· 
Traherne's very positive use of the world ~hich he celebrates 
throughout the Centu~ies. Such assessments were ·sh6wn to 
be very different from those of Protestints such·as Nygren 
using a very pessimistic :loctrine o·f sin. The question O!.~ 
siri and the fall has been noted·as the m~Jor problem 1n 
considering the creation. It w~s not~d ~s a ~rbblem that 
Vanstone d~d not face squarely. Equally the.Nygrene~que · 
ans~er is tot~lly unsatisfactory, for it r~vives 
problem of Dualism and is not consonant ~ith ~he nat~re of 
love and its stress upon the. necessity of free ·response. 
Thus an attempt ~as made to begin to deveiop a notioh of 
fall conson~nt with evolution which does·l~a~e man respons-
. . . 
ible for sin. Consideration. of the Cieation in relation to 
the notion of God as love is thus seen to be important both 
from the manner of pei~eiving God's c~e~tive ~ciivity and 
th~~ the revelation ~f his nature, an~ fro~ considering the 
.problem ·that our exper1ence of the c~eatidn 1s .riot all ~e 
would want it to be. There 1s both the qtiestion of our 
wrorigdoing and also. of the physical nature.of the ·universe. 
The latter returns us to the notion of the necessity of· 
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some form of ~volution for the .free development: of matter 
·for ou~ riw~ human ~reedoffi to e~ist . Su~h .issues form the 
.. 
. . · J. • e . 
me~t of f6llowihg chapt~r~,/fre~dom in the next chapter, and. 
furth~r ~opside~atlon bf ~an's. end in the chapter 'self-
may 
lo~e' -what/man expeci f6r hi~self? 
.BY studying the ontological question of the nature Of 
relation and being, ~rith the thought that 'God is love', 
· po~itive consequenc~~ for the nature of man have been 
drawn. The i~portahc~ of the Trinity in safeguarding the 
necessity of relation for the fulfillment of being has a 
vital .role ~o play i~ safeguarding the being of men. Unless 
. . - . 
God is himself relational, the i~portance of relation for 
men cannot be ded~ced by.the theist .. Yet as many human-
ists app.:t.ecia.te;, as 1-.'e ~al< J.rl Midgley, relation is 
~••nda·m~·n~al t·o hum"n bo~~; 
.!.Lll. ~ V ...._ . C1 -........1.;..0• These two chapters of ontology 
lay t~e. groundwork. for the fol:t.oving chapters ln which ·the 
practical consequences of ·the Trinitar~&n:God of love ~re 
exe.mined. Chie£ly ~ttention- must be given to the provid-
· ential action of a God cf love se':'king to respect ~1i.s 
. . . . -· 
creat.~ies' irttegrity. The creatures' integritY is directly 
tonsequehtial from the na{ure of love wtich demands free 
relation and th:ls reg:uires. 'sJ~ace' ·for its development. So 
. . . . 
God'~ gra~e ~n~ pro~ideric~, if they be of a God of love, 
dedicat~d to the freedom of His cr~ature's response may well 
. . . 
' . . . . . . . 
take on an unfamiliai form.· 
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CHAPTER THREE' 
FREEDOM, GRAtE, AND PROVIDENCE 
The object of this chapter will.b~ to 6otisider.how 
these three interelated 1ssues may be ~orirayed in ba~mony 
with the work of earlier chapters. The three are not to 
be-~onsidered 1n isolation. Else~here in thi~ w6rk the 
view has been .devel~pea.of a God, who in Trinity fo~ms a 
. . . . . . : . . 
community of being compl~t~ in itself~ th~ough lov~;· ~hi~· 
God from the overwhelmiri~ f~li~e~s of iove ~esires to 
create a world and beings to share this divine .commu~ion~ 
. . 
Since ihis God is taken ~6 b~ the God. pf love a~d it is 
.axiomatic that love can only be off~red.ou~ of a ·fre~. 
willingness to God, the faculty of freedom is int.egral to 
man. Thus a coricept of Gbd bnilt around fue notion of love 
and of creation as outlined, requires con~eptions of grace 
and providence which do noi prejudicie the freedom of man 
held to be vital to hi~. Traditionally it ·is th~:se two 
concepts which ofte~ seem to prejbdice freedOm~ Likewise 
. . . . 
the classic~ 'if God kno~s of evil~ H~ must.be able to. 
. . . 
. . . . . . 
re~~ve {t, ~e does not .therefor~ He·~is not' aigu~ent.has 
depended on views of grace and pro~idence which ascribe 
'tbi~l' power to God. It will ~e ·attempted in what foll6ws 
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to show ~~~ the c~ncept of. dod which has be~n used through-. 
out this work both· serves t~ guarantee our human fre edam, 
and al~o in some ~~asure to ~ecoricil~ a God of grace to the 
. . 
continued existence of evil ~rid. suffering in _this world. 
In our estimation it i~ the recent wor~ of Hubert 
Vanst~ne whi~h shows very ~learly the link between the 
doctrine of God as loVe and the consequ~nces which follow 
for the conceptions:of the nature of men's freedom and the 
doctrines of grace and providence. An an~lysis will thus 
be given of Vanstone's work. Patallels to his work 1n 
oth~r theoiogians will also be nbted as will be the cerise-
queht problems, withi~ the str~~tur~ of 'Vanstonian' 
providence. 
Vanstone prepares the way for his ~nalysis of grace~ 
and providence by for6ulating his to~cepiion·of God. He. 
cre~tes his picture of the G6d _6f lo~e·vla an analogy from 
1 human love. He regards t~is as justif~able since he 
holds that the word love c~nnot ~eanin~fully be used vithout 
first appreciating our ordinary human experience·ther~of. 
Secondly he uses ~ via ~~gati~a. That is, he defines thr~e 
'marks' which deny love in the human sense and from this 
holds that God must ex~~plify.the converse. The ·first mark 
is that of limitation. 2 Love never .witholds itself, unless 
there is:g6od r~ason f9r the sake of the beloved. When men 
test love, they ~an 6nly ~Y trials establish love's falsiti, 
its authenticity cari ri~ver be 'p~oven'. A totality of self 
giving 1s ·essential~ by loving,}the self makes itself avail-
able. If. this can be said of the best of human love, it 
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s~ould also be safd of the divine. Th~ charac~e~istic 
expression of ih~ limitiessness of ~ivine love ia in the· 
notion of Christ's endless- forgiveness. The second. 
negative niark J.s that ofcontrol.3 In human love;if. the 1·ov·er 
is ln control Of the beloved then love fails. Love. is· 
activity for the s~ke of the othe~ and not self aggrandi~e-
ment. Ir the beloved lS under the control 6f the lover, 
the b~loved is no longer other and so no longer belov~d~ 
but merely an extension of one'~ own ego. Vanstone gi~~~ 
as an example; the son living at home with his mother who 
has got him 'where he is'. Lov~ is always distorted by 
possesii6n an~ contr~l that lS one sided. Conversely 
w he r e t h e b e 1 o v e d i s r e a 11 y o the r , t he a c t i vi t y o f 1 o y e . 1 s 
always precarious. True human love has no riertai~~y of 
~ompletion because true love relies on mutuality and ther~-
fore in this world's setting 1s precar·ious and vulner·a.qle. 
With human beinis, true love 1s alw~ys ap~n to disappoiht-
ment~ For example, Vanstone quotes the problems of 
children's upbringing. Wantirig the children to discoye~ 
for themselves is balanc~d by the temptation n~ver to 
expose them to any danger. In Vanstone's eye~ control of 
on e party by an o t her 1 s very di f fer en t from tend er mu.t u a 1 
toncern and is fatal to love, which ought always to be 
marked by vulne~ability arid precariousness. 
~t ~hOuld by no~ be clear what sort of influ~nc~ 
Vanstone's portrayal of these 'marks' is going ta have on 
. .. 
the doctrines oi freedom, grace and providence. With the 
first mark, that of limitiessness, one can imagine the 
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majority pf Christians feeling no unease whatsoever. 
However when th~ s~cond mark is translated to God, many 
Christiani might feel that the doctrine ot P~ovidence w~~ 
.under threat~ I~ not the essence of man's sec~rity pre-
ciiely .that h~ 1s under the control of God? The 
unde~standing of God being in control over his children 
has been fundamental to Christian theology, whether in 
extr~mis. such that men are merely machines, or in mo~e 
mode~ate 'popularist' views that 'God will make it come 
right in the end', the view that whatever happens was all 
r~ally So~ the be~t. Fitalism in a weak form 1s.very 
comfortin~, one no lohger has to excuse one's failures. 
· Vanston~ 6ow~v~r.has virtually overturned this theology. 
'Virtually'is stressed, for it 1s vital to note that 
Vanstope will display a ~eans by which God remains Lord. 
Certainly his intention under this heading is to give 
to human bei~gs a remarkably radical fo~m,6f fteedom. Thus 
if what. is said of ~en under this hea~ing 1s referred to 
God, it would seem tha~ God is voluntarily relinquishing 
~spects or his potential control over human beings, to 
which he might be entitled by virtue of his sovereignty. 
From the orthodox viewpoint, what is most questionable· is 
the suggestirin tif God's precario~sness and vulnerability, 
as if anything that mere -mortals might do 'could effect the 
Almighty God. • It is as if it ·is being suggested th~t God 
is hu.rt when men take no notice of him' angry he might be 
but not hurt (irony). What Vanstone suggests must be very 
threatening to many but it does see~ to be a theology whi~h 
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1s g1v1ng the abiliti to determine the f~te of th~ un1verse 
into the hands .of men as a gift of God. . This would. s_eem a 
providence· much more acceptable, to today's sci~n-tific -w-orl·d 
view~ Parallel~ ate clea~ly·visible ~it~ th~ .'~~olutionary'·: 
theology of Tei~hard de Chardin ~y which ma~;s ~b~iinacy lS 
.able to impair.e~olutionary pro~ress. 4 M~n's.~cceptan~e pr 
not of love determines for Teiihard whether he re~ches his 
God-given _end or not. 
This challenging of traditional portrayals 1s co~ptetej 
by Vanstone's analysis of the third mark, that of detachment~ 5 · 
It must be remembered that in the Gre~k view .of God whi~h 
Christianity has in·large measure inherited, detachment·, 
God's self sufficiency and· invulnerability ~re key fea-tures 
.of God's being God .. In some forms pf mo~astic _spi_rituality 
too, it has been axiomatic to st~ive ib~ d~tach~ent·~ for 
. . 
'separ£')-tion urito God' from all attachments to the world and 
other persons. I~ human terms Vanstone ~6~trays the 
negative mar.k of detachment as a self.-sufficiency which is· 
unaffected and unimpaired by the ~~e ~hom it professe~ to 
love. If love is described as a self-giving it ou~ht; 
~ccording·to Vanstone,~give a power over onese·l.f. to the other. 
In loving an6ther we are gi~ing to the other ~ certain powe~ 
over oneself. Detachment for Vanstone 1~ greatly to be 
feared because it d~st~oys vulnerability~ It removes the 
power to ~ake the other and/or-oneself angry, glad, sorrow-
ful and joyfu1. 6 Ironically it is the idol of the modern 
. . 
era with its desire 'to have no ties', where self-sufficiency 
and inde~enderice are held up as ideal~. Vanstone allows 
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d~ta~hmeni as he ~llowed control, only if ~t 1a exercis~d 
to foster the d~vel6pment of the beloved. Thus a parent 
. . . ~ . . 
may have to become detached fro~ a child in order to let 
it mature. · 
In contrast to much .theological wiiting either on the 
·doctrine of self-~tifficiency or upon sp{ritu~lity V~nst6ne 
empha~izes attachment ~nd vuln~rability betw~en God and man. 
He thus raises the qtiestion of m~n's contingency ~ doe~ God 
need us? This w~s. tackl~d under· 'Trinity a~d Relation'~ 
Now Vanstone's portrait of ~od~ rendered vulnerable to the 
decisions of men, who has ~ndowed the~ ~ith very great 
freedom, ~nd whO wish~s·to be a partner ·with ·men 1n 
mutuality and not control, .ls ~ccepted and c6nnect~d· t6 the 
It can be noted, however, 
that the American theologi~ri Doriald. Goergen ~ro~ides a 
. . . . . . . 
broadly similai analysii ~f de~~chment .at the human le~e1. 7 
He uses the terms deperiden6e .and independ~n~e and note~ 
how: 'Too often we ident1fy dependence as a neg~tiYe trait 
. . . . 8 . . 
and 1ndependence as a pos1t1ve one' H1s 1deal term 1s 
that of interdepend,ence. ·His book, however, 1s an analysis 
. . 
of hum~n relati~ns particularly in the realm of celibate 
spirituality and does nci make a central issue of linking· 
. . 
human-human ideal~ ~~ relation to the divine-hu~a~ 
relation in ~anst~n~'s manner. Howevei, like Varistone, he 
does· accept the propriEty ·of applying an analogy drawn from 
humari experienc~ to the divine~ He does this _by noting 
how the church has often used the Song of Solomon as a 
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spiritual metaphor of the relation between Christ and the· 
Church. So Go~!gen ii abl~ to state, 'Even interpret~d 
allegorically, i~ tells us. ~om~thing about sexuality 1n. 
that the rel~tio~shi; between the tv6 lovers 1s used as 
an appropriate ~ay td symboli~~ the ~y~t~cal· union'.9 
.Even in Paul he finds the use of human l~ve a~ a symbol qf 
that is 
Chri~t's love. 10 ~exual union is-thus sacramental, I at 
. . 
~ts best a iign of divine love. For Goergen the· signifi~ance 
·or s.exualit~ is that it r~veala that we are ~ot created 
self-subsistent being ag~inst all the tendencies to stress 
monadism w~ether {~ ~an or more dangerously in Go~.ll· 
If th~n ~ith Vanstone, the ~alidity pf the human 
met.aphor of love is· acc~pted, :lt has been seen that .this 
portray~l of ~ove as yulnerable, attached and giving a· 
degree of control to the bel6ved will have consi~erabl~ 
effect on Freedom, Grace and Providence .. Thi~ ·i~ made 
abundantly clear in th~ following chapter.where the human 
analrigy is applied to Chri~t's redeeming work~ He uses the 
category of Kenosis noi simply as a description of how 
Christ beeame man, but ~s being in harmortj wiih the three 
marks of the analogy of ·love. Renosis be6omes a summary 
of the wh-ole divine relation to the created orcier, 'the 
God Who is ievealed ~s the very God who 'empties H:lm~elf' 
whose vhole ~nd to~il activity is the ac~ivity of .self 
emptying' or K~nosis' I .1 2 God becomes a kenotic God .. The 
objection that if God empties himself he becomes less .thari 
his fullness is answ~red by r~tortin~ that his fullness is 
fulfilled in his verj nature of self giving. Kenosis 1n 
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Christ 1s not just a means of God becomirig man in order to 
redeem us - a t·echnical feat - but the natur.al expr.ession. 
. . . . 
of God's' being who will not withold anything of himself 
fo~ his cr~atrire~. Keno~ii thus affects the notions of 
grace and providence not just 1n th~ divine acti~n in 
Christ but in the ~octrine of cr~atioti. Creatioti is the 
result 6f God's kenotic activity as is its susten~nce and 
its redemption in Christ. 
The cr~ation ~f th~ ~orld is th~s a totally kenotic 
act on the part of Gbd ~hich must reflect the three marks 
of love~ There can be.no.limit in God's own self giving~ 
The. whole of G()d 1s expended in the creative and sustaining 
act accord{ng to Vanstone: 'Nothing must be ·witheld from 
the gelf gi~ihg which is Creation: no unexp~nded reserve 
of divine power or. potentiality: no "glory of .God" or 
. - .-, 
. ..L"' 
"majesty of God"' .. ~ .It is not ·a.s if .having creat.ed man, 
a part of the. divine nature c"arries. on as 'before u~al t.ered 
by what has happened. God did not have to create~ but 
once embarked on the course, it would be against _the nature 
of God, according to Vanstone to hold back anything of his 
bein~. .Ail this a~tivity of God takes place 1n an 
~~olutionary world, and the example Vanstone develops 1s 
the e~olutian of artistic tale~t. 14 The artist ~ho having 
. . 
the crtide mat~rial, by his ability shapes it to the de~i~ed 
end,. and is able if ialented to turn miitakes into beauty 
The .power 1absolute and supreme, which God ~xercises 1n 
creation isthat oflove. it is therefore a limitless 
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capacity for sel·f g1v1ng, and not ·~ naked powe~, it i~ 
power to cope ~Teatively with any situation but it is not 
powe.r to behave arbitrarily. God's nature is loving· and 
. {herefbre trustwotthy, his power serves iove and not uice 
versa. 
The kenotic God tif love who creates cannot do·so by 
an assure.d programme. Cr.eation cannot be the exerc1se of 
naked power, rather it lS the spending of his own bei!lg 1n 
order to create' beings vdlo can freely respond to commun1on 
.with God. For that. free response, aid to do justic~ to the 
e~olvirig world~ the activity of God cannot abuse ~he ma~k 
of·control. If God contr~lled ~en they would no ~ong~r be 
able tti lo~e him fteely. · God's activity in creation a~d 
the~~fore providence m~st be precarious: 
Its progress, like every ~r~gres~ of love, 
m~st be an an~ular progr~ss - in which each 
step is a precarious step into the unknown; 
in which eact triumph contains a new poten-
tial uf tragedy. and each ttagedy ~ay be 
redeemed int6 a wider triumph. .15 
1. e. 
Thus although the end is 1n view,/the Kingdom, God's being 
Gtid g1ves him the po~er to cope with whatever evolution 
and man's freedom may present en route without prejudicing 
.the course of either. Vanstone's argument is that the 
nature. of loie, even divine love, must demand ~ creati6n 
much as it is; ·there is no fall from a primaeval glory. 
Rather h~ Rdh~res to the twin demands of humanism, that 
.the natural order· 1s not to be miraculously interfered 
with, and that man's independence lS not prejudiced by God. 
Instead a ·p6werful portrait o~ divinity built around the 
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concept of love 1s ~o pi~sented as to ~equire evolution and 
human freedom i':il order to co!lform t.o the experimental nature 
of love. God ~~eates foi th~ end of ~olun~ary c6mmunion; 
. . . 
creator and .creature·, and tci this end· God has to· w·ork 
within the natur~l ~roce~ses. 
Vanstone is· quite blunt that bec~use God is lqv~ even 
he does not fully know the preci~e shape of the end ~f .. 
. . 
Creation, however he is capabLe of coping ~ith whatev~r lS 
produced .. A lengthy quotation well illusttat~~ this: 
tf the creation ii the work. of lo~e, then its 
shape c~nnot b~ predetermined by the dreator, 
nor its triumph forekn~wn; it is the realisation 
of vision,. but of vision ~hlch is dii~over~d 
only through it~ own reali~ation; and f~ith. in . 
its triumph is neither mar~ nor less t~an ·fai~h 
in the cieat6r Himielf - faith· that ~~ will not 
cea~e from H1s handiw~rk. nor. a~an~on t~e ·obj~ct 
of His love .... The -creation is "safe'' not ·t)_ecause 
it moves by piogramme tbw~rd~ a ptedeteimiri~d 
goal but bee a use trie s arne loving c rea t.i vi ty is 
ever exer~ised upon it. 16 
The influence oi Vanstone~s use ~f love uppn th~ concept of 
. 
God lS now seen to be clearly evident in Providerice. He.· 
produces a picture which many Christians would find frankly 
frightening. T h e p r e c i s e s hap e of the ·.·end o f . c rea t i on i s 
simply not known to God, fo~ ibe sa~e·ot evolution's own 
unfettered developm~nt, and man's own freedom to respond. 
Faith in God by.~an, 1s not faith in :the ce~tainty that 
God will lead him to a fixed end, b~t that fiith in God's. 
ac~~on leads to an ~s y~t tinknown but highl~ appropriate 
end. Again a parallel.can.be seen in·Teilhard de Chardin's 
thought where evolution's final fulfillment depends on 
man's val U:ntary co-operation with God . 1 7 Vanstone has 
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pushed the· analogy between· God and artistic ·creation very 
far irideed. H{s pi6tu~e ~iil certaini~ be more r~adily 
reconcilable with an evolutionary world view, but for 
. . . . . 
tr~ditional theolOgy God has .b~en st~ipped 6f attri~utes 
normally ~pplied to ·him such as omniscierice, omnipotence and 
his. impassibility. 
The classic problem of Providence is that of innocent 
suffering.and Vanstone offers an eXJ?lana.tion of this to fit 
. . . . . . . . 
1n with his 6oncept .of arti~ti~ ~rea~i~~ in iove. Again it 
. . . 
seems to fit 1n with an evolutionary '..rcirld. v1ew tut to be 
at odds with e~rlier Christian c6ncepti. _Vanstone ascribes 
. . 
. . . . 
physical evil to what he tifms the precariousness of creation ~ 
which is 1n scien~ii~c ey~s, the ran~om and. causal ~lements, 
creation lS ·.not sensitive ,t.o man's lvishes,. Physical evil 
lS not for him ~ue to· m~li~i6usrieis ~n the p~rt of Creation, a 
VleW 
/ ,;.;-hich Christians starting with the ·Gene;sis texts have 
. .' d. .18 . t somet~mes veere to. Vans one emphasize~ tha~ this is no 
radical dualism,but 1s sirrply the ~~tu~e-of creative l~ve. 
Since that which 1s created haS to be 'other', it has to 
be free to be aliowed ·it.s b~n p~ssibilities. These cannot 
be 'foreknown but ~ust be discovered; (and) ihat its 
possibility must be . 11 1vbTked out" in the creative process 
itself; and that 'th~ working out mu~t incl~de the correction 
of the step which has proved.~- false step. ,l9 Genesis. even 
with God ·resting on the seventh day mak~s cre~iion seem 
' . 
effortless. Vanstone notes this, ~oldirtg that the language 
used 'conveys an i~pression of ea~y. control and limited 
· d · f. · · h 1 d v , d d ·, 20 en eavour~ o resources e 1n reser e. an Po¥er.unuse . 
3': 12. 
It 1s against this 1mage, popular in devoti~n, and f~r the 
sake of accepti~g the evide~ce ·of gr~at wastag_e and l·oss. in 
the physical process that Vanstone ·develops his· alten1"ative·. 
'Evil. as evolutionary fallout' . ·is the phras·~ us.ed. b·y· 
Spr6xton in his discussion of de Chardin's con~eption of 
. . 
evil~ and it may al~o se;ve to describe V~n~tone'~ view. 21 
This ~vil ~hich is a co~sequence of the physic~l 
. . 
progress does no~ exist deliberately as a m~ans to a 
greater good. All along it is only a 'possibility' conse~ 
quent upon the ~llowance by God of fieed6m both to 
matter and people's own development ~ both are £ree to 
develop within.their dw~ boundaries. This does make· sense 
if Vanstone's God is soverei~n; His God 1s sov~reign yet; 
. . ... 
has not predestined evoluti~ri, so matt·er is freedom from 
the direct control of God in the same mariner in·~hith men's 
nwn freedom is ~ore n6rmally conceived~ Freedofu here is 
not 'a -free for all' but a freedom to de-velo"p in ·conforllii ty 
wi~h its own ~aws or volition, under the ~ustaining but not· 
directitig providence of God. Evil then is the ptoblematical 
. . 22 
moment unforeseen and unforeseeable. Vanstone ~it~s the. 
specific example of Aberfan. 2 3 God here is firmly-placed 
as allowing himself to be subj~ct to the physical creation; 
He writes. that, ~t the moment when the. m~untain 6f Aberfan 
slipp~d, "something went .wrong"; the step or" creative.·ri?k 
. . . . . . . . . . . .. ·.. . . . 
w~s the step of d~saster: ihe creative proces~ pa~sed out 
of control.' God is po~trayed _not as looking on from a~ove, 
permitting the· disaster for 'His own inscrutable reasons', 
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but as a God. 'Who received, at the foot of the mountain, 
its appal~ing impact;' 
Vanstone fits ·God into the naturalistic scenario. 
Nature rs tiattir~ as sc.ience ~ees it,. and God de~i~ed to 
risk its being sue~ in his creation,se~ure only {n the 
knowledge tba~ he has the capability to cope. Df the 
61assic doctriri~s of ·omniscience, omni~otence, omriipresence 
and {m~assibility, only omnipotence and omnipresence are 
left. Omniscience and impassibility have clearly b~en 
removed, albeit by God's own choice ~nd foi the sake of 
the_freedom of his creatur~s as a consequence of the nature 
of love. . 'Miracul-ous·' i nt erfer enc e is thus removed. The 
:only ~ifference between·~ Christia~_and a n~n~Christ1an 
judgement of creation is {~ the significance ~f t~e pu~pose 
that they attach to_the material and nbt 1n their estima-
tion of the physical processes. For.Vanstpne, the Christian's 
distinctive position i~ ~o see in the scieniific ~roce~ses 
a God at work u~herihg in through these, at greai cdst to 
himself~ a Kingdom in which love·will be all in.all. 
The probl~m-·of the lack nf moral evil in this picture 
was discussed in the previous chapter. What needs to be 
emphasized heie is just how radical a rewrit~ng qf the 
doctrine of Godhas occured in Vanstone's work. Through 
hii analysis of love,: the doctrine of providence ha$ been 
rewritten to harmonise with the natural sciences. The 
nature of God has been utterly changed from the accepted 
notioni of impassibility, omniscience etc. Instead God 
does not 'knn~' very much about. the precise future course 
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of cr~ation; his ~istinctiveness is not 1n .his 'knowl~dge' 
but in his crea-ti .,e · po:.,er to love, which can cope with and 
redeem whatever· is pres·ented. ..This revelation of the 
. . 
kenotic nature of G6d is seen as th~ ~ssence Of the 
Incarnation. I~~anence 1.s being ~tr~ssed r~th~r than 
·transcendence. God as o~tside the world hai beeri firmly 
placed in~ide th~ ~reatipn,· not as a cog or component, but 
as its creator .who, unlike the clockmaker, does not sit .back 
tci watch having wound it up. God is the artist ·permanently 
and traumatically irivolved 1n his cr~ation. 
~od 1s so inv6lved in love f6r the creation and thus 
so concerned for its free Tespons~ that in ~ final radical 
step, Vanstone holds out the possibility of our frustrating 
God's end: Sin2e God'i~ love ~nd therefore vulnerable to 
the response of the other then: 
th~ issu~ of His love ~s trium~h or tr~g~dy 
depends upon His creation: There.is given. 
to the creation the p6wer to deter~irte the 
love of God as either triumph~nt or tragic 
love. This power may be called "power of 
II . . . . 
response : upon the response of the crea~ 
tion tbe lcive 6f God dep~nds for its triumph 
or tragedy. · 24 
Man's freedom is so important that the possibility of failure 
due to our gon-response has to b~ allowed for. This notion 
t hat me n c an f r u: s i rat e G 0 d I s pur p 0 s. e in a f in a 1 s en s e . l s 
. . . 
. utterly at variance with prior Christian thought. 
H~r~ is theolrigy ~t'the limit. On the one. hand Vanstone. 
maint~ins that God's love can cope with all, and on the 
other, th.e possibility .of aur frustrating God is a·llowed 1n 
order to preserve out freedom and to stress our responsibility 
- there is ~n element of ~aradox present. Certainly 
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the sheer existence of sin and evil testifi~s t6 the 
existence of some· d~gi~~ of ~ fiustration fac~or. Further, 
such a view of triu~p~ ot trag~dy do~s harmonise with a 
: . . . . . . . . . . 
creation in whi~h ~c~e~tists cannot discern any certain 
purpose - rather. it is ou~ choice to create it in harmony 
with Go~. It is not self-evident no~_~ill it be miraculously 
imposed. 
Vanstone•s=writ~ng 1s recent- 1977i Also within the 
book he is not very fbrthcomi~g on the sburc~s of his 
thought. This is deliberat~, fo~ both within the book and 
in correspond~nce, Vanstone ~akes cle~r that th~ inspiration 
for his work was principally.~erived from parish life. The · .. 
rest of this chapter then will be.ah attempt·to provide 
parallels and sources for. the ~evelop~ent of this radic~l 
doctrine o~ God and Pro~iden~e. It wili be seen -~rom what 
a variety of traditioris parallels 6an be drawn. Thi~ 1s 
important s1nce Vanstone himself seems ie~y reluctant .to 
join ani particular S6hool. He certainly ought not to. 
be simply lahell~d ~~-a proc~ss theologian despite some 
. . 
affinities with th~t ~c~ool:of thought. One theologian 
whom he specjficilly quotes is Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Already, 
in the autobio~iaphical·~hapt~r, he had been quoted as 
.being a sub~tantial iniiuence in Vanstbne's early ministry._ 
The quotation tbatr is used.is fro~ 6ne of ~onhoeffer's 
. . 
poems - 'Christians and Pagans'. It 1s set in the context 
of a discussion.of the vulnerability ofGod, the suffering 
he voluntarily undergoes at the hands of creation. 2 5 
Vanst6~e qu6tes only 'poor ~nd scorned, without shelter 
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or bread, whelmed und~r weight of the wicked, the weak and 
dead' speaking of a God .who is the subject of these lines. 
It mu~t b~.said or ~hat follows about Bonhoeffe~, that 
there i~ the problem that all the material from the prison. 
p~riod is what might be termed experi~ental. It was all 
written in a ~eriod of great crisis and so was .never fully 
develope~. Thus the radical doctrine of God that has.been 
d i s c o v: e r e d in Bon h o e f fer ' s . wart i me w r it i n g s i s . ·not a feat ur e. 
of the. ~arlier Cost of Disciples~ip. It is witnessed to 1n 
this later w~rk only by tempting snippets. 
'Christians and Pagans' is a poem designed to stress 
the di£fe~ence bet~een the ge~eraily accepte~ concept of 
do~ - the pagan view, arid· what Bonhoeffer sees as the .case -
The ironic picture of the poem is that . 
men go .to God out of need, 'Men go to God when they are sore 
bestead', and .instead .find tha~ they are going 'to a. God 
when he is sore bestead, {and so) find 6im poor and 
scorned' .. The Christian finds as 1n Vanstone that the 
crux of response lS to 'stand by God 1n hi~ hour of grieving', 
God .indeed 'goes to every man when ~ore bestead'. The 
concept nf God and thus of providence has been changed to 
portray God suffering at the hands of his creatures. This 
s~fferihg G6d is th~ exact o~posfte of wha~_much theol6gy 
expect~ of God and Accordingly changes the cohc~pt of 
providence. ~his is ciearly seen in the other classic 
Bonhoeffer text o:n the matter. His comments ori the inci~erit 
. . . 
in .the Garden of Gethsemane start fr6m a line of 
~hristia~s and Pagans: · 
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"Christians stand by God i~. hl~ hou.r .of· gri·eving"; 
that is what distinguishes Christians from·· 
pagans. Jesus a:·sked in Gethsemane, "Could y'ou 
not watch with me o·ne hour?" That is a reversal. 
of what the religious m~n expects i~~m God. ~an 
is summoned to share in dod's sufferings· at the 
bands· of a Gddless ~orld~ · .~6 
Subsequently these sentences have earned the· title 'religion-
less Christianity'. What is evident 1s that if they are 
accepted, then the sort of portrayal of providence Vanstone 
adopts will follow. God has for the sake :of his creatures 
abdicated certain of His powers such that He is ·the sufferer. 
_As Bonhoeffer notes in the prece,J.,ding letter, 'Man.'s 
religiosity ~akes him lo~k 1n his distresi to the-po~e~ of 
God in the wcirld. God is· the deus ex machina; The, :B:lble: 
directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering; onl~ the 
suffering God can help' . 27 
To be sure.there will be prcbl~mi concerning 
Bonhoeffer's ~xegesis of the Biblical mriterial. For our 
purposes t~ough it is sufficient to dem6~strate the conse-
quences of adopting the lang~age for this chapte~'s three. 
doctrines. Clearly a God who suffers at the hands of a 
godless world, who. is not the deus ex mdchina ~ill' 6p~rate 
a different .sort of providence. one it 15 suggested,close 
to that provided by Vanstone.. It is the latter who.; it 
might be held, provides the developed picture of ~religion-
less Christianity' that Bonhoeffer was pr~vented from 
creating. The essetice of this thought is ~ot to t~rh away 
from this world, to seek to find God in another altogether 
more secure ;rorld, but to ;;ee the world itself wit:p. all its 
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pain as the st~ge of Godrs action~ to participate in the 
pain of tb~ wo~ld ~s God's p~in~ The r~dical sepatation 
. . 
generally-~sed bet~~en t~~ ~ain of persons and tbe being 
of God .must. be completely overcome if either ·Bonhoeffer 's 
or Vans tone's -words. are taken seriously. God has been 
. . 
seen as attractive by many peopl~ 1n pain, as-helping by 
virtue of his not suffering; .Thus 1n the middle of pain, 
the painless serenity of God pro~ides a pbl~ to clutch. 
Bonhoeffer and V~nstone ~ttack precisely 'this serene God. 
From the same Gercianic tradition Buber p~o~ides a _quota-
tion concerning Christ in which· the parallel to Bonhoeffer 
and Vanstone is plain. In I and Thou h~ writes ·oi ·,ihe 
eq_uality o:7.' all lovers who~~ 1ii~ is circumscribed 
by the life c)f one. beloved human being t.o him that is nailed 
. . . .· 
his life long to th~ ~~oss of·the world, cap~ble of what is 
Im~ense an~ ·bold ~nough tb risk it: to lo~e man'·. 2 8 Here 
are the same themes of the dominar.ce of.the interpretative 
category of love, the conseq_uent stress not on naked power 
bu-: onthe inexhaustibility of love, and of the sense of 
'continuing crucifixio~•, 2 9 seen in. Bonhoe1fer and Vanstone. 
An even earlier pa~allel to Vanstone takirig into account 
the scientific world view - Bonhoeffer's 'Man 6ome of ~ge', 
. . . . 
i 3 provided. by John. Oman Is wo:d:. of 1917 ~·_Grace and Personality. 
. . . 
Just as Vanstone by defining his cioncept of God around that 
of ijhe h~man exper'ience of love .,-as enabled to rewrite the 
three doctrines, Oman too follows the same me~hod. His 
analysis does not specifically ~evolve ar6und the nature of 
love~ ~ rather, he:considers the ~emand of ~hat he terms 
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'm~ral personality'. Since God has created per~ons, he 
cannot operate iuch a system of grac~ and providence as to 
destroy the ccinditions of freedom under which ~heY w~re 
. . 
created ~o realise th~ir personhood. Omari rtarts by noting· 
hov the tension ha~ devel6ped from the Enlightenmen~ whi~h 
made man aware of his indeperid~nce, over against tbe 
'religious' man's view of an ~xt~rnal iniailible ·authority; 
in the eyes of many the plainest inference from God's nature 
and man's need. 
Omari pro~oses to challenge the whole notion o£ 'the 
might of omnipot~nce directed in an unswerving line of 
. . . 30 
omnJ.sclence'. He ho-lds that '.His omnipotence is an 
assumption based on_the mere naked idea of absolute force 
and .in no way ccncerned with the notion of God ~s Father.' .31· 
Oman's argumeni is that the no~ion of God's providence 
tied up with infallibility an~ 6mnipo{ence h~s gr6wn up 
not fr Oin moral t heo l 0 gy but from a more ]l.Y imi t i \~e power 
the6logy based on the sovereignty of God. Crudely speaking 
this is the notion that since God created us and lS Lord 
in terms of power, He can d~ facto do whatsoever He pleases 
' 
with::mt question from us.· This is the doctri-ne of Calvin 
and of Paul in Romans, 'Will what is moulded say to the 
potter, "Why have you moulded me thus?" Has the potter no 
·right over the clay to make out .of the -same lump one· vesse·l 
for beauty and another f~t menial use? r32 Su.ch w1;iti:1g is 
to be utterly rejected. Historically speaking ~he growth 
of such thought cari be understood. God was initially 
feared and treated simply ~s power, how~ver. ~s moral 
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sensitivity has devel6ped.it 1s Very clear that· the nak~d 
exerc1se Df powe~ is morally dubioui. 
Conceining the moral-ambiguity of. sheer power both 
Vanstone ind Oman use remarkably s.imilar language. Vanston~· 
too is identical to Oman in his disavo,.,ral of power theology 
.and its effect_on providence. Oman writes 'there is little 
to show that either tru~h or righte6usness ever came by 
way of irresistible might'~- and, 'Would such irresi·stible 
~ight as would save us from all error and. compel us into 
right action be iti accord either with God's personality 
. . . . 33 
or w1th ours?' Oman coridemns 'All infallibilities (as 
presupp9sing) an idea of grace m~cha~ic~lly irresiitible. 
. .. . : . .· 
But-a direct force controlling persons as things is n? 
. . . 34 
personal relati6n between Goi and man'. The 'infaJli-
bilities' of omni~otence, omn1sc1ence etc. owe more ·to the.· 
thou£ht of Gbd as power, deriv~d from the doctrine of 
sove1~eignty than from moral. cons.ideratio"ns .. Like-w-ise 
Vanstone ~rite~ that 'the imagery of popular devotion 
suggests g divine supr~macy over the u;{verse'. Ho1-rever 
the idea of supremacy is more appropriate to that of a 
tyrant - hence the _atheistic reaction such language can 
precipitate. Tln:s, .'supremacy is not the relationship of 
~he artist to th~ work of art, nor of the lover to the 
obje~t of his l~ve' : 3 5 It is precisely the images of the 
lov~r and of the artist around which Vanstone .revolves his 
portrait of God, ana in the tase cf the lover this is an 
image also at .the heart of Christian spirituality ·and 1s 
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a strand in Old. Testament prophetic· writ{ng.36 · V~nstone'~ 
own condemnation of the influence: of power theology upon · 
the t"hree doctrines could hardly be mo:re severe: 'That God 
should be super1.or 1.n. <.=ver;)r or 1.n any respect; to ·an 
inferior universe i~ a quite illegitimate deduction from 
the doctrine pf creation' ,37 
Too much $tress on ~ari's conscious rebellion. atainst 
God s~emming from:an over literalistic interpretation of 
Genesis leads theologians-to forget that cohtrolling all 
. . 
reflection ought. to be the ~otion ~f the end for which man· 
is created, to share in the 'glory o~ God'; Jfirg~n 
Moltmann, ¥hose theclogy also ~~nds away from the thought 
of God's naked power, towards that of a God involved in 
the pain of this worl~ end allo?ing him~elf to be su~ject 
to the natura ;L for c e s , t as a l so re.-u s ed the · notion of t 1-: e 
' 
'glory of God' as a co~trolli~~ factcii in ?ur con~_epti6n· 
of ourselves and our purpo~~ in partners~ip with Goi~ In 
Theology and Joy he is ·at pains to stre~s that the end of 
m~n is enjoyment of ahd with God. The joy of play - not 
childishness but chil~likeh~ss . 38 1.n trust-has to be recovered .. 
This is the thought of 'whosoever sball not rece1.ve the 
Kingdom oi Hea~en lik~ a little child ~hall not enter it. • 39 
.M~ltnann recognises that-categories like joy and the 
'glo~y of God' h~ve been eclipsed by power th~ology. He 
. . . ' . . 
accepts that the 'domi~ion oi God' is important to Biblical 
thought but hol~s that it .is complemented t6 an equaY degree 
by the 'Glory of God' which 1.s 'God's display of splendour, 
his ~eauty and his kindness of iove1iness' .4o In the same 
paragraph prominencie is given to love~ 'a love which does 
104 3:22 
.not merely m~nif~st itself ethically in love t6 the· neigh-
bour but also aesthetic~lly 1n festive play before God'~. 
~peaking of mah's response, which is thus ~ot simpl~ 
. ~ . 41 
obed2ence. · Unfortunat.ely the 'one~sided emphasis on 
.the d~minion of God in the Westein 6hurch, especially iri 
Prote~tintism, has subjected Christian existence to Judicial. 
an~ moral ca~·~gories' . 42 Here is a Calvinist th~ologia~ 
~ho has s~en that naked power is unacceptable to Chri~tian 
theology .. He has seen that a consideratio:r; of our. end as 
joy and 16ve in the glory of God is necessar~ and as· his 
vi~er theology has shown, this has altered the concept cf 
God and of his in~olvement in the world. (cf. The Crucified 
God)~ 
·The whole power argument could hardly be made simpler 
than V~nstone's own pithy comm~nt that 'Respect on the part 
. . 
of an inferior may be dictated by prudence; but. it can 
ha~dly ~e j~stified by.moral sensitivitj. Superiori-t~ as 
suci~ confers no moral right to respect: 1n pa~ticular, 
. 4 ?. 
superiority of power confers no such right' . .J Meanwbile,)· 
Om~n having made clear his stance on the power issue: that 
of icipla~able opposition to any notion that God wishes t-o 
6ontrol m~~ outside their ~eing as persons~ moves on to· 
de~elop wtat personhood may mean. In. so doing he ·provides 
~ discussion on tbe.classic debate betw~e~ Augustine and~ 
Felagius concerning the free will of man and: the Providen~~ 
of God. Oman is problematical here ho~ev~r. This 1s 
through . 
because /the centuries the two side~ hav£ become so 
. -
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polarised that it 1s difficult to be certain whether what 
. . . 
is bein~ said ~f one party was ~~tua~ly being_said bi t~at. 
party. Pelagius does not necesiarily fulfil the role 
Oman gives him . owan's argument is that grac~ ·o~er all~ 1.e~ 
Augustine' s· position, is appropriate .if it means that God 
1s ultimately ~esponsible for all that is - the doctrine 
of contingency. H~ writ~s 'The religious man always has 
ascribed, and found his whole confidence in ascribing~ all 
things to God' . 44 The good such a man does he is eri~bled 
to dd by the. grace of God and he shohld not claim it for 
himself. By contrast for Oman, 'Pelagianism, instead .of 
affording· calm tru.st and patience, causes·men to seek· 
security in their own doings' . 45 
Referring to what. Pelagius actually said, it should be 
noted th~t he has a concept of all-sustaining grace,·as a 
necessity for salv~tion ~t every mo~ent. 46 It is in this 
context of all sustaining grace, (in this paper understood 
as c~eating the gracidus possibility of free will) that 
Pelagius asserts 'free will without denying our.perpetual 
need of the help of God' . 47 That man can exercise the will 
to good is wholly gift for Pela~ius. 48 All this~~ shQuld. 
hold is fundamental to the portrayal of grace this chapter 
supports. Where Pelagius does become questionable·i~ in 
his asserti6rt of the possibility of meri's being without 
. . . . - . 4 9 . 
sin and his .denial of any sort of congen1~a1 ev1l; ·. 
Pelagius ought perhaps to be s~parated from 'Pelagianism', 
and distinctions ought to be made within his own ·thought· 
between the p~ofitable and unprofitable elements 1n the 
106 3:24 
same manner as 1s done with Augustine. Wh~t Oman sbught 
was a grace that is over ail to stress nien' s contingency, 
. . . . . .. . . . . . . 
but ih such a mahher as not to thre~ten men's freedom. 
. . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
Despite the quotatiorts above~he does not .sE;:e P~lagius as 
providing this nor does he think Augustine wholly 
sati'sfactory. In the history of the Church Oman sees 
Cathblicism as a compromise ~of an Aug~~tinian church 
with Peiagian members' ,50 In readirig Oman one cannoi fair 
. . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . 
. . 
to note how the two are discussed withou~ reference to 
. . . 
the~selves but in comments ab6u~ the subsequent party 
positions: 
Re6ently a ~seful arid e1ren1c discussion of ~hat 
Pelagius and Afigustine stood f6r has been provide~ by 
. ·: . . . .· .· 
J.R. Lucas. His starting point is the tension within 
Christianity concerning freedom. It is for t·he freedom pf 
men. 1n order t 0 stress their moral re spans i bi 1 i ty'' ·and 
against men's freedom in so far as it ·.mi-ght ·prejudice 'the 
role of God as sole and suffici~nt ~aus~. L~cas responds 
by asse~ting th~t moral .r~sponsibiltty necessiiates a. 
concept of freedom. With or ~itho~t the existence.of God 
a cohcept of fr~edom is required for .moral accountability, 
and if the latter sim~ly does. not exist, and men are dee~ed 
to be causally determined, society would face grave 
problems. Like Oma~, he notes how Augustine and Pelagius · 
provided the ~rototfpe fbr the theological debate. Unlike 
Oman and the ~ajoriti of Christendom, he does ·not opt ~o 
side with one or other .. of the protagonists. Rather Lucas 
·sees errors in both, and these errors stem from an 
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i~adequate a~alysis oi the noti6n of causality.· Lucas 1s 
. . : . . 
in practice 6onceined ~ith reconciling Vanstone's second 
negative mark. of love -.control, with the .t:hought that 
often enough Goa .is seen to be in control, yet men to be 
~oral need to be free. Thus both from the point of love -
Vanston~ and mor~lS ~·Lucas, man's freedo~ 1s an essential 
crim~Onen~ of hi~ relation to God; Hbwever, Vanstone, 1n 
tying the 1ssue to love, 1s able to m~ke the issue sp!ing 
from the essential character of God prior to the demands of 
humanity. 
. 51 Luca~ distinguish~s two s~nses of cause. There 1s 
'cauae', as t~e single ideal ·and 'complete ~a~s·e' embra~ing 
all.other facto~~; ~nd there 1s 'cause' as .the singl~ most 
significant f~ctor in any act. Su~h a distinctiOn enables 
Lucas to commend Augustine for giving th~ glory for his 
conversion to God. Yet Pelagiu:s is ·right to ·say that if 
Augustirte is takeh lite~ally, the. manho6d of God'~ children 
1s denied. Luc~s ch~racterizes the two as makin~, the one, 
. . . 52 . . 
of God a th1ng; the other, of man a th1ng; . August1ne was 
~igh~ tb give t~e credit to God and not himself, yet he was 
~rong to say he had no involvement in the matter; whereas 
Pelagius·was right to stress men's freedom but wrong to 
turn ~utonomy into autarky. This is all related back to the 
disttnctions about t~usali~y. Causality is highiy complex 
and it is unusual for one single cause to be identifiable. 
To gi~~ a complete causal account ·of a moral decision would 
in~ol~e. many sources, thus of necessity one 'primary' cause 
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~s often selected. St r :lke a match on sandpaper· and i·t will 
: . . . 
lighi, provided the antecedent ·sufficient condition 1s 
Sulfill~d - the presence of oxygen. A selection of different 
~auses {s possible without conflict but what cannot change 
is the full specification of the minimum antecedent 
sufficient causes even if they may not all be fully 
i'dentifiable. In the c~se of a drowning, Lucas cites four 
'causes', all differ~nt but r~al.5 3 
When t_his is tranf?lated into the -d.iscussion on 
· Au~~stin~ and Pelagius~ Augustine is seen as using 'cause' 
i~ the narrow sense, in attributing all directly to God. 
A sepse of inevitabil~ty appears 1n A~gustine c~ri~erning 
. events, which is particularly evident in the. Confessions~ 5 4 
It is easy 1n retrospect tp see everits e~pecially 1n one's 
own life as mor~ inevitable .thari they really are, s1nce 
once. an e~~nt has occufed, ~h~ other options are quickly 
forgotten. This is illusory, yet it is "the impression to 
be derived ffom reading Augustine ~n his. stress on the 
initiative of God. However, it might be more acceptable 
'to .say that God gives the ability to exploit to the best 
a given situation which has arisen in the natural course 
of events. Thus Augustine seems to .credit God directly 
with the trivial matt~r of making people move house 
'coincidentally' in·order ~o build up Chiistian fellow-
ship.55 Vanstone and Luc~s would prefer to credit God's 
providence firstly ;with e sta bli shing a creat~ on in wh{c·h 
such possibiliites develop; ~nd secondly~ enabling his 
cr~atures to exploit opportunities, which naturally oc~ur, 
to the serv1ces of God. 
I 
·I 
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This is not a concept of God directing e~ents, but of 
Him providing a~ iriterpretative anci creati~e fa~ulty which 
if exploited enables the·. same ·event to become a matte_r of 
. . . . . . 
grace or noi. A~ ~vent's be~6mihg a maiter of. grac~, its 
becoming graciously significant for the ·oeliever creates 
further opporturiities in following events, e~ch ~equ{ring 
further free acts-of affirm~tion by the believer. A 
pro~idence th~n th~t is firstly, though infrirectl~ cortsti-
tuted through natural ~reated processes - our continiency, 
and secondly, in each individual event evaluatively creative. 
is.made. 
A distinction/between_ 'how' and 'why'. Man has little 
choice coriceining his physical status~ th~ 'how'. Here 
Aug u s t in e w o ul d at t r i but e t hi s d i r e c t 1 y t o Go d, wh i 1 e 
... · : 
Va~stone ~rid Luca~ ~auld haVe_ God becoming voluntarily 
subject to his own creat~d n~tural proces~es~ _ C6nceining 
what he make~ of hi~ physicai status --the 'why', man lS 
free to choose a wi~e variety of Qptiona, 1n some of which-
he can choose_ to align-him~elf to God and 1n ~o ~oing· 
p~~cipitate fu~ther gr~cious possiblities~ each requ1r1ng 
. . . -_. . . 56 lndlVldual a£f1rmat1on .. 
It i~ tbe link between the 'how' and the 'why', or 
·the constitutive and evaluative which becomes problema~ic. 
. . . 
Augustine t~rns ireedom of choice into the choic~ to do 
evil alon~, an~ his.positive sense of freedom becomes 
libeity, that 1s being freed by God from sin. ·rre~dom 
as the choice to adopt God or not is funda~~ntallj denied 
because, the 'Lord did· not only say, ·''Without me you can do 
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·nothing." He adcied, "You did not choose me; I chose you."'57 
Of the "free'i w·ill he adds, 'it is either "·free from 
righteousness", and then it is ~~~; or eis~ " .. . . .· .free .·from. s1n, 
because it 1s a slave of righteousne~s."'58 :Either vay' it 
1s practically 1n bo~dage. To Augustine,· choice arid liberty 
are two very diff~rent senses of freedom and he cares ortly 
for • t ri e · 1 a t.t e r . He is not concerned here with the mora.l 
issue of responsibility. The post~Enlightenment concern 
for the independence of the individual .ma~ is n~t ~n· i~~ue 
for h::.m. H o vT ever , h i s d i s i n t e r e s t h e r e 'and h i s r e a dy 
acceptance .c,f predestination create mammoth problems .. 
For if it is correct tq see Augustinecascribing to 
God a very direct role in the :c~niti~utive··sense~ that . . . :l s' 
that God dir~ctly orders and foreo~d~in& events; it 1s 
har~ to se~ any role for man's freedom ih tb~ evaiuative 
and thus moral· sen~e. 
former must te clear from the d·ircct co1~trol of God. .If 
God has fixed an event so t!1at it is 'loaded' for a person to. 
make a certain decision, not only 1s God thr~atening men's 
freedom as choice, he 1s a1so liable to the ~ccusation of 
inj·c.stice, In such a situat~ori Go~ may be ~u~~tion~d crn 
the twin gr~~nds of the abuse of. freedom and the moral 
an om a 1 y o. f c r e at :j_ n g s om e me ~ de s t i n e d f o :r . damn at i on . By 
. . . 
. . . -
contrast an 1nner link ·is demcnstrable b~t~een ihe Vanstonian 
analysis of God's r6le in crE~tion subject tp the·~at~ral 
order, and ih~ preservation of men's freed~m. Provided 
scientific determinism l.s avo::.cied, man's freedom. is actually 
111 
safeguarded more ·by .those theolqgies embra~ing ~volution 
. . .. 
than by theologi~al determinism de~ying ii~ 
Lucas' preferenc-e for allying God to a sense ·of cau~e 
as only 'ihe mosi impprtant mem~er of that set of ~onditions· 
that are conjointly sufficient' 1s thus td be prefe~~ed.59 
Even he~e God ought not to be conceived as a separate· . 
membe~ vyin~ for. a pla~e of influence am~ngst other fo~ces .. 
This is the virtue of Vanstone's p~oviderice in not presenting 
God as a separate figure~ either be~ide, or above ahd in 
.direct control, of natural processes .. Rather, God ~llows 
himself to be the subject of these processes and he -~akes 
his progress by relying on ih~ creaturei~ ~r~~ res~onse tp 
God ~s it perce1ves him ~ithin. Van s t on e ' s ex e g e ~ 1·s .of 
love, th~ no~ion of its angular progress ~ri~~th~ par~ilel 
of·tte artist, are used to link God into ~~scenario i~ which 
God himself '""arks with .possibilities a~d options,· aJ.b~it 
towa~d~ a gi~en end - the Kingdom. God'~ pow~r-lies n6t i~ 
. . . 
his pjecise plan overruling natural forces hut 1n· his. 
ability t6 work out his plaris withi~ his own self~impci~ed· 
limit·s of conforming to his .created natural order. Vansto"ne' s 
ideal is ihus in complete contrast to those who endeavou~ 
to link God's providence to a 'straight line' c:oncept~on i,n 
which God has one fixed ~otite toward~ his end, ail deviatio~ 
-1. e.· 
from w~ic~ 1s either impossible /a striGt t~eologica~ 
determinism, or i-f possible sinful. 
As Lu~as holrls, however much Augustine may have felt 
that his conversio'n to God took place at an appciinted time 
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. and w a s i r.r e s t i}? 1 e , none the 1 e s s it .:i s e s s en t i a 1 
that man ii able to say ~o'to G6d. Ahab fel~ that ho~ w~s 
. . . . . . 
searching for him and yet he did not r~p~nt. 6 ~· Vanston~; 
too,in his passages on tragedy ~egards it as an essential 
component of God's nature of love that. man must ha~e the 
. 61 
ability to s~~~o~ For Augustine, the mystery is t~at 
aespite men's f~eedom all that Occurs lS . . 62 in ·God's plan. 
For Vanstone, the mystery is that the possibility·of a 
tragic end to love~s endeavour has to be reckoned. with~ 
Behind these diffe~ences lies two different. estimates of 
the morality and nature of freedom. Vanstone sees man even 
in his fallen state as free: indeed, his dignity and gr~ndeur 
consists in this faculty of bein~ able to make God's 
·endeavour tragic or triumphant by his respon·se. Augustine· 
~onceives freedom in relation to a serious view of the fall. 
Freedom for him is n~t s6 much freedom ;f ~hoice ~s .libe;a-
tion by God from the .de~th of sin. -Thus immediately after 
his conv~rsion he pbrtrays his. own free will as ~ein~ the 
force of bis ~ebellion against God and·th~t all God '~sked 
of me was to deny my own will and acc.ept yo~rs' . 63 ror 
A~gustine,man's free will is inescapabl~ ti~d up with sin 
and rebellion, it canriot be a partner .with God. Augustine. 
. . . . . 
do~s not desire to give it ·creative autonomy iri.part~ership·,· 
which is Vanstone's ideal. Free ~~11 in A~gustipe is 
.synonymous ~orith sinful ret·ellion, but in Vanstone. if 
symbolises the cieature's dignity in the imago dei. 
Luca~ like Vanstone r~gard~ it a~ vital. that man 1s 
free aS regards the pOiver Of response, and it is ·:Ln man 1 S 
ability to say 
/ 
'no' that he creates an actual providence 
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similar ~o Vanstbne'~.They start from ~ifferent. places: 
V~nstone's radi6al providence ~s presented as :a good thi~g 
in itself~ consequent upon"his doctrine of love and 
creation. With Lucas there lS·the susp1c1on that his 
radical doctrine 1s something of· a necessary evil conse-
quent upon ~en's say1ng ~d. Vanstone ~evels· in a myriad 
of options~ wher.eas Lucas seems to have· some sympathy· for 
~ugu~tine's assbciation of.choice with ~ebellion. ·Fa! him~ 
choice becomes. a somewhat simpiistic ~ither/or~ - 'It 1s 
always possible to say No, as if the only alternative was 
.V 164 
... es .. Vanst~ne's sceriario accepts a world in which many 
~ecisions are morally uncertai~, in which we just cannot 
~e sure of ~6d's will. Lucas seems to associate choice very 
closely wit~ a crisis of obedience~ as 1n '.if we are deter-
mined to have our own way~ at.whatever cost, rather than 
~ . .., I 6 5 h _ s ~ . we .c ""n . By using such language~ the ~uestion is 
posed as to vh~t extent is Lucas reveali.ng a preferenc.e for 
a ··straight line' view of providence where ~en's will 
permits? Rarely~though,can the possibilitie-s o~ discerning 
God's will be so clear cut as to be linked to simple 
obedience and disobediehce. It i~ not just that 'I disobey 
Yo~', but the ne~us of relationships both materia! and 
personal ar~ so complex as to make much moral decision,-
making a~biguous. Decisions must still be made~ 1!1 
the hope of working through to answers, and· it lS this picture 
of God's working 1n an area of complex growth that ·vanstone 
portrays . so well . However~ Lucas and his commendation of 
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Pelagius ar~ trr·~e appla~ded for safeguarding man's 
responsibilit~ for ~is decisions and thu~ his moral fr~edpm. 
The questiob theri arises; if. thi decis~on is mert's, 
has too much been said. For' 'If we insist on the agent"' s 
being ~n effective control of his actions, ·then must not he 
a~orie be described .as the caus~~? 66 Vanstbne would opt. 
for man's b~ing ln ~ffective control but only as. the gift 
. . 
of Go~ which is vbluntaiily h~r~oniiable with th~ will of 
God - a gracibus gift towards the end of man. Lucas reaches 
the same ans~er but v1a turther analysis of ~ausality. The 
agent's ·decision, ~lth;ugh a n~cessary· condition for an. 
act's perform~nc~, is not a ~ufficient condition unless 
exte-rnal circumstances are al.so f'avourable. This is true 
with or without G6d. Simply because a person wills.an act 
. . 
does not make it phyii~~liy possi~le ip its~lf. Similarly 
it rna y b e he 1 d t tat a 1 though t he de c i s i o. ri . i s t he ::' r e e act 
of a man, the ability to per£orm an act is·the .result of 
God's grace. Furtheimorc the ability to take a free 
decision is ~lso an antecedent gift of God. 
~n the 
So to say that in a~ent has ~ role j co!ltrol of 
actio~s 1s not to say that the agent is the sole cause. 
·his 
Lucas notes how language oversimpliii~s reality, for he has 
no~ r~ached the position where he will hold that • + ~ v is true· 
to. say that boih Augustin~ and God wer~ responsibli for 
. . 67 August1ne's convers~on. ' God, though, must bear ~he primary 
res~onsibility in generating and sustaining the creation, 
complete with all its Tossibilities, including free will 
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and also, his responsibility in ~ustaining it. ·Belief lll 
God ~ust necessit~te this ascri~tion~of primary responii-
bility, even if it 1s. then bel~ that Go~ has· disGharg~d 
. . 
voluntarily the. responsibility for ceriain functions t6· 
men: 'The choice 1s ours, Pelagius is right. Only, it is 
. . 68 
not thanks to us the choice 1s .ours, but thanks to Goa.' 
. . 
The root error 1n the disc~ssion on freedbTh ind.grace 15 
believed by Lucas td be the lin~uistic error 1n focussing 
( 
on one cause as explaining action. It is· the. inability 
to relate together a variety of causal ~espohsibilities 
that creates the problem. 
Lucas provides a chapter specifically ·entitled 
'Providence' . In this, more detiil ~mer~es on ~iff~rences 
. . .· 
• • . ' I •· ' 6·n •T betveen h1s awn a~a Vanstone s pos1t1o~. ~- ne atteupts 
to reconcile God's providence and men's freeftom, encount~r-
1ng the thought that the latter ~'0 may f~ustr~te God'i plans. 1 
The two authors are at variance because ~iih Lucai the 
rroblem Of the divergence of the divirie and hum~n wills lE 
not inherent 1n nature's grovth a~ it 1s with Vinstone. 
. . 
For Lucas, the disparity 1s a cons~quen~e of. mens' decisions,. 
which 'frustrate what, so far as we had.been abl~ to make it 
out, had been God's intended pl~ri~.i_7l Granted that 1n 
certain situations a man may consciously _choose to fruitrate 
1-rhat he regards as God's will, in many situation:s it car. be. 
argued against Lucas, that it 1s iripossible to identify with 
certainty what is God's will, as if th~re was only one id~al 
option for everi situation. Vanstone~s creative providence 
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does not tie God to preferring one route it each juncture, 
.but .allows .fcir a creative variety J.n lfhich .nurr.bers of 
options a:re possible. It: becomes ne.::essary to identify 
~ithpui any.certainty mar~ or le~s satisfactory answers, 
in which God is. creatively inspi~ing the will in a general 
~irec~ion rather. than on a ~~rticular path: Oddly encugh,-
Lucas .seems to fall into his own. trap. Having warned against 
the dangers of reading the inevitability of providence into 
past events ('vle read 'into events a pattern that is not 
. 72 . 
the r e '· ) , he then p o s t •i1l at e s a future p ~ovid en c e a r o u n d 
an ideal fixed plE•.n, 'my belief that God has a plan for· .me' · 73 
Nonethel~ss in .his consideration of how God actually 
wo~ks Lu~as becom~s very ~imil~~ io Va~stone. Since ruan can 
. . : . . 
and does .se.y nc' to God.~. God. alJows hi!llself to be 'the 
. . 
v:ict irii (yf e-,rery bloodymilided 7h man;. This i-s because 'It lS 
the . c or o ll a r y o f c: FJ.. :r- i-n e; ,. · t he t on e s h o u 1 d b e . v u 1 n era b 1 e , and 
a God who £ares infirtit~ly -will be infi~itely vulne~able' ,7 5 
- a strikine; parallel. vii th Vanstone '-s lang,;.age. Thus God 
is ~ulne~able and suffers at the ha~d~ oi .man's cwn God -. 
given f~e~dom: his is a·.;continuing crucifixior;' 76 ~he 
concept. o: God is changed i!l. the manner Vans·tone' s was, in 
orde~ to safeg~aid the freedom of men, and Lucas haG also 
n 0 w t i e d t hi s . 't 0 t h e . nat u r e b f l 0 v e . Vanstone's God is th~ 
artist with the cre~tive ability to·us~ the material while 
not kn~wing the pr~cise ioute, ~bile Lucas' ·is ihe planner 
who allows nuin to frustrate his plans but always· has the 
ability to present a plan for the LeW ~ituation. He writes: 
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'One plan may fail, but there are always ethers. 
as we torpedo·his best desiips· for u~,· he prodtices out .of 
. . . . 
. . 
his agonised reappra{ial a .se~qnd ~est.;7i In th~ sense 
th~t God allo~s ~a~ to affect his de~i~n~ ~nd yet always 
has the ability to cope with whatever ve may do, this is 
very close to V~nston~. 
Dissatisfaction may b~ f~lt with 'best desigh' an~. 
. . . . 
'second best', for with such lan~uage Lucas,~eems 1n the 
throes ·of the tension between. old arid new ·cone ept ions .of 
providence. He cert~inly seems aware o~ the dangers 
inherent 1n a conception of a fi~ed plan towards ~hich the 
world 1s necessarily aimed;· so he. says~ 'It is· an: e:rror· t.o· 
. . . . 
talk about. God'~ blueprint for the ~orld 1 .1B. Such a fixed 
blueprint 'must be Procrustean'~ I ri stead L u c a s a r g u e s, we m us t 
'either und~rstan~ by design . only the bare s t .0 u t l in ·e '. , ·w h i c h 
. . . . und:ersta nd 
would not be affected by any man' s nor}....: c o <;>·per at i on ; or I 
. . ~ . . 
'that· an infinit~. God has an infinite set of blueprints~ 
so that whatever situation emerges .. ~ there i~ a ~efinite 
course of action that God would have us tak~', This latter 
lS Lucas' 
. . 79 
preference. · H~wever if do~ has ~n i~finite set 
of blueprints, of what is God really ignorant? Does man' .s 
free choice stand·for anything? 
The possession. of blu~prints implies· that fore-
knowledge which s~ems to in~ulate Dod from the traumatic .. 
tincertainties of man'i exist~nce, even if it 1s that GOd 
is unawar~ until the ·last moment whi6h ~lan is in fact 
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to be. executed. Lucas has the image of the plahner and 
Vanstone the artist. It i s c on t ~ n de d that the 1. at t e r i ~ · · 
; .. 
more appropriate to the placing of God within the human 
context ot uncertainty. The value qf Lucas 1s that he 
clearly wishes men's freedom to be safeguard~d and he ii 
prepared·for a consequent change in the nature of God. He 
does stand against the 1 c6mmon n~tion of provirlence (being} 
. in l~rge measure a noti~n of God's getting his own 
way in spite of our own wishes to the contrary' .~ 0 
Sproxton in his biography of Teilhard alsb presenti 
a similar_ tension without apparently noticing it.· He · 
writes of Teilhard holding that the wqrld is bound for·~. 
desiination, it ha~ a beginning arid an end. But must the 
latter be fixe~ in the· manner suggested by Teilhard's 
'Point Omega•? 81 · Christians may hope for a ~ertain· ~nd, 
but as Vanstone suggests ln his words bn triumph and ·tragedy~. 
~ur experience ot the wotld is such t~at"belief ~n God 
. . . 
should not be treat~d as a quasi-l~gal guarantee. This. 
latter sense th~n seems to be picked up in Sproxton's coQ-· 
elusion which ·would seem very close to Van.stone.and to a 
lesser degree, Lu~as. ~he truth is ~that we are evolution-
with its awful consequences. Man is now free'.· The stage 
of man's ~elf-consciousness has now be~n ·r~ached where we 
~ay be saved neither 'by n~tur~l intervention .·. nor 
. . . . 
by super~atural interiention ior supernature lS ln 
This suggest~ ari immanen~ presence.of God within man, 
coupled with great scope in his freedom of choic~ to 
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determine the ttiumph·~r tragedy of God's rireat·iv~ act. 
The inno~ation that needs io be grasped is that. God's 
being sov~~e{gn mai ~ecom~ the ~eans by which man's free-
dom is c~~ated an~ not the m~ans by.-~hich it is destroyed, 
·:.: . . . . : ·_ . . . . .. 
not~iihstanding past peif6rmance. Nonetheless it was 
understood by Omari- over sixty years ago. He sees God's 
creation of the ci6ral per~onality as being the guarantee 
of ~e~'s ultimate free~om and of their preservation from 
being merely physical oriani~ms. Autonomy and Augustin-
ianism a~~ both proble~atic for Oman. toncerning God's 
authority it rieeds to ~e ~tiderstood that 'Wh~n we insist 
. . .· . . . . . 
that God'~ ~ower, being absolute, can have no limitation, 
human _responsibilit~.VIi:.nish~s'. 83 However, if God is entirely 
becomes 
div6rt~~ fr6m morals~ map's will / 'the only element in 
moral· decisi~n' ,84 .· then the question .is raised, .how can 
man fuifil ~hat is demand~d of him?· O~an is thus happy f6r 
conceptions of God to b~ gen~rated not ~o f~lfil the philo-
sophy of the.absoluie ~ut to fit the ~iil of man's need. 8 5 
M~n's need is for grac~, that is, the ability to grow 1n 
moral. beh~vioui. From the Christian point of view this lS 
contingency 
his· j · yet he -also needs freedom to be deemed to be 
mor~llj respon~ible~ T~e resol~tion of this dilemma 
. . 
r e qui r es gr a c e to b e c om e 1 i n k e d bot h t o pow e r, a s ab i 1 it y, 
arid to the m~intenance cif ~an's free will. 
"Thus the ne~d is· 'not to iheorise about the operation 
ot omnipotence, but to ask ourselves, What is a moral person-
ality, a~d~ how is it 
. . 86 
succoured?' The moral demand puts. 
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the philosophy of pow~r and of God'S o~nipoten~e behind: its 
own demarid~ because in God's. dwn n&t~re-~his o~de~ 1s 
followed. The sense of this 1s.seen as follo~si 
If ~nstead of a. God.circumscri~ei on ev~ry h~nd. 
by corisiderations of Hi~ ow~ dignity, ~e·hav~ One 
~anife~ting His wise care iri the m~st trivial · 
events and. c6mmon rel~tionships, a God ~rimaiily 
concerned with our need and not with His own 
schemes or His own honour. 87. 
Wherein the two latter issues ·vill in a new manner be s~fe-
guarded by the former. 
Oman then in parallel with Van~tone and Lucas seeks 
. . his view that ~od's. 
to tie-his conception of the naiure oi God t6 / nature 
lS one.of love. God's ~elation to us which lS o~ love' 
requires that, 'If grace .1s determined hy love, not mer.ely 
as spec1ous sentiment, but as t~is ~ractidal regard, the 
first queition cannot be, How would it s~ek to display its 
dignity? but must b~, How w6uld it ~e~ve itB cbildi~n?'BS 
The. principle of analogy ftom the.nee~ an~ context of human 
experien~e used by Vanstone is adopted by Oman, f6r since. 
'that service t~kei place uptin eatth,. out exp~rience. upon 
earth alone can. beth~ me~ns of unders~&nding:its:.character~ •89 
Oman's method is thus sirikingiy close tb .V~nstone; in th~t 
t y an a l y s i s o f that love w h i c 11 . i s o f God , . t he d. i s c u s $ i on i s 
enabled to c.ent!'e upon man Is need buY only by prior refer~ 
ence to the.nat~re· of God's love. This lS .evidericed lD 
Omari 1 s commen~ that: 
If grace, therefore,.be the operation of love, the 
essence of whi~h is to have 1ts eyes directed awaY 
from its own dignity .... and .·towards t·he object. 
of ltS care, an inqu1iy into its nature must be ~n 
vairi which does riot start bi consideri9g the human 
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nature it would succour. 
So the. question, 'what is the nature of God's grace'?'· is 
ans~ered by 'what 1s the nature of a ~oral p~rson?'90 
In stressing the ·priority of the ·latter question, ·a · 
clever link is established b~tween the·work of God's grace 
and man's moral autono~y. If, as Oman holds, the nature 
of the moral person embraces-moral autonomy, ln the sense 
of responsibility, then the grace w-hich created this moral 
person clearly sustains and succours this very moral 
autonomy. As with Vanstone and the levin~ personality, so 
Oman and the moral personality, by allowing man's genuine 
ff~edom itsel£ to be an express1on of grace, overcomes .. the· 
disjunction between grac-e and freedom. Man's moral ~aculty 
for decisions is fr·eely his. as gracious gift, while the 
power to execute decisions is also due to .the grace of Gpd, 
already 
Ahy necessary changes. h~ve I been made· to the ~revious 
conceptions of God's grace and omnipotence. Hence to ret~rn 
to Augu~tine and Pelagiu~, bruan is enabled t~ condemn both, 
because both make a false divide between 'grace as a gift 
merely given and on works as human resolves merely carried 
through' . 91 Oman believes both to hkve an impersonal account_ 
of God's providence, thus making grace mechanical .. Th~· 
personal account that he has given he holds ~nables man 
and God to become freely consenting partners,rath~r than 
. . 
separate agenc1es with clearly defiri~~ spheres of operation. 
. . - . . 
Thus, I In a right relation of ·persons' especially of father 
and ch1ld, the help of ihe one does noi end where the effort 
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of the other begins' 92 
Such a pe~sonal relation, as 1n ~anstb~~. has its 
consequinces Yor theodicy. This is.because the tey for 
gr~ce's fr~iti6n in this analysis is the free resp6nse of 
the b~loved. A 'gracious relation ~annat provide the 
flawless world to b~ expected from ~race as overriding 
omriis~ience guided by omnipotence, because a personal 
relation can only work as it meets response' .9 3 This 
response depends on ou~ free and genuine perception of the 
.goodne~s of God's will. His will is not to be judged by 
its powe~, lGod is stronger than I, therefore obey) but 1n 
our recognitiori of its goodness: 'In short, we .cab only 
accept Go~ 1 .s w1ll as, b~ insight, ve discov~r it to be our 
·o~rn,. Y4 Providence for the believer becomes ~ot the con-
viction that everything was really ~lanned for the best 
anyway, bu~ rathe~ the_end point of faiih. It becomes a 
belief in the supreme triumph of Good d~spite the great 
paln·and.wastc of the world. 'A true belief 1n Providence· 
is the goal and not the starting point of religion, a 
_prophetic victory over evil and not a metaphysic~l optimism 
. 9c; 
about the balance of good'. / Provid~nce is not an 
or the provision of 
insurance fiom paifr,/ material bl-~sslngs for the few, 
bUt a means of seeing purpose in t~e world despit~ all 
indications to the Contrary; It provide~ Q tool for using 
the experience of pa1n. It is the stress 1n Oman on the 
personal nature of the que~tion that conditions the outcome. 
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This ~tiables ~an not to 
forget that a personal relation has two s.i.des, · 
which. req~ire .us to find God 1 ~ world also our 
world .. ! : by bur. own insight and ae·votion, 
and that the essence of. a personal sys.tem is 
. not· to mariufa.ctU:re. us ·good, but 'to help us win 
. our ~reedQ~ and th~ rig~~ use ·of. it t6gether. 
In ih~t c~se ~od .c~nnot ~eli~ve us of our 
responsibiiiti~i eve~ wh~n ·cal~mitous. Without 
it we might be the clay and H~ the poiter but 
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1-re should not be c·hildren 9.nd He. our. Father. 96 
The close parallels between Vansto:ne arid Oman are 
thus. e~ident, with a ~re9.t stress 6n hu~an freedom as a 
gift of God, by which God, fo~ 6ur sake iimits.h~mself. 
The key tp all three, 'Lucas, V~nstone and Oman, has been· 
a version of th~ free will defenc~ of God~ in which men's 
free ·will is used to explain the great pain and suffering 
.experienced, .·it being the- inevitablE, concofuitant to ge~uine 
. . . 
freedom of iesponse. However, thi~ does only de9.l with 
moral evil., the prior physical evil of the worl~ is not 
affected. This lS a gen~ral w~akness of presentations of 
. . . 
th~s argu~~nt, th~ir u~happiness in ac~ouriting fo~ physical 
evil; as a result it is generally skirted ov~r. Both Lucas 
and Oma.n have tended this way, to consider the issue. just 
from the vie~poi~t of ~an's wrongdoing ~nd consequent 
. suffering. ':Ph.is is perhaps a legacy of the biblical par-
the moral 
trayal of the pri6rity of I ovei the ph~sical 'fall' in 
·Genesis. 
golden age ~s 
T~e concept of ·a I no longe.r tenable,- s_ome account 
has to be tak~n of evolution .. In this Vanstone proves.more 
satisfacto~y despite h~s inappr6piiate use of Karamazov 
discussed previously. 97 Indeed he revers~s the situation 
·~nd deals with physical ~nd n6t moral evil. He has not 
.. 
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placed man's ig-norance of God just in relation to· the human 
respon~e but in relation to the whol~ physical.dim~nsion. 
Often the implication seems to be that God knew exactly 
how h~ would create the world ~nd men, he then implant~d 
into this physical system free _w1l~ a~d from thence th~ 
problems arose. Vanstone goes- one step further in holding 
that the precise course of the whole of ·the created system 
is a mystery even to God. the Cre~tor vho ~ives it the 
energy ~o maintain it 1n being. All that 1s secure i-s that 
·God 1s working towards an end through natural processes, 
which though set in being by him are themselves given a 
genu1ne intependence in development. In this situation the 
supreme period of Crisis has heen reached, in this· tiny 
· ~ra of humankind, t.he era whe.n creatures capable of free 
response. to div1nity have reached being. 
The means by which grace can rem~in God's action.and 
yet still genuinely relate to man's owri free act has been 
shown to be the crucial issue. Certain distinctions can be 
noted concerning the differing presentat1ons of the modes 
of grace~ action~ An auth~r whose work in this area is of 
considerable 1nterest is Dene 6utka.9~ His discussion 
star~s from noting the standard d1lemma; tbat it is morally 
eisent1al for humans to be. res~onsi~le,b~t how then can· a 
rol~ f~r grace be found? · He notes four distinctive methods 
b¥ ~hich Christians have ~ndeavoured to r~solve this coti-
flict. It may be resolved by see1ng hu~an virtue. as the 
instrument of invading gra~e, as itifused by gr~ce, as 
acquired irrespe~tive of grace, and as elicited by g~ace.99 
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The first 6ption is cla~sically Protestant.·~nd has been 
well stated in Nygren •·s Agape and Eros. 'The' sp_ec if'i c . object 
here is to stress God's act in man again;t h{s o~n inade~ 
q~ate sinful and fallen resources. Man's free will and 
moral autonomy are not worth stressing becau~e bf the help-
less state of man. The theology of the Fall is· thus an 
influence at work in evaluat1ng God's grace and its role 
in mankind. The completely ~ifferent v{e~point of Vanstone 
for whom nothing could be so abhorrent as irr~.~istible 
grace, likewise stems from a very different v1ew of the 
Fall·. Nygren's real error 1s 1n destroying this abiljty 
to respond ·that Vanstone hol.ds so dear. The ·cathblic 
D'Arcy also regards this as a ser1ous error ~n Nygren's 
part. Using Nygren's own language he writ~s; 'Go~ is Agape 
and we should ~aturally expect someone to be the benefi~iary· 
·of that love and as beneficiary to respond. ·But if··the 
theory i~ taken l~terally lNygrenrsJ there is rio one to 
respond . . In this elimihat1on of Ero~ man ~as been 
• . • . . I '100 
el1m1nated . · 
Of the sec6nd - infused grace, Otitka notes its 
t radi t i anal i dent i fica t ion with Roman C"a"thol"i c theology·. 
Thus Outka notes how a Roman Catholic rep~esentative li~e 
Gillemari.n can speak of it as a sanctifying grace .·which 
elevates the whole man. Tn Protestant .ey~s sudh as Outka's 
it has unfavourab~e cbnnotations ~ith th~ supernatural and 
the miracuTous·. Outka associa·t-es ·the third," acqui·red grace·, 
. . . 
with th~ moral 'I ought therefore I can' argument. It 
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reflects~ universal capability but str~sses on~'s own· 
efforts,wherea~ infusion str~sses God's. Th~_ p~bblems· of· 
infusion are that i~ 1s mechanic~l and of acq~ir~d,t~at it 
lS Pelagi~n. 
The fourth option, g~ace elicited, 1s provided by 
Outka as an attempt to resolve problems inherent 1n the 
others. 101 It attempts to preserve a distinction,.noted· 
at other pointg ln this th~sis, betweeri ihe f~~edom of the 
will to respond as decision arid the powei to execute good 
deeds as grace. Grace's object is to elicit ~ respon~~: 
the agent must a~tively respond to the gif~ offered in 
. . 
deciding to ~ccept it, rather than passi~ely ie6eiv~ it. 
t·ha t· 
Perhaps an6thei way to express Outka's ~oint is to say/the·_ 
agent activeli seeks .in ~rder passively to re~ei~e the gift:, 
and this' is to be preferred for the- element ~i dialectic {i 
suggests. Thi~ is appropriate to an issue whi~h-the_direct 
applicatio~ of lan8uage riannot resolve, ~in that an el~ment 
of linguistic tension is inevitable between grace ~s the 
entire gift of God and man's own free will and ~es~ons{bili~y ~ 
the i~sue of causality already discussed via Lucas. 
Outka regards elicitati6n as prese~ving the genuineness_ 
of the human response to grace, in ord~r that no~hing fti~da­
mentally non-human is introdu~ed·, which ii the suggesiion 
with {nfusion. Distinctions are ~equired.between super7 
rtatur~l and natural, and their relation to hUman nat~re. 
Thus infused grace reflects a clear understanding of_the 
boundaries of natural man and of the ess~ntial r61~ of the 
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supernat.ural in bringing him to fulfillment. Elicitation 
reflects a v.J.ew inwhich man.must·find fulfillment.in.the 
natural, though here the natural may become so charge~:as 
. . . 
to become in ~proxt6~•s ~o~d, . ·. . . ·. 102 1 Sup ern at u r e ' . The 
flavour of Vanstone is such that the natural is to be 
pr~served in the sense 6f th~ integrity of natural pro-
c e s s e s and o f man 1 s · i n de p end en c e , yet t b e s e · b e c om e the .very 
tools of the future_Kingdom. Elicitation J.s. thus· distinct 
in Outka 1 s analysis from ·infusiori in that it requJ.res·man~s 
decision and will.. It diff~rs from acquired grace J.n that 
virtue is ~voked and sustained fro~ without and is not 
simply self-act~Vat~d irid ~elf-directed.· The key to 
.. . 
elicitation is .that ihe agent decides to do what in himself 
he cannot do, the positioh _being that a man cap decide.·to 
follow God ~ut cannot by h~mself actually follow God. The 
. . . 
moral str~ss on the f;~edo~ 6f man is t~us on the decisi6n. 
while the power or ability r~sts with Gdd. 
To a degree it has to be granted that if grace is·real 
J.n some sense it 1s irresistible. Cert~inly any resist~rice 
that is possi~le l& due t6 God's own self-limita~ion as in 
Vanstone. Everi. so, the grace of creation remains irresisti~le, 
I had no choite over my birth. Man is not consulted over 
whether be wishes to participate in the venture of ~xistence, 
Within this f~amework, once existing he 
may choose to resist. Continued sustenanc·e in life i·s 
itself a gi~~e ~hich has simply to be accepted, unless, 
onte again, the radical God-given freedom 6f choice is used 
.J.n suic.ide. Freedom theri J.S functioning within a fixed 
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physical realm. 
Outka'.s u~e of elicitation is thus presented as a 
Us~ful understandi~~ of ihe operation of grace whirih can 
c~mplement the pi6tures-seen in Vanstone, Lu~as and Oman. 
From th~se authois and from the other sources quoted, it 
can b~ seen that"a substantial body of op1n1on has. grown 
up this c~ntury, whic~ has not been afraid to develop a 
new _d6ctrine of Godi in order to counter problems felt 
wit~ traditi6nal presentations of Grace and Providence, 
and at the same time to try to provide a providence more 
consonan~ with belief in evolutionary theory ~nd the 
s6ientific w6rld view, Th~ overall outcome is an emphasis 
ob m~n's re~pon~ibility for the end of the world,. with or. 
without God. ·Man 1s 1n the position of exercising great 
power, ~uf~icient as 1s only too clear in this age to 
determine the fate o~ his own kind. With God, man 1s placed 
. . 
in the pos{tibn ~f t~king God to the li~it. The mystery of -
today is n6t how it is that all is really planned by God 
fo~ the best, but to what extent ·will the tritimph and 
tragedy theme of Vanstone be taken to its final end - has 
man really the ability to say 'finis 1 to God in a nuclear 
holocaust? Stanley Hauerwas in remarks to Durham students 
~v~rred th~t t~e crucifixion was mor~ tragic than nuclear 
armageddon, and that it had been followed by Resurrection. 
Perhaps true, but nothing-ought to be said that lightens 
the load on mari in this day. 
Of the various authors, it 1s held ~hat it 1s Vanstone 
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who provides .the most thorough reworiing of the· doctrine 
of God to reflect the ~emands or man's personal autonomy. 
He d6es this through his analysis of God as lov~, arid in 
. . . . 
·. . 
. . . 
a book so_radical, t.he surprisirig and satisfying ~lement 
i~ the pri6rity and role that is accorded to God as 
living and active. Men are not emancipated from God 
despite all the radical thought, ratb~r genu1ne created 
~artnership is achieved. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SEL.F-LOVE 
One of the most enigmatic texts in the gospels forms 
the root of perhaps the single most contentious issue in 
theological ethics - the role bf Self-cancer~. Je~us' 
texts of self-·denial are unequivocal~ -'let him deny himself 
and follow me'~l ~hen· Je~us.~a{d in abswer to one of the 
most fundamental question put to hi;m concerning his beliefs, 
'Master which isthe g·reat comma.ndment?', stressing. in his 
reply, 'Thou shalt love thy ·neighbo.ur as thyself', he 
apparently introduced a radical discontinuity i~to his 
... 
teaching. 2 Des~ite th~ critics th~ two can be r~conciled. 
Indeed it might be hoped thAt Jesus did so .hi~self. Here 
attention ought to be drawn to another ~f hts cardinal texts~ 
. . 3 
'If any man .w6uld be first,· he shall b~ last of all'. 
Often taken ~s a classi~ text of denial yet it spr1ngs out 
of self-concern. It has even received cri~icism for being 
. . . .. 
a 'spiritual insurance pdlicy' ~ suffer now for JOY. later. 
Thus while ChristiAns port;ay th~i~ religi~n as one of s~lf-
sacrifice and service of others, quoting the example arid 
words of the ma~ter, t~~ir detractors also quoting Jesus 
hold that it lS a reiigion for th~ underdog, promising an 
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unlimited heavenly return for earthly poverty .. 
~swill be·s~e~~ Christians ~r~ by no me~n~ consi~tent 
1n their approach to the role of the s~1f, ~u~~to v~rying 
as~ess~ents of the Ne~ Test~ment ma~ertal~ Such·a~~es~-· 
ments themselves are being controlled bj authors' wider 
preconceptions concerning_other d~c~rines., espec~ally those 
of. th'e Creation and of the Fall. A ~urther influehce ·on 
Christian reflection has been the c6nc1usions of other 
philosophies, for there are a myriad of Vlews concernXng 
self~concern rang1ng from the Greek ~hilosophers to the 
. . . . . 
latest in psychoan~lysis,-such i~eas as Maslow'~ _self~ 
actualising m~n. Since Chrisiian ethics d~viloped in 
.. 
relation to prevailing Gieek ethical attitudes,. study.will 
. . 
commence with the intellectual air'. Christ Is. Cipin:l_ons ent.ere.d. 
Aristotle's Ethics prese~ts a co~siit~rit treatise· ~n 
friendship, c~ntral to which is· t~e rDl~ 6f self. 5 A friend 
i~ one 'who desire(s) the good o£ th~ir ~~iends for the 
friend-'s sake . . because each loves the other for ~hat 
he is, and not for any incid~nt~l quality' . 6 . Su~h ·a 
passage might seem to harmonize well with Jesus•· teaching. 
How~ver it reflects ari entirely diff~rent, and philosophical, 
setting producing a very dif£erent res~lt from the· th~olbgy 
of the New·Testament. This is clear from the context of. 
the previou~ citation. in Aristotle a fiiend.is not to .b~ 
1 b v e d f 0 r t h e p e r s 0 n a 1 q U" a l i t i e s 0 f h i:s b e in g but by h is 
possession of the abstract quality of the Good. Not that 
he is but what he 1s. Aristotle d~iines three kind~ of 
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friendship: that of utility, the business relationship; 
that ~f pleasuret the sensual relationship; and perfect 
friendship based on goodness~ The perfect friendship was 
the subject of the l~st quotation artd immediately _preceed~ 
ing it can be read, 'for these people each alike· wish good 
for the other qua good' and immediately following it, 
'Accordingly the friendship of such men lasts so long as 
they remain good'. 7 Despite the existence of altruistic 
passages, it is clear that Aristotle regards what is 
actually being shared a~ an abstract quality of g~odness, 
and the respect for persons by virtue of their individual-
. . 
ity i~ ~ot a conce~n .. A good deal of attention is then 
·give~ to the rol~ of the self: The actual b6nd b~tween 
the ffiendship of goodnes~ is not· descri~ed ~s love, for 
tthe good are friends for each other 1 s sake, because their 
bond is goodness•, 8 although ~ubsequently Aristotle does 
note that ttiiendship seems t6 coniist mbre in giving than 
1n receiving affection' . 9 
In this affection to the good between friends the 
self 1s fulfilled, 'And in loving a friend they are loving. 
their own good • For when a good m~n becomes a friend to 
. another he becomes that other's good: so each loves his 
ow~ g6od, and repays what he receives by wishing ~h& good 
. 10 
of the oth~r and giving him pleasure', and earlier, ·'each 
iridividual loves what is good for himseif•-. 11 A long 
passage lS then given over to the thought that friends 
reflect our· feeling towards ourselves and these arguments 
lead to a consideration or the sp~cific problem; is self-love 
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. . . 12 . JUSt1f1able? Self-love 1s justifiable and indeed 
fulfilling only .in the c~s~ of the godd man, whb .. s1nce he· 
is properly ordered towards the. good, will 1n loving himself 
benerit himself a~d othe~i. This is the ratiortale behind 
th~ friendship of the good, that the sha~ing of this quality 
seen in each other 1s mritually attracting and fulfilling.· 
. -
. . 
The r e i s m u.: h he r e t hat s e $ m s c o mm end a b 1 e , t her e · i ::; c e r t a i nl y .. 
much ~ndisputable pra~ticai wisddm - to give is better than 
to receive. 
. . 
It might seem as if Aristotie's arguments could be 
applie6 to the reconciliation .of Jesus' own e~igmatic 
statements. Howev~r·two things militate agairtst t~is: 
one in his ~onception.:of th~- highest~category _of personai 
.. . 
6ommunion b~ing the abstr~ct notion bf the _'good' rathef 
than the personal ~uality of 1.lb~~· c~mmended 1n the _New· 
Testament; seco~dly his analy~is bf .the ideal or. 'magnami-
no~s' man. 1 3 He is Ari~totle's hero_, the good man of 
proper friendship. This is the mari who bas practised 
himself ln the art. of.~eing good; He posse~ses a ~roper 
self-estimatiori of himself founded on his real ~haracter. 
. . . 
He knows he is go6d and expects to be treated as such, 
which 1s no more tban he deserves. Humility is here totall~ 
ruled out, and Aristotle condemns 'pusillanimous' man. A~ 
for '.magnaminous' ~:an, h~ can be liken.ed to today' s self-
sufficient man, full ~f self-control and independence, for 
'He is disposed to confer benefits, but is.ashamed ~o 
accept them, because the one is an act of th~ super1or. and 
. . ' 14 . the other that of an lnfer1or . 
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Despit~ the apparent parallels to Jesus' ehigmatic 
commendation of self~i6ve~ A~iitotle's self-love is 
. . . . . : .· . . · .. 
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. radically differ~bt b~~ause it is .not ~onc~i~ed within the 
category bf grace. This as ~iil be s~en is- tundame~tal 
to an understanding of Jesus' positibn, whereas Aristotle 
speaks of self-love from a position bf utter self-sufficiency. 
This tendency has been n~~e~ by.both Krobk and Vlastos. 1 5 
K~ook significantly entitl~s h~r chapter on Aristotle as 
'Self-suffi~i~ncy for 16ve' •. Sh~ puts him in a secularist 
utilitariart tra~ition embracing Hum~, Bentham and. Mill. 
All three typ~s of A~istoteliari mari, Speculative i.e. 
coritem~lative, M~gnani~~us and the. Peifect Fri~nd shire the 
common characteristic ~f ielf~sufficiency~ Magnanimous man 
i~ {ri be~ .eye·~ tod~y's .secuiar: m~n. 
. . . . . . . . 
ne has perfect self-
. . . . . . . 
~~ritrol, he ~news where .he. is .going,anrl so is· titled the. 
Man oi J~itif{able Pride. Krobk ~otei how Plato and St. 
Paul r~g~rd it as virt~ous to suffer. inJustice, while for 
Ariit6tle it .is slavish and poo~ spirit~a. 16 Aristotelian 
self-~ufficien~y estibiis~es a 'love' free fr~m need or 
claim, which in Krbok's judgement 1s not the. love either 
of Plato or the New Testament but 1s a form of pride, in 
' . whi~h you admire_iri the 6ther only whit you kno~ to be good 
in yours~lf. Vlastos concluded th~t love in Aristotle 1s 
not love for .a person qua person but 1s a mutal recognition 
It is between members of a social 
/. 
elite, who can afford disintere~ted affection for their 
peers, ~~sured that it will be returned by virtue of their 
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stat1on. 
To turn to Platonic love,.Vlastos cannot interp~~t this 
as being personal. From the Lysis he notes that love is 
received only in response to the pioducition of a good: 
'become Wl s e . everyone -will love you .. . . otherwise 
18 
no one.will love you' Be notes that there is no sense 
.of 'for the other's sake', let alone ~he Christian_treatment 
of the other. as an absolute .end. The root of this v1ew as.· 
noted in our first chapter, is the Platonic belief that 
l6ve is not a constitutive category of b~ing itself. Rather· 
it is symbolic of a lack, love 1s essentially need-orientated, 
s~ch that 'it one were 1n want of nothing one ~o~ld feel no 
affectioA and he who felt nu affectiun would not lov~' : 1 9 
This leads to the doctrine·of the Forms by. which all beings 
seek to approximate t·o the ideal form, and this in -c.urn. 
. . 
. . 20-pro~uces Plato's vision of the Good. The problem here 1s 
that the ideal Good is no~ a lovirig God~ hence the lack of 
affection and love in the ~deal which is surely the opposit~ 
df the New Testament intentions: This,as will be seeri later,_ 
1s one o£ the main points in Nygren's major albeit 
problematic study,Agape and Eros. 
In the Republic, Vlas~os notes how the ideal society 1~ 
held tbgether by bonds of fraternal love bfit ·poses the· 
question as to whet~er this lcive is a form of enlightened 
self-interest~ to m~intai~ the sistem. -As Socrates tdld ·. 
Lysis, · 'You will· be loved. only .if _you are us efui' , the 
doctrine of love .1n the Lysis fits the Republic well; 
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Wh&t~ier a man can cl~i~ ln the Republic lS tied to what he 
dbes·and not th~t he i~. Vlastos rema~ks how Po~per has 
labelled the R~publ{c, 'colle~tivis~-a~d political utili-
. . . . 
tarianism' and that 'Pl~t~ recognise~ ohly on~ ultimate 
stan~ard of jusii~e - the interest of the state. Morality 
is nothing but political hygiene•. 21 Although love has ·a 
role in Plato, it is not.firmly welded to persbn~~ being . 
as {he highest cate~ory of existence in the ~anner normally 
attributed to Christianity, and this affects self-
aspiration. The c~d of man as noted in the Symposium 1s to 
. lose self-awareness in the visi~n of the 
. 22 . 
'1dea'.. Vlasto~ 
holds that in the Platonic ~octrine of love, the person 
itself is not 16ved ·but the image o~ the all emb~acing yet 
l-ifeless 'idea' . , .. 23 ln nlm. 
T~o questions ar1se for Christian teac~ing lD conse.q~ence 
of t~is analysis cf Greek t~bught. Firs~ly in .terms. of the 
final end, what sort of self~fuifillm~nt.d6es Ch~istianity 
speak of in consequence of iti st~ess on the living Gbd and 
his gracei_ and s~condly, how in the present is that end 
achievable? This second question requires an ~nalysis of 
tte role of seif invtilve~ in 'Love your neighbour as your-
self'. Within Chrisiianity two broat trends of response 
· ~here is a 
~~n be i~entifie~. I n~~a~ive, usually Protestant str~na, 
which greatly str~ss~s the Fall·and God's s6~ereignty and 
grace_; this tends to writ~ down s~if-regard. Yet pec~liar 
to this tradition is the great value given to the ~elf in 
terms of private jud~ement. On t~e Catholi~ side, with a 
less grave view of the Fall_and a·developed natural theology, 
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the role of the self receives greater attention. Yet here 
. . . . . : 
aga·in; a tradit-ion within a tradition, that is· asceticism, 
appea~S to the.6utsid~r to l~y g;eat si~ess ~nUtter self-
. . 
. abnegation.· It is this lait:tradition ~ith i~s stress on 
. . . . . . . 
. . . 
self-d~pr{vati~n that h~~ often been th~ t~r~et of those 
who ~ccuse Chri~tianity of having a rewar~-~critered ethic, 
but £ounded Upon other-~orldly fruition. 
Amongst recent Protestant authors one who has tackled 
the issue from What might b~ term~d the classi~ Protestant 
' ·. . . . 24 
positicn_is Anders Ny~re~. Nygren has specific heading~ 
on Self and Neighbour tove.~ut in order fully ~o appreciate 
his position therein, his wider position need~ to be under-
stood.. His bas {c. t n e s i s is s imp i e ~ that t be natura 1 fa 11 en 
state of man is well seen in >rhat he terms Greek Eros. 
This 1s. utterly rr,an. -~ents:ted; it starts from the incomplete-
ness of man ar1d. his conseq_·J.ent need to .. ·fulfil himself. 
Thro~ghout the book the 'deadly rivalry~ Of Eros and Agape 
are stressed.· In his introduction. he writes that 'It is 
a-fact ~~yo~d contiadic~ion that ~he idea of Eros and Agape 
belo~g to two diftere~t -spiritual worl~s', and that one 
must 
Ti' .. 
'"ros 
'begin by e~~&~~~zing their complete disparity' . 25 . 
is man's desire for. sel:::' fulfillnent; and becau~ie of 
this stress 6~ s~lf it is held to be wholly erroneous. No 
a~pirations of. man are allow~d by Nygren to be. of any· saving 
significance. ~igren c6ntrasts Efos ~ith its fatal stress 
on self. concern ~rid its Greek or1g1n with the Christian 
idea of Agape. ·Their root difference ~n Nygren's eye~ lies 
in ·causalit.y. Eros is 'caused', being bTought about by 
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desire and need, seeing value in the object of desire. 
Agape 1s the very opposite,--,it is repeatedly stresse-d· how 
Agape. 1s s~ontaneous and uncaused. It has n6 need 1n 
itself for mints lo~e and lS not created bj any wo~thiness 
on man's part. That such a God,unaffe~ted.by man's 
response is suspiciously similar to· the Platonic goes 
unnoticed by Nygren. 
That the_ consequences of these v1ews are reflected in 
his considerati~n of the nature of man and thus the role 
of self is clear: 'Agape is th~ direct o~posite of that. 
love which is called out by the worthiness of its object'; 
and? 'The man·whom God l"oves has not any value ·in himself·. 
•)6 
His value- consists simpl-y the fact. tiat God loves h • I . .._ ln ·.liD . 
. Clearly self love will not find much scope here. In the 
narrowest sense of tbe doctrine of contingency Nygren may. 
be granted to be right but it is clear· t~at h~- is not 
thinking along these lines. Man's·value ~an be seen in t~o 
senses. Considered absolut~ly as a creature, or as we 
. . . . . , f t 27 
encounter h1m ex1st1ng.ae ac o. ·. In the former sense all 
theists would have .to support Nygren's comments that man's 
value derives not from any eternal pre-existence but 
d~rivatively in being a creature. This though does not seem 
to be how Nygren se~s the issue. Far him, man's lacking 
any value in h i m s e 1 f i s . not s o · m u c h a c on s e <i u en ce o f h i s 
being~ creatu~e·but of his being a-fallen creature~ 
The argument c6ntinues in this· anbiguous vein. Of 
Ritschl's 'the infinite valu~ of the hufuan soul', he 
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comments that t_his . 28 1s 'not a basic Christian idea at all'.-
He~e also Harria6k's phrase~ 1 all ~ho be~i the hum~n form. 
. . 
are of more value than the whole world', is. condemned. 
Nygreri i~ allowing onli ~;~ options in the· estimation of 
man: the Greek Vlew of his. eternal immutable value, and his 
own that man .has no· worth in hims~lf apart from the flow 
of divi~e agape in him, and that this does not flow in 
fallen man; Indeed to become a Ctristian is to allo~ thi~ 
agapB into one's life. There· is though an eisential third 
way ~hi~h however demands a natural theology. This in 
N y g r en '· s v i e w i s h b p e 1 e s s 1 y t an gl e d up wit h G r e e k Eros . 
This-riat~~al the61ogy would say that since man 1s a crea-
ttire- of God, .even as fallen he is st~ll 6f incomparable 
worth. The 'infinite value of the bU:man soul' 1s 
1. e. 
derivable frdm two sources,/rro~ ~ philosophy of 
immortality, which he condemns, and from the theoldgy of 
. . . ' 
creation which h~ nowher~ considers. 
Sin~e Er6s is all of men, not as created but as fallen 
and thus conde~nable, and dgape is all of Qod and the only 
. . . . . . 
form of ldve allowable, it 6an be argued that Nygren 
. . . 
~vacuates man of his independerit existence. Commenting on· 
. . . 
the lo~e comrrandment, he states that as_the Divirie love is-
. . . . 29 
untondit{onal,.so man's self surrender is uncond1t1pnal .. 
This pa-...re:s the • way for the argument that in· responding to 
God man does not actually respond himself; ~ath~r,-·he is a 
mean.s by which God's agape flows from God to man and so 
back to God. 30 Once again a peculiar doubleness is manifest: 
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.Read one way Nygr~n can m~ke sense; neighbour ~6ve i~ held 
t6 spring out of God's lo~e, t~ere 1s brotherhood only 1n 
fatherhood. Is this say1ng that a concept of creation.ls 
essential from which to derive neighbour love? Or is he 
saying that only 1n God's agape, in which man can have no 
independent role of self since he is fallen; can man lov~ 
others? The answer· is clear 1n comnents such as, 'natu·ral 
affection 1s not love at all 1n the dee~er sense but only 
a form of ~elf~love'. So self love is utterly to be con-
demned 1n Nygren's eyes·. Neighbour love is only Christian 
so long ~s it is united with God's agape. This seems an 
. e:x:clusivist pos:ltion stemming f~'om a radicai view of the 
w6rthl~ssness of'man's activities outs{~e the clear 
. . . . . ·. ~l ~oundEries of God's ~~t1v~t1es.-
Doi.lbts that might be had as to whether Nygren lias any 
conception of a tbird 6ption between his understanding of 
agape and the Greek view of eros are ~iipelled in his 
c~mmen~s on Jesus' advocaiing 'as ihyself'. For such a 
major text it. is remarkable how Nygren sees fit to dispatch 
the interpretation of this verse in two paragraphs. There 
is no consideration of other viewpoints beyond his saying, 
'Perhaps it need not be said that this idea of self-love 
is alien to the New Testament ... and if there had not. 
been a desire on other gro~nds to iriclude self-love among 
the ethical demands of Chris~ianity, there would be no 
motive for ~eeking to find it in the New Testam~nt command-
ment'. Nygren writes that 'Self-love is man's natural 
141 4:12. 
condition; it lS also the basis of the perv!=rsion of hi~ 
will to evil' . 3~ Few passages could better illusirat~ the 
pr~judites of the author, who wfll not coni{der any oihe~ 
. . . 
view of self-love beyond the condeinnation of it be_ing·i_he. 
cause of the Fall. This need not follow at all; since 
"men's creation might well embrace a ro~e for self-love as 
God-given, which man in the fre~dom of his will chose tn 
abuse. To present self-love as i~retrievably: sinfu~ and 
thus the cause of his downfall is to be blinkered. ·S~lfish-· 
ness and self love in many philosophical tr~atises .hay~. 
been two entirelj different ~~tters: Nygren is not 
i~terested ln th~-possibilities of such distincti6ns and 
so gl ves scanty treatment to the phrase i as thyself'. It 
lS glven only the minimum interpretation, that at least as 
a starting point love others as much as yourself, and from 
that go on to ov~rcome self-love. The· words of Je~us are 
not·taken as. definitive but as a crude i"hetorical maxlm 
fo~ Christian behaviour. 
It lS no surprise that Nygren use~ his section.on . 
Paul to reinforce his stand. Accordingly, 'man's ·self-. 
giv.ing to God . . is no more than a response . . it lS 
b~i a reflection of God's owri love. It lacks all·th~ 
essential marks cif Agape~ it is not spontaneous or cre~;i~e. ,33 
The possibility which would still preserve the spvereignty 
of God arid the contingency of man that ·God cr~ate~ man as 
a contingent equal is not considered. Yet·an· Anglican 
theologian like William Temple could ~rite, 'in.so far as 
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God and man are spirit~al they are ~i one kind .. 
(lik~~ise of t~~ir ra~ionality) . But 1n so tar· as Cod 
~reates, redeems and sanctifies while man is treated,· .. · 
~edeemed_ and san~tified they are of two kinds. God is. ·not 
c~eature, man is not creator' ,34 This is not for. N~gren, 
~ho quoting Paul; 'I live and y~t no longer I but Chri~t 
liveth in me',35 lS enabled to write of ~eighbour love 
that 'it 1s not really man but God who is the subje~t of 
. 6 
this love' . 3 Further 'he has nothing of his own to _glve, 
the love which he shows his neighbour is God's Agape_1n-
him' ,37 Nygren's doctrine of-agape i~ used in the case of 
neighbour love to· .evacuate all coritent from the self, 
replacin~ it by God's agape. As for self-love, that-_is 
beyond the pale as the cause of the perversion 1n t~e firit 
place: He_ specifically remarks on the attempt to distinguish· 
a right and wron~ self-love, that it was erroneous ~o find· 
it in the Gospels, and it is alien to Paui too, the orily 
. . . 38 
self-love there 1s, 1s the root of all s1n. 
The final attack on any role for self-love 1 s .delivered 
in his summary chapter~ Once again only one ·possible m~an-
ing for eros and s~lf-love can be considered, t~~t which 
condemns it. T h e not i on that· s e 1 f- 1 o v e may h a v: e . a- . r o 1 e a s 
a ieature prop~rly pertaining to the creature, a G6d-gi~en 
self-concern ·for God's sake (remember 'need' ·and 'God' in. 
chapter i)·, albeit- which may be abused, is impo-~sible 1n 
the face of such stron~ judgement as, 'B~t agapd ha~ no 
place for self~love. Christianity does n6t recog~ise- self-
143 4:14 
love as Christian; It recbgni~es love to God a~d love to 
~ne's rieigbbour, but self-love is the· great enemy which 
mu~t be overc6me. 3elf-lov~ ~eparates man from God' .39 
Added to this is a definition of neighbour-iove as 
'inexplic~ble, unle~s this love is Agape and is not really 
·a human lo~e at all~ but God's own Agape operating in 
.. . 40 
man'. The charge must be made that Nygren's theology 
·is not only an utt~r condemnation of all forms of self-· 
conce~n and thus self-fulfil~ment, but it also evacuate~ 
any independehce of b~ing from man .. 
Strnng lang~age may seem to have been used in this 
a~sessm~nt of Nyg~~n but this lS only in consequence of his 
own appro~~h .. H~ m~kes no· attempt at reconciliation ln his 
. . 
an~lysi~ of the ·i~eas of Eros and Agape. Possible distinc-
·. tions that 6ould be made between the Greek philosophical 
v~ew which may fit his portrait, and Christian reflections 
upon it~are not corisi~ere~ •. Indeed .sue~ distinctions are 
. . .· . . . . 41 
alluded to as belng of no value whatsoever! Distinctions 
bet~ee~ self regard, selfishness, self-centredness and 
~elf-fulfil~ment are ignored, all are lumped together. 
~igren's sche~e can ha~e-no role what£oever for self-love 
. . 
and self-fulfil~ment and leaves man's existence as an 
indep~ndent beirig c~eated by God seriousiy prejudi~ed; 
'Agape~lo~e to God lacks entirely the egocentric note· ahd 
is identical with the complete abandoument of self. And 
there is one form of love. for which Agape has no place ~ 
• . 42 . 43· 
self-love.' Nygren claims objectivity for h.is study, . 
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but the reverse 1s the case. What could bette~ illustrate 
the role of pr~suppositlort~ in his itudy ~~ati the a~s~r- ~ 
tion that agape 'starts frbm the ~onvict~on of man'~ o¥n, 
i-rorthlessr.ess. _When man has fa:)._len a.w.ay from God he ;ts 
wholly 'lost and of no value -at all~ : 44 
Another famous Protestant treati~e on the tbpic of 
self-love 1 s that provided by S~ren Ki erkegaard. Here· the. 
a~th6r is at pains to t~k~ seri~usly the 'as yours~lf' and 
to provi~e a role for self-love; tondemnation is·reseived 
fQ~ poetic or spontaheous love, (~~ odd contrast with 
Nygren's advocacy of spontaneity).· Love .that is .voiunt.ary 
- · ·. · · · 4s 
in humans is not nece.ssarily eternal.·-·. Thi.s is becaus·e 
love founded on particular relatiohsbips is e~~ose~ td the 
·v1hims of temperament. Love s o f part i alit y ~ a ri ·qui c 1~ l y . be ~ ora e 
hate: alone of all-io-.res.cnly the duty_of' neighbour love is 
free from the dangers cf partiali~y bi v{~t~e of its un{-
veisal aLd commandable charact~r. Unliie Nygren, although 
self-!ove is condemned bi ~i~rkegaard as leading to 
. . 
partialiiy and b~ing the root of pa~ticular· relations~ it 
is not implacably opposed to God's lriVe- rathe~.a 
transformation h~s tribe effected. A~~6rding to Kierke~aard, 
the genius of '~s yourseli' i~ that ~he c~mmand 'wrencheE 
. 46 
open the lock of Eelf-love' .. · 
. - . . . 
J~sus is ~eeri as not ·talking 
of an ideal,. for self-love 1s as with I'lygr·en fundamentally 
"flawed. Instead Jesu~ the pra~matist knows the enormity of 
self-love within people and in this saying endeavours-to 
. . 
t thl·s r sou·rc·e out~ards· iAR yourself' is as c_lever as .urn e . . .. · . -
. ; 
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the Gold~n Rule, fo~ by the addition of these two words 
escap~ from neighbour-love is made impos~ible~ Self-love 
1s totally exposea aid left nothing for itself. 
Kierkegaard thus s~rongly ~ondemns s~lf-love as 
practised, for being divis{ve and leading to partiality 1n 
the love of others. The 'as you~self' reverses this effect 
and turns ~~lfishness inescapably into neighbout-love. He 
does though allow that th~ 'as yourself' is taking jnto 
account a proper form of self-love. The command. of 
Matthew 22:39 lS also say1ng 'You shall love yourself the 
. . 47 
right way'. Kierkegaard believes that Christianity 
teaches prvper self-love and this ~akes possible proper 
. neighbour~love, for ultimately ~he· two are one and the same. 
A roie for self~love is being pr6vided in a manner very 
diifer~rtt from Nygren. The point is developed further under 
. : 48 
the heading 'You shall love yotir neighbour'. There 
distinctions o~ preference - the poetic ~ove·which i·s a 
for~ of self-love ~ust be removed. li6wever this is certainly 
not to cease lovi~g either the beloved·or oneself .. Instead 
it is to turn the wrong form ~f self-love and love for the 
beloved into the right form. This is a warnin~ against 
self-abando~ment and abnegation. To cease loving the beloved 
would be to turn the 'word neighbour into the greatest fraud 
. . . .· ··. 49 
ever d1scovered' .. If Kiertegaard does·do a disservice 
to partial loves in the sup~emacy he accords io neighbour 
. . . ·.. . .50 
love, he has still given them some role· as a genu1ne love. 
As a contrast t6 :these Prcite~tant positions, three 
exponents of the classic Ca~holic positiori may be cit~d, 
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namel~ Geach, HMring and Mortimer. The latter-is an Anglo-
Cat:rwiic, whose. analysis of iove starts from the !>osition 
that all 16ve has two sides to it, a selfi&h arid a Belfless 
. . . 51. 
element.. People are loved for the ~leasure loving another 
gi~es, and for the qualities in the other which call forth 
our love. Thus God is loved both because in loving him we 
find ou:t own happiness and because his 01-rn c-haracter of 
perf~ct goodn~ss dem~nds our lo~e. The contrast to Nyg~en 
is i~mense, the starting points are poles. apart. The 
pDrtrait Mortimer has given of the tyo elements of love, 
-would immediately eain fro~ Nygren the coridemnation that 
this is i~os~ man's own self-seeking founded op the 
co6victi6n of his ~wn inaliehabie wort~~ 
It c6uld be irgued though,that M6rtimer's convictions 
stem from a.theology of creation in which man although fallen 
lS still ~~e cieat~re of God. The in~lienable worth man has, 
lS no~ derived from the structure of the soul as in the 
Greek vi~w, rather it is given to hi~ by vittue of ·his being 
a creature. This 1s the 'image of'_God' -vrhich though obscured 
i~ still prese~t. Man 1s not 'whollY lost and of nc value 
at all', 52 since he is GoG.' s creature.· God has ·a role for 
him 1n relation to his creation and thus a p~oper estimate 
of his owh role ln God's order is essential ror his proper 
functioning in that.order; If lov~ is the proper relation 
bet~een God ahd his creatures; there 6ann~t be eridicated 
· ~it~er a proper self love desiring enjoyment a~d possession, 
or ~ selfleis love desiring the .good and happinesE of the 
beloved. Within God these two elements are to be found 
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because God is not monad but Trinity. The problem with 
Nygren's agape is that it is u~~dir~6tibnal,· there is.no 
life ~ithin God, for the ~rihiiy ~is absent. As seen 1n 
our first chapter, with the. Trihity present both ·type~ of 
love, the selfless and th~ self-regarding .can be con~eived 
of within God and so within man. 
The theology of self~love muit b~ seen as controlled·· 
by the theology of creation and of the Fall. Behind this· 
the influence of the ~rinity cari .be detected., rel~tiofi 
within God relates to ~elation ·~n mari~ If God can have·a 
self-regarding element· (need) throug~ the. Trini~y, then 
so can man. The notion. of lov~s.b~ing. 6aused, so inimical 
to Nygren's uncause.d agape beca:use of its .connotations of 
eros~ is acceptable to N~rtimer be~ause the notion of 
cRusality, in terms of value calling forth love,is inherent 
in the T~inity and thus ~cceptable .in th~ cjeated order .. 
God has not created wan 1n order to swa~p .his God~given 
. independence in a flow of divihe agape. According to . 
Mortimei the selfi~h element 1n man's 16~e of God is ·the 
true enlightened self-love ~ in him ~lone is peace and 
happiness, et~rnal life. This end is contingent upon God, 
it is not the inmortali~y o~ Greek .ero& Mhicb Nygren may 
rightly.condemn but ~ith which he should not label all· 
other Chri~tian attempta to as.sess self-love; Mortimer 
fi~mly says that all men by nature must desire their ow~ 
good and happiness. 53· Si.lc h s elf-:c one ern is not t h·e product· 
of the F~ll which m~~ howeve~ ~buse and warp it. Rather 
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it. is both the de fa~to sta~e-of affair~ and the constitu-
tive duty 6f the creatur~, the basis of self-~feservation. 
It is.not self-concern· that is at fault but the ~~ans by 
which.mati pros~~ut~~ 'that ·ebd. Wh~ri man ceases to ~egard 
. . 
ieif-concern in relation to his end as a cr~ature of God~ 
.but regards s~lf-conc~rn as cart~-bl~nche for selfishness, 
th~n he is fallen. Man should know that his own best· 
·interest .is in recogn~ising ·his cr·e·at\irel).ood arid thus 
d~pendence upon his Creator, - self~lo~~ ~s fatal only wh~n 
t~ed to a conce~~ of man'·s own ind~~endence. 
The self ~egardirig element in·love o~ght to be the 
God giv~n faculty of appre6iating our s~etus as c;eattire, 
and so for Mortimer the selfless element in man's love df 
Gdd i~ the will to serve God, placing him and his wili 
. . 
above everything else;54 As creatures there can be ~ 
pr6per ~ole for self-love because God the creator ·wish~s 
. . . ,· 55 
to 'give good things to them that ask h~m . This can 
b e don e on 1 y 1-1h en t i e d t o t h e r e t urn e 1 e !ll e nt o f ::: e 1 f 1 e ::: s 
love ln obedierice towards the Crea~or. The distinction 
that Nygren would not consider is vital. The fla~ is not .. 
inherent in self-lo~e ~u~ is inherent in selfishness._or 
~elf-wili, the desire to take decisions without refer~n~e 
. -to the Creator, this is what pe~verts self-love .. Mortimer 
~bows his. awarene~s of the ~roblem by str~ssing the ~ole-6f 
. . 
free will. Fr~e will is a gift of God but it i~ fr~e will 
rather than self-love which predicates the pcissibility 6f. 
selfishness 
. 56 
and thus sin. 
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HMiing'~ consideration of ihe stibject occurs 1n his 
. r:;T 
~onu~~ntal work'on m6~al·theology~' It has been suggested 
that the t he.ology of Creation and of Trinity controls the 
. . - . 
' . . . . . . . . 
Cath~lic.vie~pbint ~hile the Protest~nt io~ition. is con-
troll~d by ~'certain t~eology of the· ~ali and sin. Hiring 
illustrates this in his e~rly stress on the role of the 
Trinity. He has a h~ading entitled .'Participation in the 
Triun~ love of God', 58 an~ her~in may be read that 'To be 
in Christ ~nd in the ~ov~ri~nt ~f his love with t~~ Church 
means to~~ iLcorpotate in the life of the Triune·God. 
Only in Christ do we have access to the mystery of the life 
and love of the Hol~ Trinity'. Qui~kly foll~wins on 1s, 
'every kind cf'love is ~n incii~ation toward. some good 
. . r:;9 base~ on ~o~sciousness of value'.' This is titterly at odds 
w~th Nygren's thought. This is.bccaU:se ~>'ith Nygre·n ·agape 
finds· no expression 1>ithin .the life .of. G0d, it 1s ',:holly. 
outward-going yet not stimulated by ~al~e: It 1s a·oosi. 
odd conception with no role for ~elf-regard and none for 
the ~~lu~ of iti ohj~ct. ·With Hgring the practic~l ~iifer-
. . . . 
. . . . 
erice of his Tririitarian comffiitment 'is clear. Love within 
the Trinity is dill~d out by virtue of the value of each 
to each, and so love as response to value is not a prio~i 
. . . 
. alien to tbe being oi G~d in th~ manner sug~ested by Nygren. 
Consequently~ completely ~ifferent picture of man's 
r e 1 at i or" to Go d and 6 f h i. s o wn s e l f-und e r s t and i ng i s 
provided by ERring in comparison ~ith Nygren. HHring 
adv~cates as a motive, the highest form of e~daemoriism, 
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'Once man realises that only ~od can make him h~ppy· 
. . . .· .· . 60 .. ·. 
then he already· has :true love',- and," the 'perfe~t form 
. . . ·. . . 61 
of lo~e is the love-of fr1endsh1p 1 • ·· Ny~ren a~d 
Kierkegaard ~auld hav~ conde~ned such t~lk as b~ing of 
erds or preferential love. HHr{ng, however~ is at pain~_to 
distinguish his position from that of the Pl~toni~ts; 
'Supernatural hope is that undiea~ed oi fuliil;cieti~ .of -~he 
~reek Platonic eros . _which knows no rest unt{l._it has 
asce~ded to the divine. And yet superhatural·hope is 
. . . . 
ess~ntially distinct from the._Greek ~ros for it does no~ 
spring fr.om man· himse Z.f but froi:n the gracious ·and unmerited 
bo·~nty and condescension :or God who ·awal~:er1s . . . . 62 . • ·~ .. a hope'_, .· 
·The inclinati6ns within man to~ard a di~ini end, ~hich 
Nygren labels. as a self-concern alien·. t.o the vill .of· God, 
are 1n HMring t~~ g~a6ious gift ·;f God i~pellin~:mun to 
himse-lf. In the light of ou~ iirst. chapter·'s comments on 
need and God, the harmony between T-rinity, love and self 
con~ern ought now to be ~vid~nt. · 
Self-con~ern, ~ pr6per esti~ati6ti of one's rale .within 
God's world ~nd not selfishness~ c~n and ought to be a grace. 
. . -. . . . 
Sripernatural hope~ the hope of sel£·and corpor~te fulfil~ment 
in the divine, is not 'the flight of mere· man',· while it 
invol~es an image of God totally diff~r~nt tram that of the 
Greeks'. 63 Th~ ess~ntial differerice betw~en th~ Greek and 
Christian God is that the breek GQd cannot love, he is an 
abstract end, while the Christian God is an a~tive and 
. . 
loving God ~s is greatly stressed by HHring. Nygren 
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posses~ed the same distinction, but ~hile he d~fined the 
Greek God.as beipg at the root of all theologi~s havitig ~ 
role for self, and the Christian God as beirig totally 
agapeistic ani opposed to self-concern, H~ring's concept of 
the Living God is of one who out of love implants 1n man 
the desire for himself. This is because it 1s proper to 
hlm as a creature,whereas 1n Greek eros, the desire was 
borrt out of frustration with earthly incompletidn. 
spe~king, the Christian desire for God rejoices 1n its 
earthiness, its creatureliness, wh~reas to the Greek this 
was repugnant. Hgring's conclusions are opposed to those 
of Nygren, yet ~is sjstem like. Nygren's is all of grace, 
'without 
. 6~ 
any merit on our part'. Since it i~ all of 
grace, so it cah sl:ow our genu1ne free~cm and ·a role for 
self concern a~ proper to the cr~ature .. ·Here are two 
theologians ..;<u.o ac:r,ieve diametrically opposite results 
from the ss,me premise, that all is of g:face. 
. . .. 
concepts of grace's ope~ation in the world, of creation, ~f 
t 1:;. e Fa 11, ani u 1 t i ma. t ely of the nat '..12' e of being ·I-T i t hi r" God ~ 
are responsible for this divergence,n6t allegiance or 
otherwise to the Greek Platonists. 
In complete variance to Nygren, HHring has ass~rted 
that God is the proper object of man's o~n love, b~cause he 
wa$ created to thi3_'end: 'The virt~e df love als~ ba~ 
for its object. . . . d . l G. d. h. lf I . 65 W~ sre p~1v1lege to eve o 1mse ·. 
Emil Brun·ner is specifically condenri~&, and thu~ implicitly 
Nygren, for c~ntending 'that God himself accepts no love 
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£rom us because he has no. need of our love. • 66 . ·While -God 
may not depend o~ our _love _l~ order tp exist, that does not 
mean that· iH~ does not vant or will not accept our love, 
I 
again, a distin~tion Nygren fails to recog~ise. In .nMring 's 
woris, 'the true Go6 has no need of cur love but he wills 
. 67 t~ be loved by tis'. It could be contended that it is 
. . . 
Trinitarian theology that ~nables ~his distinction to be 
made with its portrayal of love overflowing from the fullness 
of life within the Trinity, a love that does not depend 
·but delie~ts in giving and accepting. Witho~t the Trirlity 
it is hard to see recipr6city within divine love. I\'ygrer_'s 
p~rtr~it cert~inly has no role fo~ {ti for him ail· tru~ love~ 
G~d's love, i~ one-way agapeistic _love. With the Trinity, 
without prejudi.ci_ng r1an's own ~o;itinger:cy ·2.nd God's 
. . 
sovereign-:.J,. si:cce there is recipr.-ocity .,.;:it.hir:. the GodheA.d," 
God's desir~ for man's response can ~e 5een ~s being a 
feature by grace of God's relation to·man.· By God's o-wn 
free ch6ice it can be held that dod's love will need to be 
reciproc~ted by nen for its fulfill~ent, not because it IS 
riece~sarily s6 but because he has chosen it to be so. This 
is e~sential groundwork for a proper estimation of self-
lo~e ·1n a creat~re pf God. 
Thus when Hiring moves from the ontological content 
of love to the practical content 6f neighb~ur love, he 
~tarts as a consequence of _the preceeding ontology, by 
stressing the 'inner unity Of Divine love, love of self,· 
love of neighbour' . 6B Through the theology of the Trinity 
153 '4: 24 
and of Creation the ·three lo~es .are all essentially inter~ 
. . 
related in the ·a.ivine plan. For, Nygr~n the ~nly love of 
any validity wotlld have been th~ iatter, and that ~auld not 
be an independent love of man but. God's agape .active. in man. 
Whereas w~ argue that God's sovereignti.must be so construed 
as not to prejudice the i~dependence ot his own creature, 
Nygren does so prejudice man, whereas HHring does·not. For. 
HHring the •I' of a ·person· signifies· a subsistent being 
spiritually conscious of self. Thi~ .~I' is _only meaningfu~ 
with 'Thou' and to fail to perceive the 'Thou' is to be 
defective iri love and to fail to find our o~~ e~sential 
personhood. 'I' have my being only because o£, and in con-· 
junction with, the 'thou' of mi neighb6ur and in _Christian 
terms with the .'Thou' of God. Self~iulf~ll~~nt of 'I' is 
thus found in a proper attention to '~hou' .. Sel~ishness 
will never fulfill 'I'. So the e~sent.ial distinction bet~e~n. 
. . 
proper arid impr6per self-love which Nyg~~ri condemns, is 
found to be essential: 'Only if there is the movement of 
love from the I t6 the thou wh~ch takes the thou as seriously 
the I itself are both firmly £ixed,in themselves' • 69 as 
HHring notes the conriectibn b~tween self-fulfillment 
and creation-. As creatures whose ~oot _of being, e~en as 
fal-len creatures, lS orientated to God,· 'We are really I, 
only ourselves fully when we f~ce the thou of God' . 70 I~· 
ibis then the sense of 'as yo~rs~lf' intended by.Jesus? It 
will ·never be possible to judge the m.ind of Jesus but tpere 
are these two choices: that Jesus ~eant as Nygren or 
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Kierkegaard hold, that 'as yourself' was a clever gambit 1n 
exposing the ma~que of self-love, or that Jesu~ in this 
phjase ~as organically link~rig,the three loves ·i~ one 
. . . . . 
~ritity - love 6f God, of self, and of n~ighbour being_£urid~--
mental to th~ created harmony. 
ti~ in which love of God is tbe guarantee of th~ ordering 
of self and n~ighbour love. The relation to God lS realised 
on earth by the relation.to our neighbour. HHring.not~s 
John's ~x~ortation, 'How can he who does not love:hi~ 
brother whom he sees, love God whom he does not see?~7l 
God has created these loves and without him they will.be 
fruitless. He is love's centre, so 'love of self .and lqv~ 
. . . 
of n~ighbour cannot reach the depth essential fdr preserva-
tion and fulfil;;..ment unless both Seek and fi n:d in God their· 
origin and· centre' .7 2 Or quoting Augustine, 'O~ly ~h6se who. 
love themselves for God's sake love themselves as they 
should'~ 7 3 · 
·with a positive c6ncept of divine creation it is thus-
entirely po~sible for the Christian to have a li~ely and 
genuine role for self-love free of the sinful ~lement of 
selfishness, while still being a genuine for~ of ~elf-
concern 1n a manner non-existent in Nygren. Man ·1s a 
c~eature of God created to-glorify-God and to se~ve his 
rieigh~oour.·. Unto this end he.is constituted-and in.this he 
can fulfil.: himself and his aspiratiop.s beyo_rid all the · 
~reams of ple~sure that selfishness can prompt. Indeed 
. . 
such are the ·rewards promised by Jesus· for his followers 
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that the accusation c~ri be-made that Jesti~' ethic 1s reward 
or self-centred~ a 6harge that w111 b~ a~~~~red prese~tly. 
The proper for:tn of self-loVe e~n-~equent -·up-on· the act-ion 
o~ God's grace Hiring c~lls the Su~e~naturil love of s~lt 
and neighbour. In his judgement it tia~scends 1n value 
naiural or human love, yet to be efficacio~s and fruitful 
it must be rooted in ~atural love.· Rightl~ ordered h~tural 
'· love is itself a prod~ct of God's grace~ as an in~irect 
consequence of ~reation. Natu~al love .is out own love ·over 
which men have the power of abuse, so when nian- abuses natural 
love in selfishness thi~ 1s a false self~abandon~ent. 
Cons~dering sin, it may be said th~t 'all ~in ·flows from a 
_disordered seeking. of self, a self-se~king,~hich is _iot 
~4 
open to charity'. 1 False ;elf-lo~~- :l.s ~o; HHring the . 
great enemy of love for God which ~mbraces prop~r -~elf-· 
loVe~ so again tbe distinction Nygre~ will nbt make 1s 
h~re held to be vital. 
Ac c ord:l.ngTy w·hen considering duty,· Ha'.r u1g hold~ that 
the first dut~ of prbper·s~lf~love a~ a creature-~f Goa 1s 
to curb bur native egoism, thi~ conc~rn. for rampant 
selfishness-thit is a consequ~nce 6f the F~11. 75 Under 
the heading of 
_· - 76 
'The Standard "as yourself"', Hiring 
~mphasize~ the latter clause which the 'S~ripture splendidly 
illustrat~s'.77 Neighbdur love is to be as much ·a part of 
. . -
my proper natu~e as self-lev~· for neither is sel£ish· love. 
Rather Christi~n self~love is -'the hoiy love of self 1n God' 
~nd not the 'naturally noble love of self' - the Greek 
view. 7 e This· is 'a_ love of self which is a participation 
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in Christ's own love for us'. It is the prio.rity of God· 
or Christ's lo~~ that can give a proper me~ning for self-
love and neighbour love. Without this C~ri~~oceniri~{ty,· 
self-love may earn the condemnation ~ygren g1ves it. HMtitig 
and Nygren both stress Christocentri~ity; one of them 1s 
enabled by this to remove mean1ng from mati·as an individual 
and so of concern for himself: The 6ther uses this 
Christocentricity to achieve a con~ept 6£ self and ·neigh-
bour love by which both are preserved and stressed as 
necessary for the health of one another. ~he·theol6~y-of 
creation and of its end i~ decisive in freeing ·self-love, 
either from the accusations Nygreri justifiabli·makes of 
· Gjeek thought, or from his consequerit concept· of agqpe ~by 
which man's own individual integriti is n~gii~d. 
The third author cited in our 'Catholi.c' analysis ~as 
1::)0 Geach. His analysis of the role of ~elf-love ·flows o~t 
of his analysis of, and the necessity fo.r~ Tririita:dan 
theology. His work is therefore most appropriate-to uur 
heading on that subject. Suffice it to say that through 
the Trinity, Geach holds that self-regard and self-givirig 
within the being of God create ~ peifect harmony. God 
loves men and men love God not for .their individuality 
to be destroyed but for it to be fulfilled, and as creatures 
it must be that their creator fulfill~ tb~m. God's .jealousy, 
adopt i:rig an Old Testament theme, 1 s. for his c r·ea ture s' sake, 
he is jealous for us as his creatures for our own best 
interest. The paradoxical viewpoint is maintained that 
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God's j ea:lousy is a n ec e ~ sary factor in m·aking· _men free. 
God wants men t~ love him both for his .. sake ~n~~heir own. 
For his sake because he is. the creator ~rtd sfnce h~ ii 
himself lnve, be is to be loved not to 'satisff.him' ·but 
·for goodness' sake. For our ~ake, self-l~ve is appropriit~ 
because men are God's creatu~es and thus he wishe~ good 
things fo~ them. Geach goes so fa~ as to m~intain that 
unselfishness is not only not a virtue asc~ibable to God, 
it is just not a virtue. 81 This is because in itself 
unselfishriess or selfishness is not the moral criterion~·. 
for instance, certain unseifis·h actions.may be highly 
. . 
immoral, such as ·bravery in battle for· an· immoral: cause .. 
·. Likewi~e certain self-regarding actions fuay be highly 
~irtuous, such as the·acquisi~ion·6f kno~ledge. It 1s ·the 
end that 1s being sought in being self-concerned or unselfish 
that determines the morality of the stance. St. Paui i~. 
clear that one can lack charity even if~one gave all one's 
82 goods to feed the poor and offered one's body to be .burnt~-
The c~nclusion must be that~discriminatirig lave or attach-
ment, to others or a cause, is not charity~ ~ov~,to be 
Paul's charis, must be towards the right ~aus~s, ~nd f~r 
Paul that is to be tied to the love of God, 
Numerous theologians have e~deavoured to chart the 
· va~yirig strands of .opinion coricerning self~lov~. One such 
is .Gene Outka. 83 
. . 
He c haract eri s es four .general responses 
to the issue: Self-love aswholly nef~rious; Self-love as 
normal, reasonable and prudent.; Se.lf-love as j~-~tified 
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;deriv~tively~ Self-love is·~ defini{e obligat1on. Signi fi-
cantly a general move throughout the spectru~ i~ seen fro~ 
Protestant to Catholic ~uthors res~~ctively~ Con~erning 
. . . . 
the fi~st ·position of self-love as whoili nefaiious, Outk~· 
identifies numerous associations with thi~ viewpoint. It 
is generally linked as in Reinhold Niebuhr, ~ith a strong 
v1ew of s1n such that self-love,pride and Sl~ are identi~ 
fied. This negative view, of self-lov:e is also typically 
linked to a view of acquisitiveness. That-~s, this.type of 
s~lf-love 1s such th~t in r~lation to all other~ the 
individual's predominant ai~ is private s~tisfaction: Outka· 
notes that Nygren opts for such a view of self-love in which 
this private acquisitiveness effectively ~overn~· all the~­
actions of man. 84 Outka condemns this vi~wpo{~t and 
maintains that Njgren's portrayal of men as 'psycholti~ical 
egoists' lS inaccurate. Nygren's maJor mistake in this. 
analysis is to hold that such self-love •is the sole spring of 
behaviour for all. This dest~oys human freedom for it 
allows no other s~imuli for actio~ aside fiom God's direct 
agape. Had Nygren said that such ~elf-love is a basic 
trend in. man then the possibility of i~ee conversion apd a 
genuine reversal of this trend, respecti~g man's integrity 
would have been possible - this 1s a que~tio~ of the 
opera t ion of g r a c e . <· 
As Outka notes' Nygren. ca"n only have two world VleWs 
utterly opposed to one another, eros :~gainst agape, whereas 
Outka makes the essential ~i~tinction which has underlain 
much of this chapter's earlier discuss1'on on the· consequences 
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of the doctr1n~ of creation. That is,.the distinction 
between.a natural human life apart from G6d's sust~inip~ 
· grac~, which is Nygren's position, and the actual human 
' . . . 
1 ife where God is always inescapably act i v.e and sustaining." 
Viewpoints such as Nygren's may be held to be in dan~er of 
~dvocating a radical dualism between man and God. · Outka 
notes the point by using a quotation from M~cLagan:· 
'There may be a concept of "natural man" that refer.s to. 
no actual individual, btit only to a purely hypoth~tical 
b e i n g , t hat 1 s t o s a y , t o man a s he would b e we r e .it not 
for the grace of God, but as in fact he n~ver is, sibce 
. . . . . . . . 86 . 
God's ·world, whlch he has not abandoned'. . . t-his lS 
The· portrayal of 'self-love as normal, reas6nabl~ and 
prudent' 1s mov1ng into the centre o~ the ~pectrum. Here 
self~love is neither virtuous nor evil, rather it ·is thi 
~tate 1n which man the creature prese~tly find~ hims~lf. 
It is the desire for self-preservation that has preserved 
the species while at the same tim~ being able t6 cau~~ 
considerable hurt within the species. Its dangers are 
more towards narrow-mindedness than incorri~i~le s~lfish~ 
ness. 
87 
Outka takes as an exponent of this vie~ Paul Ramsey .. 
Self~love is taken 1n this instance as the p~radigm for the 
meaning of other-regard .. ·.· He says 'How. exactly. 
do ydu love yourself? Answ~r this question ~n~ you will 
kn6w how a Christia~ should lov~ his neighboui'. It is 
assumed that one can love one~elf prop~rlY as God intends 
and not as de 'facto. occur~ wrongly. The essence of this 
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pnsition.is tha~ self-love may reasonably be universalised, 
·.so as men· rightly value their own· interests, so nien must 
.~alue other~. · S~lf~love i~.not ~rang provided others are 
. valued e<lually~ This is very different frqm saying, 'How 
m~ch .I vai~~ ~yself, I must ~~stray that valuation, negate 
myself and turn myself entireiy to others'.· Outka appre-
ciate~ that a distinction between a wrong ahd a right self-. 
love is una~oidable; . The wrong sori of self-seeking is 
. . . . . 
self-defeating because the self is never rich in isolation, 
. . .. 
. ·the pr~ncipl~ of rela~ion being fundamental ·to ~rue 
irtdividuality. Whereas self-giving pro~uces self-enhan~·ement 
arid fulfillment, ana thi~ ~ould be said from both a 
Christian and h~manist'v{~wpoi~t~ 
The third position isthat of self-love as justified 
·. . .· ...... 88 
derl\:atlvely. . In this, deliberate c·on.cern for the 
agent's own welfare lS p~imis$ible so ~ong as. thii can be 
deri~ed from other regard. ~he scriptural·.warrant for 
this would be ~rovi~ed ~y ~ par~bie like that concerriing 
. . .·· 89 
the tal.ents. .· The implication ls that there is the 
. . 
. . 
obiigation.to .develop one'.s o.wn abilities for the. sake of 
othe~s. Numerous practical examples are given of this, for 
instance, ~n agent should stand up for his own and others' 
hfii~n ri~~ts when by neglecting to do so, others are 
e~c~ur~ged to furiher their owri coiruptinn. An agent should 
further as~~rt· hi~self when the rights 6f those close to him 
are threatened e.g. th~.~amily.9° Finally, an agent should 
~onsider himself in order not to burden others by creating 
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. . 
needless problems. Simone Weil ln her own con~ern fpi others 
bec~me so extrem~ ~n her a~6~tical pr~ctice~ t~at .she ~as ~ 
a burden to those around her.· A· h~ppy a~d che~rful-~erson 
full of his o~n joi~ de vivre is a blessing.a"nd l·iberat.ion 
to others. Proper self-love in this a~alysis has a pragmatic-
iole to play in harmbny with other love: The two 'loves 
' . . . 
are inseparable because neighbour love ~ill -wish· the 
rieighbour's own good whi~h vill include a correct estimate 
of his own self. 
The final position. lS that of self-lbye as adefinite 
obligation. The two authors cited heie by O~tka ar~ -both 
Roman Catholics, D'Arcy ~nd Johann. 91 As already note-d, 
D'Ar6y's own stand~oint lS one of deliberate 6pp6s~t{on to. 
·' . . . . . 
Nygren's viewpoint, D'Arcy characterises e·ros· as active 
self~re~arding love, and agape as passlve self-sacrificing 
love. In the fashion of Geach he regards .tieither eros or · 
agape, self-love or .self-sacrifice, as -e~ds ·.• ln themselves~ 
He b~lieve~ both are corrupt~b1e and both. have a prpper 
ideal founded ln God by which they may become. compatible. 
Both taken to excess glve roughfy the s~me danger~: 
'Selfishness is only a vice_ if it means an undue reg~rd; 
unselfishness is orily a viriue if it_ls cpuntered ~y ~elf-
respect. The two lov~s therefore so far frQm ~ei~g 
~pposites ~ppear to ~equire the presenc~ of each other' 
F~om this point of vie~-it is not su;prising that D'Arcy 
ii very critical of Nygren. Particularly criticised is 
. : . 
_Nygren's ~dentification ~f dre~i eros with all other_-non-
aga~eistic forms of life. Npt only is there this conf~~ion 
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over the bound~_of eros but he is also criti~al. of Nyg~en's 
use of the concept of God's sovereignty. D'Ar~y ts vorried 
that Nygren evacuates man~s independent reality and that· 
Nygren has not given a concept of sovereigqty sucb tha~ ~an's 
relative self-dependence and freewill, themselves the God-
g i v en c r eat i v e prod u c t o f 1 o v e , ar e p r e s e r v e d . 9 3 · N"y g r en 
ptejudices man's independence in ~is concept of_ God's ill-
sovere1gn agape. D'Arcy is moved' to criticise· this, .for 
'if all agape in man 1s the diVine nature itself, .~ow can 
man escape b~ing ~holly divine qr else radically s~p~r~te·:·? 4 
Either ~ay man as an independent creature ceases to exist 
and .~ith the ·latter Nygren seems to create a radical du~lism.· 
Outka's analysis thus conveni~ntly ·shows_how.dif~ering 
assessments. of self-love are derived from differing .church-
manships with their varying beliefs conterning the nature .. 
of creation, sin and grace. He also chart.s the possibilities 
.. 
1n analysing self-love positively, from a pragm·atic view-
point to that of a theological virtue alon9sic/e.-_ s e l f- g i v i n g·. 
. . . 
G~ach's own, and Outka's explicit,use of D'Arcy'_s sep~ration 
of the issue of self or other love from the finil ide~l is 
vety helpful. Nygren makes agape the fin~l ide~1:and eros 
the tiltimate enemy. Cons~quentlj 1n not usi~g ·t~e pririciple 
of relation which demands both loves, he destroys man _and 
. . . 
reduces God to a monad. Geach, Outka, D'Aicy:ahd implicitly 
HHring by their harmony of the two loves resolve this 
tendency. 
A similar analysis~ though in a more psychblogical ve1n, 
lS 
. . . . 95 prov1ded by D. D. W1ll1ams. . He staits by noting the 
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as God's agent y~~ charged to subdu~ and govern the world. 
. -
. . . . . . 
His ~re~tivity i~ Go~ g~veri·, ci~d has handed bver certain of 
his. soverE;:ign powers to man as.:his intended agent·, albeit 
under divine judgement, ~o it ·defeats God's own purpose when 
man's own cr~ativity is deriigrated. 
Williams takes Er~~h Fromm as an ~xample of those who 
have reacted ag~inst this 'self~~enyin~' stfand i~ Christianity. 
Hls philos6phicai basis_ is that of ~~y~hological self~ 
realisation. A~ainst this Fromm s~~s Christian faith as 
~estrain'ing freedom andrepressing p-roductive love. He. 
. . -
rail~ ag~inst the Pr~testant R~form~~s, 'tuthe~s relation to 
God .was ~~eof complete submis~ion ~ .9 9 Wh~reas in .complete 
c6ntrast_ N1gien. was able to -write that 'Luther de~arts from 
the tradi~i~n~l idea ~hie~ ~i~c~vers ~ ~b~mandment of self-
love {n the commindmerit of love to on~'s n~ighbours, ~hat he 
finds thi~ iatter io ~onta~n a direct prohibition of every 
kind of self-love 1 • 100 ~n ~espons~ to the criticisms of 
- . 
. Fromm and Camus, Williams piesents a psychological analysis. 
of the Chri~tian view of self; 
This is· seen cl_early in his view of the ideal: I All. 
the humari loves, sex, co~radeship, hum~nitarian·and religious 
-love of the good a~d beauti-ful belong in the fulfilled self. 
. . 
They will be ~r~nsfor~ed in_ ~elf-givin~ yet they must live 
101 
for they coristit~te personaf ~ife'. Nygren starte~ from 
the pre~up~osit~oh of a certaih nature of God,~iz.his concept 
of ag~pe~ to which mankind and eros were tailored to fit and 
. . . . . . . . . . 
so lost theif ~xistence. Williams starts from the opposite 
- . 
end ~ith a con~ept of man, w~ich alth6~gh it may be 
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'fulfilled' or 'tra~~formed', cannot radically ~e alt~red. 
~he loves ~f ~eri knnwn in this pres~nt st~te have to be 
retain~d, ~uch that it. l& the eo~cept of-God which will need 
altering :ta ther than the .cone ept of man._. This rtJ.ay sou!fd 
radical, but two justificitions for this can be given. 
T~eie is the argument by analog~~ that our prior experience 
of love is hum~n,and that to speak of the divine without 
feference to the human is t6 spe~k- nonsense. Secondly, 
since God himself creat_ed this n~ture ~nd its loves, his 
own ~ctions upon us will.b~ in harmony with our nature, not 
out of necessity but as.deliberate policy. This returns 
one to the· nature of· the Fall and Creatio.n. argument, and 
.. 
it alio .holds out.the po~sibility of a eonsi~erable change 
1n otir rinderstanding of'God. A recent illustration of this 
~tarice ~hich has be~n illustrated at great length is 
. . . . . 
. V~nstone's work. Traherne too, at· a much earlier-date, was 
happy to see the n~triral 16ve~_of posse&sion as the material 
. . . . . . 102 for transformat1on 1nto fel1t1ty. 
Williafus for his part is employing the same scheme and 
has a thesis that two. aspects of the human loves prepare men 
Human loves 'have the power to open up the 
self _and to show the reqt1irement. for self-giving', and 'they 
reach the limits ofself-fulfillment and so can acknowledge 
_that orily a lo~~ which transcends the· human loves can fulfill 
the s~ifl . 103 Williams i~ ~ai~tairiing, as Geach ~nd D'Arcy 
hold from different t:taditions, that the human loves c~n be 
go~d or bad, unlike Nygren whose position he specifically 
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·condemns. Human love is not wholly to be despjsed - the 
loath~d distinition b~tw~en prope~ ~nd false self love i.s· 
used:l04. Thtis Williams 'spec~fically reje~ts . (that) 
. agape 1s a cDmplete contradiction of human love' . 105 
.His psychological insi·ghts coupled with his star_ting with 
man is clearly seen in his treatment of the Fall.· Concerning 
it; he .writes that 'men's loves have th~ ability to go 
wrong and so need the redeeming influence of agape' . 10 6 
From the statement that every self can find integrity only 
in chapge and by risking relationships with others, he notes 
that this inherent risk frightens men. 'Psychological 
blocking', where meti do not· take the risk of change and 
re£use to use ~heir capabilities to the full_is fQr Williams 
.a m u c h m or e s u b.t l e vi e w o f s i n t han man c on s c i o us 1 y at t h e 
centre 
. . 107 
of his every wrong act. 
The traverse across the spectrtim .of v1ews has riow 
reached its. fullest extent: Catholic anO Protestant, 
Conservative an~ Radical ha~e been examined. In Williams, 
man is to the fore to such an extent that if anyone is 
prejudiced it is G6d, ~hereas in Nygren it was the other 
way around. In all_ the· various authors, the consequences of· 
creati~h theology and of beliefs concerning the Fall have 
b~en shown to be dir~ctly r~lat~d io their portraya~ of 
the role of s~lf-fuifillment in man .. Despite the ·criti6ism 
m~/Je.' of it, the value ·of the distinction between false a-nd 
proper self-love has been seen in a very wide variety of 
authors r~nging irom Geach ·to ·williams, whose churchmanship. 
4:38 
1s very diffe~ent. lt is contended that this distinction 
.was intended by Jesus in ~is pronouncement 'as thyself'~ 
He perceived that his Fath~r'~ cre~tion intended in its 
eve~tual harmony to include the happiness of all~ derived 
from the Father who intends to give good .things to his. 
children. Recourse is thus made to one of the i~itial 
objections to tbe sayings ~t Jesus, that the talk of self-
denial is 1n f~~t self-centred. This i.s the idea that 
sac~ifice 1s for the sake of eternal regard: chastise 
yourself now on earth and you will fipd eternal bliss. Is 
selfish- prudence thus the ethic of the gospel? 
lt canriot be disput~d that there·a~e two strands, at 
the least paradoxical,in the Gospel. There are the classic 
texts of self deni~l, 'if. any man would follo~ me let· him 
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depy himself'. Y~t even amongst these texts· the element 
Df self-fuifil~ment is pres~nt. Each Beatitude receives 
its s~nction in a prom1se. Mark writes ~hat 'if any one 
. . . . . . . 109 
~ould be f~rst he must be last and servant of all'. A 
little later, Jesus having ~~horted his followers to leave 
all for the gospel promises they 'shall rece1ve a hundred-
110 fold'. Jesus tells the 1 ri~h ruler' what he .must db to 
. lll 
'have treasure in heaven'. Ddes this mean that all the 
stress by Jesus on obedience and self-~orgetf~lness before 
God and love of the neig~bour has lost its validity? .Kehneth 
Kirk 1n a ~iinificant c6ns~deration of this 1ssue coricluded· 
ihat this paradoxical mixture of themes wis a. deliberate 
. 112 
act of Jesus. The basis of Kirk's answer to the problem 
'• 
168 4:39 
1s to employ the same distinction ~sed b~ Geach. ~nd other.s, 
that self-forgetful~ness .1ik~ selfi.shhess, for ·its own sake 
1s .wrong. Self-forgetful-::--:nes~ is never an end in itself, 
b.ut can orily be a servant.to an end,. in this· case the 
.establishment of the Kingdom-~f God. Kirk not·es · ·t.ha.t 
Baron Von Hligel pointed out th.at Jesus promised rewa-rd 
never ·for reward's sake or .as a payment for self~forgetfulness. 
. . 
Reward lS simply not link6d to self-centred a~~ui~ition: 113 . 
Rather reward it oniy presented in re;ponse t6 a~ottier 
. . . 
motive, that of obedien~e to God .and Ch~ist. ~hus in a 
text with both tbe ele~ent of. self-satrific.e ahd reward 
p r e s· en t on e · r e ads , · 1 who ever 1 o s e s iii s 1 i f e for my sake and 
. '14 
the Gospel 1 s will save. it'.~ · The key Droviso ha~ been · 
added, 'for ;:ny sake•aild the Gospel.'!:> 1 _. Fidelity _to Christ 
for t~e sake of who he i~, is ·the m6~ive for Ctr{stian 
r e nunc i at i on . T 6. g 1 v e up j o ys no,.,. for j o :y s i n e t ern i t y 1 s 
not the moti\re for renunciation· ·and. wouLd be ·to f.orf-eit .the 
re>:arq.. 
It ought to be stressed tbat.self~forgetfulness and 
self-concern must not be pres~nted:as ends in themselves. 
Taken alan~ they are amoral as:Geath no~ed; .it is th·e ends 
they serve that g1ve them value. In this- tase the end is 
. . . . . . 
the realisation of creaiu;ehoo~ whic~ i.s the realisation of 
the Ki~gdom of God in fidelity to him. For this end's 
fruition, roles for both s elf.~forget fulne s s and self cone ern 
. . 
are needed. Thus tbe reward motif in th~ Gospels is not to 
be assessed on the bumah s~ale of return for services 
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rendered. The. parables of the prodigal sop and· of the 
labourers ·in the vineyard teach that rewa.rd.is-not 
. ll5 . 
quantitative. . The principle of .the labourer's ~~i~~ht 
was not pay in exact propo~ti~~·to w6rk done, r~ther.mor~ 
was given than was· expected, which irtci~ed th~ ·~ispleasure· 
of the one group who expected payment for services rendered·-
the lal>ourer s' who in fact received full and fair payment 
for their ~ervices and yet wete displeased ~it~ the charity 
of their master. The essence of the reward mot.if .is not 
prudencebut grace, overwhelming gift beyond eipeciation. 
That all sinners are blessed out of all proportion to 
. their des:rts is the essence o·f je.sus' forgiveness 
are all unprofitable . 116 servants'.-
. and 
.Kirk's reasoning 1s that reward is gr~ce,j.it ·i£·· 
introduced not to attract man's p~udence but as.the 
'we· 
inescapable consequence of the Kirigdom 1 ~ fruiti~n. It 
~annbt be earned, it is simply given as ~he ines~~pable 
cocsequence of·the obedience whict ~llows God to ~stablist 
his Kingdom. At the same time·, it declares that the self-
for get fulne s s and self-love commended by these text~ are 
not ·ends in .themselves but rather are harmoniousiy ·1:l.nked 
in the attainment of the Kingdo~. In the rationale behind 
a the th~mes 6f 
this,/return 1s ne6e~sary to/cteation and God's.soyer~ignty. 
As Hi~ing saw, self~lov~ and neighb~ur lov~ can orily ~e 
heid together and find fruiti6~; ·{n lov~ of Go~~ .Tb~ love. 
of God must be prior to all things and only from this can 
flow a proper ~ense of tbe.o~he~ two lo~eB because it 1s 1n 
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Go~'s pl~ri for ihis· to be so. Since th~ Creation and the 
kirigdom are intended to be good and God given, the joy 
promised in retbrn for obedience ~s not a comcierci~l bargairi: 
but the gift of one ~ho wishes th~ v~ry b~st for his 
·creatures. He can obtain this end only by our own free 
~D-operation, s1nce God desires ~~n and not automatons, and 
this 1s the es~ence of gracious love. 
Flew picks up the same two points in his study of New 
Testament ·ethics, that Jesus tiansforms rew~rd with his 
conception of God's giacious dealings. ~ith man, and the 
conception that servi.ce of God is duty, performed out of 
love th~t cannot be assessed in terms of work or earning~.ll7. 
. . . 
Sirice it :~ight still be asked why Jesus used wh~t is to 
our eyes an ambiguous terms, Flew explains how natural it 
was for Jesus to adopt its use. It ~as a subtle play on 
Jewish use as 1n the par~ble of the labour~rs. The tradi-
. 
tional Jewish schem~ ~a~ that of God punishing sin and 
rewarding merit. Reward in the Jewish sense possessed a 
religious use with which Christians today no longer identify 
because it has acqui~ed conn6tations. of recompense for 
service. The p~oblem for the Jew~ was that this had alr~ady. 
happened to th~ term ·in its liriki with 'works' and the '·law'. 
Jesu~~ use represents an attac~ on this trend ~n~ ari 
. . . 8 
etideavour to return it to the use of· the gift bf love. 11 
N~~ Testam~nt ~cholars ihow that for Jesu~ the use of 
'r~ward' ~nd a role fot. 'self' are a direct product of his 
~ 
beliefs concerning the end of man, wbat is called.Beatitu~e·. 
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Maritain, a Roman Catholic, considers this matter 1n his 
treatise on morals. He starts his discussion:by noting the 
text, 'Today thou shalt be with me 
. . . 119 . 
1n Parad1se'. Be1ng 
wfth Christ in the Kingdom 1s the absolute end Of ~an in 
which the three loves of God, self and neighbour meet. For 
Maritain this .is because this. is the statement of lovers 
and not the appr~hension of the Platonic id~a of the ~upreme 
value, good. The happines~ here is not simple pleasu.re and 
he links Beatitude and Paul's saying, that 'Eye hath not 
seen .. 
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I Maritain's words can ~e taken as a philo-
sophical commentary upon the biblical use of 'reward' 
attached to g~ace used ·by Kirk and Fiew: Thus he emphasises 
the same point concerning motive as they did. The motive 
for Beatitude o~ re~ard is not a selfish desire of the sa~e 
for oneselfi ~ut firstly the desire to obey God. :t~a:r i tai n 
pla~es God first, then our own concerns are relevant but 
only as his creatures. He does this by ~lstingui·shing 
.between man's ab~olute ~ltimate end.- God, ~nd his subjective 
ultimate end 7 man's o~n end, the vision of ·God; From the 
priority of God flows a proper role for man's self-love as 
a creature of God. Maritain explicitly aims to over~ome 
the egocentricity of Aristotelian eudaemonism, in that man's 
absolute end, although fulfilling for man, is absolbtely and 
personally oth~r. Here is why Nygren. has gcrne so wrong, 
in refusing to allo~ t~at while dreek eros could not respond 
to a iiving God as ~n end and an ·•~ther', Christiari 
reflectio.n on self-love may:, while not necessarily, so 
respond. In this case it is the living '6theri who defines 
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and cr~ates the possibility of man's own enfi. 
The variet.ies of. 'seif-love' are nearly as varied as 
the varieties of '16ve' itself. Despite t~is v~riety·it does 
. . . . 
pr~ve possible to ccimment on ·certain. factors inherent 1n 
. . 
th~ Christian position as ~ortrayed in the ~uthors 
consi~eted. Notwithstandi~g th~ statu~ of ·his study, it 
.will first be ·said that the m~j~r work of Nygren on thi~ 
subject does not contribute to an understanding of the 
problem. On tb.e basis of this stud~r it wo·Lild appear to 
possess two m~jor flaws. The identificati6n of Greek eros 
w{th all ChTi~tian _attem~ts to justify self-love3 which 
Nygren repudiate~,does not hold. Two of -the authors 
cobsidered, HMrin~ and Maritain; who ha~e a high view of 
self~io~;, deliberately noted that th~ir work stemmed from 
the theology of gr~ce and was r~dicallj different from 
Gteek. exp~~~ations: This exposes the sec6n~ of Nygren's 
errors. He d6es noi appreciate that th~ 1aryin~ Christian 
stra::ld.s on seif~lov'e. do not stem from allegiance. or· otherwise 
to .the Greeks but to differing understandings. of b·asic 
doctrines like the Trinit~, breation, Fall ·and Grace. The 
consequences of this variety have been clearly seen ln the 
difference between the 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' 
p~eseniations~ A positive view of creation as involving 
man's own end and a less negative view of the consequences 
of-the Fail have generally enabled the C~tholic position 
· to d~velop a role .for self love. This use of creation is a 
fe~ture that cannot possibly be derived fro~ Greek philosophy, 
which lacks the ·notion of God's creating the world good. In 
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iact Nygre~ and the Greeks share a position ~f distrust for 
the created order! 
The concept of Beatitude, personal an~ li~eli communion 
1n the life of God, ls also alien to the Greek v1ew of abstract 
contemplation. Yet this is a major element in th~ analysis 
of self-love giv~n by HRring and Maritain. The ~iff~rences 
bet~een Christ~an Beatitude .and the Greek Platonici view 
are se~n in tbe manner by which the Christian presentation 
is tied to the New Testamept theme of reward. This tbeiJe, 
held up by its detractors as selfish, has been shoyn to be 
a major New Test~ment them~ ·~hich li~k~ the three loves of 
God, self and Leighbour ln a living whole witnessed·to by 
Kirk, Flew and Maritain. Ny~ren m~y well ·be correct vith 
. . . 
his analy~is of Greek thought but he· 1s wrong to tar .other 
st~ands of Christendom with the same b~ush. 
The distinction between proper an~ ~alse seif-love 
which Nygren ad~mantly refused to illo~ has also been .shown 
to be vital fro~ a variety of viewpoints. Mortimer, Geach, 
. iirk an~ Willi~ms all perceive that selfishness is not equal 
to self-love. Ling~istically this study ha~ shown that for 
a large and varied element of Christendo~, it is essential 
to distinguish between the negative forces of selfishness · 
. . . . 
. . 
and self-cent~ednes~ and what may be the posi~iv~ forces o~ 
self-love, such as seif-fulfillment and self-concern, whether 
out of concern for our end as G6d's creatures - HRring and 
D'Arcy, or out of a .positi~~ psychological assessffient of 
.these drives - Williams. ~he overwhelming conclusiDn to 
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t~i~ study must be to note the f~tility of trying to 
undei~tand ~elf~love {n a ·christian sense, 1n isolation 
.frpm other doctrinal considerationE. All the· authors 
offering a positive assessment of self-:love, offer th.at only 
. . . 
having previously &sseried that self-love can never be ari 
end in itself. Geach and Kiik empha~ize~ hov rlrives .like 
self~~ove and selt-giving in themselves do not contain 
moral value~ but only ac~uire that in relati6n to the ends 
they serve. Christian self-iove is a po~itive value 
offering et~r~il bliss to the individual~ telling him his. 
happiness is important, but only in relation to the 
happin~ss of others,_ with all men seen as the treature~ of 
·cad who by his ~race alone ha~ the ~bility to bring_ about 
. .· . . 
this KingC.om. 
·. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LOVE . AS COMMANDMENT 
For Christians lt may be difficult to appreciate just 
how distinctive and peculiar Jesus' Love Commandment is. 
Certainly ther~ ar~ non-Christians ~ho would argue that it 
.is a contja~iction i~ terms. This 1s 1n part because there· 
. . 
a~e ~any whos~' concbpti6n of love 1s one dominated by 
e·motio:halism and irrationality. Those who stress love· as 
spontaneous and uncaused including su~h Chri~tians as 
. Nygren, or alieinatively ihose .who reduce it to. meie causal 
. -
. 1 
attraction, for example,St~ndhal, ·onli rein~orc~ this idea. 
. . . 
Karl Po~per's book ihe Open S6ciety and i~s E~emies is an 
e~ample of what.£ollows when .the sense of love as command-
merit cannot be recognised. ·In- a chapter :significantly 
entitled 'The Revel t against Reason', Popper states, 'But 
I hold that he who teaches that not reason but love should 
rule opens the way for those who rule by-hat~:. For Popper· 
lo~e ~s opposed to reason and 1s simply an emotion, thus, 
tno emoii~n;not ~ven love can replac~ rul~ of iristitution 
.controlled by reason' . 2 Granted its i~entification 6f love 
~ith e~~tionalism and irrationality, Popper's conclusidn 
clearly follows. ·bne can see why Popper is unable to -make 
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sense ~f the commandment to love.· 
Whether t.he Love Commandment 1s seeri as irrational or 
.n~t depends on how love is un~erstood. Arguably for those 
who cann~t believe in God it 1s very difficult to ~v6id 
I \. • 
·Popper s negat1ve assessment of love's normat1ve role. 
Likewise Greek Philosophy, ~hat other great intellectual 
inheritence of·wesi~rn soci~ti ~utside Christianity, w~uld 
have found the Love Commandment unintelligible in its 
Christian formulation. Love for Plato and Aristotle was 
certainly not_despised but it was not normative in itself. 
For instanc~ lov~ is hardly a normative principle of Plato'~ 
Republic~ As Nygren argues, the Greek eros 1s desir~ for 
som~thing else~ it is not a complete entity 1n itself. For 
the Greeks love was d-esire-for happiness, 'eudaemonism'. 
T.he object of this _desire, 1n so far as conceived of ·as God, 
was impassible and immutable. Qod could npt love, ~hat 1&, 
desire anything. Men only lov~d because they were incomplete 
~nd h~nce desi~ed ~omething f6r their completion. Love was 
not the highest category of existence for the Greeks. 
It was the Jewish conception of a loving Go~ remote 
from emotionalism that prepared the ground fa~ Jesus' command, 
~nd made it .intelligible._ Indeed Jesus' answer to the 
question· 'What is the greatest· commandment?' was a coupling 
(probably unique) of Deute~onomy 6:5 and Levi tic us 19:18. · 
V. P. Furnish concluded after a critical study r~specting 
the integrity of the· differing New Testament traditions,-
that the Love Commandment was both genuine to Jesus and 
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~entral to.his message and mission. 3 It was a formul~tion· 
that grew out of his Jewish upbringing. 
its negative fo~m wa~ certainly known to Judaism, that is, 
'.Do rio± do unto others as you would not have done unto 
yourself'; Christ's unique contribution was to give command~ 
to love a central place in His Gospel_: Furnish notes how 
. the evangelists alter the force of the command, while yet 
retaining its ceritrality. For instance, Matthew sees the. 
Love Commandment as the key to the mean1ng of the whole of 
th~ law, arid as the essential con~ent of the righteousness 
of Jesus' followers. by contrast, Luke sets the Christian 
Love Command~ent against the Greek ethic of reciprocity:. 
B6th tie the commandment into the call to·repentence~and . 
. discipleship, wh~reas John throughout his gospel an~ 
pariicularly at 13:34, 'A new commandment I give unto you .. ', 
.shows ~he new commandment to be the pri~e ~otivating force. 
of J~sus' mission. With John, 'the priority of the Father's 
4 
love towards the Soh is constantly· stressed.. New 
Te~tament studies show that it 1s impossible to treat Jesus' 
loYe ethic unifo~mly, but that it 1s undeniably c~nt~al tO 
his gospel. 
The central significance of the New Testament commenda~. 
tion of love· is that it is formulat.ed in a comman·d to· lov-e. 
It is noticeable that N·ygren, despite having a heading "'The 
command~ent of love in its Christian meaning'~uses.this. 
se~tion to evacuate all meaning from command. Man ~s an 
independent agent ceases to exist. ~{hat is commanded is that 
God's agape; spontaneous and uncaused; ·should flow through · 
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man as a mere v~ssel; As ~ivine l6ve 1s Unc~nditional so 
man's self-surrender 1s unc~nditi;nai~ .Vli th Ny~ren the 
L6ve Commandment 1s not a comm~nd to~men btit .just ·a menri~ 
of releas in~ the flow of God'~ agape .· 5 .. A d{ff~ren.t approach 
may.be seen 1n Fletcher's Situation Ethics. 6 Here. the Love 
Co~mandm~nt 1s taken a~ a distillation of the essential· 
essence of the law. It become~ the criterion by which all.· 
forms of legali~m must be judged. Quite aside fib~ wh~ther: 
love can be commanded and whether the New T~sta~ent account 
is consistent, theologians themselves produce quite· divergent. 
accounts of the· Love commandment. 
Furnish's analysis ma~es ~he p6int· against tho~e un~ble 
to see t~~ logic of ~ommandin~ ~ov~~ that .it is p~ecisely 
because love 2s comcianded, not ·from ~he natural affections 
crf the loier o~ by the naturB1 att~activene~s:Df the belo~~d~ 
but fro~ an exterior sourc~,that it. cab~~ commanded. 
Commanding love makes sense only when love is held to be 
the fundamental universal prin~iple oS b~ing - 'Dod is 
love. • 7 Furnish makes. th~ point (whethef in· 0onsc2ous 
opposition to Nygren or not) t~at love ~an be ·comm~nded 
precisely because Christian love 1s not spontaneous and 
uncaused, which 1s Nygren's ideal of love, and i~ohicalli 
that of many moderns. Christian love g~ounded 1n the nature 
of·God is ~egular, reliable and steadiisi- G6d's natur~ lS 
. . . . -
to be t~usted. Furnish quotes as examples of theologia~s 
who ha~i set out to advocate the LoveCommandment, Kant .and· 
Ki erk.egaard. Of Kant Is O.iscussion of the 'great command-
ment' he remarks that .Kant at least knew that the Ne-w : 
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Testament Love Co~mandment was not depend~nt upon:arou~ed 
fe~li~gs. 8 This love that can b~ commanded Kant ~alled 
'Practical Love' and it was to be distin~Jished from f~lial~ 
or marital love ~hich are derived from the affections. 
Kieri~gaard discusses the subject at length in his 
book Works of Love prin~ipally in the sec6nd chapter entitled. 
'You shall love'A K~erkegaard deals with the two. chief 
issues raised by Maithew 22:39, of which here only the 
question of commandment inter~sts us, the otber iisue being 
the question of self-love. That man shbuld love under the 
·'thou shait.r of eternity is parado~ical (in the manner of· 
the prayer '·whose service is perfect free~om'). Kierkegaard 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
presents the apparent contradiction thai love is·.dutj~ ·~ut 
this analysis far from being contradictory descri~es the 
. . : . 
nature of eternal love. Since lov~ is on this View 
constitutive of ~he universe ~nd 1s not -just an aspect-of 
human ch~ractei it can thei~fbre be commanded. He· urg~s 
Christians. not to se~ it as an ama~ing injunction~ .For 
the Fagan it may be a stunning idea lacking parallel, but 
for the Christian love i~ commanded and not l.eft to.th~ 
whims of passion. Indeed so strong is Kierkegaard's 
portray~! of love as corimandment over the private loves·, 
t~at it ~ay be felt.he does the latter an inj~stic_e. He 
tells his read~rs that the l~ve that is volunt~ry in· mankind 
is not necessarily eterrial: 'Only when it is a duty to love, 
ably the~ is love eternally sec~re' and 'security of·the 
• .. I 9· 
eternal casts .out all anx~ety. ~ ·Whereas spontaneou~ love 
can be tested for· its ·vali~ity, this is .im~ossible ~ith. · 
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eternal love, i_r:deed it is -an insult to test love that is 
of God. Since God's love .J.s .eternal,- it is necessary. both· 
for him and his creatur~s to .lo~e~ It is theref6re 
entirely appropriate for··thi~·lo~e ~o be ~6mman~~d i~r ii 
is simply commanding men to conform to their eternal 
character. Love ~hat seeks a ie~t is uncertai~ love, and 
this spontane,ous love can eq_ually well turn· into hate and . 
jealousy. 10 Positively ·speakingKierkegaard_does ·allow for· 
the possibility of its being turned i~to eternal lovew 
Subs e q_uently. he reaffirms the paradox, 'only when 1. t 
J.s a duty to love, only then J.s ldve made eternally free 
11. 
J.n blessed independence 1 ~ · It-m~y be tincdnscious, but it 
seems a~ if Ki~rkegaard J.B e~hoins the rationale of monastic 
spirituality in his portrayal of 'You shall' as· liberating 
in that it attaches one to ail and not .to particular. 
objects. In the monastic parallel ~ne is free by. bein~ 
available to .all: 'it i& the bringing ~f y6~r pot~ntial for 
love into the new and unlimited frtiitfulness of the Kingd~m'. 12 
A connection may also be seen io R6rrians ~~15ff of man· beirig 
~slave of one of two masters: bei~~the slave of the·loving 
God, he must obey his- mast~r's command to love. Kierkegaard 
. . . 
further develops ·the contrast bet~~en eternal and &pontaneous 
. . 
love by ·holding that eternal l~~e, th~t ls God'~ love,· is 
.not- dependent. It .needs nothing and is therefore free love'· 
where~s ~o-called spontaneous and human ~ove depends ·upon .· 
the response of the oth~r, it _ne~ds the other to acknowledge 
•, 1 
it·. Eternal l·ove has no d~penderice on bei_ng loved b1,1t 
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wishes to love others. In th~ light of our own ~arlier 
chapters w~ ~ould want to add what Kierkegaard does ~ot~ 
. . . 
th~t is~ fro~ this stems th~. divine creati~ity, love flowin~ 
out 6f the ple~itude of love within the G6dhead. It woul!i 
alae b~ desirable to introduce the T~inity in order to 
avoid ~~nadism and give a role to relation and_need, elements 
characteristic of love in our analysis~ within· ih~ Godhead~. 
For Ki erkegaard, love seen as duty is. freed from. :the· 
d~sp~ir consequent upon the need-to ~hoose a particular 
object. of love and to be reciprocated by that partic~lar 
. "l3 
which is the lot of spontaneous love. The command bu~ns· 
out what is unsound 1n love, that. is,~hatever is no~ eternal 
. . 
_and: not. therefore of. universal value. Kierkeg_aard' s study._· 
'revel yes around the three words 'You', 'Shall 1., and 
1 Neighbour'. In his analysi~ of the l~tter he demonstiates 
thai while it 1s never ~n obligation tci-find the beloved, i~ 
i~ an obligati6n to love the neighbour -'this is t6~. 
ethical task which 1s the origiri ot all t~sks. The point 
at issue is that 'erotic loves are preferential and ~he 
14 pas~ion of preference', while· Christian love is self-
renu~ciation. Love as commandment is to be justified fr~m 
two aspe~ts;_Fir~tly, ontologically,.if lov~ ii the 
con.stitutive category of the universe, ·it c_a:n_Y:.t· c6mmanded 
as .the means by which ~en fulfiil their p~oper nature~ 
' S~condly, ·if this· ·is so, it must if its univers~."l char~cter 
.is to be~ieen, be reflected pre-~minently in.univ~ria1 
neighbour .lov~ r~ther than private ~refereni{ai.affective· 
' 
. ·~·I 
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lov~. The Lov~_Commandment commands neighbourly love and 
. . 
does n~t command preferential love though this is not rule.d 
out~ inde~d 'John presents the r~latiofis~ip of Jesus to the 
' b.eloved disciple. 15 ·. ··· 
The danger of the language of univ~rs~l love is that 
the love comm~nd ceases to bave any appeal to ·particula~ 
persons. R~ther it can be~ome eith~r a vague ideal or 
perhaps worse, he taken -as .the jti~~ificati~n for .a, very 
imp~rsonal ~do-~ooding' in whi~h the object is to suppress 
th~ emoiions .. Furni~~ in .his bibli~al a~alisis, sets out 
to counter this by stating that thus.to be command~d is to 
. . . 
be add~esaed. as ah.iridividual. ~he p~rable of. the Good 
. . 
Samaritan (Luke !'0-:25-37), which may· be compared to 
Matthew 22:34.,...40 and granted to be·a_Lukan constructioJ?., 
is there to give an-example of the real concrete possibiliti'e!? 
for love's action.. The stress upon 'Go and do thou 
likewise~. is because the neighbou~ is the nexi person 1n 
need to be encouhter~d. The various differences in the 
ans~er to the quesiion, 'Which is the greatest commandment?' 
are there because.the Lukan redaction stressed the link to 
the parable ~herein ~he whol~ complex is hortatory. Th~t 
is to sa~ that the st~~y is so arranged that. the one who 
givei the answer is himself exhorted to go ·and do as the 
Samaritan did .• 
The -~~unch of the Lukan story 'lies -not 'in the formula-
tion of the .commandment as in Matthew, where Jes~s is 
. with 
probably to. be: ,u~ders.tood as the New Moses; but : f Luke's 
·~-:...... 
·theme. of Jesus • having to urge "the Lawyer to do· what he 
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acknowledges to be riiht~ 1n contrast to the Sama~itan-who 
;imply acts wher~ the ne~d~is.~ithbut ~or~j{ng ove~ whom 
. .· 
he is helping. Thus tbe Lawy~r's actual .questi~n,- 'And_ 
just ~ho is my ne~ghbou;?' 1s n~~er actually answered. It 
is not th~- object of mer~y whom Luke makes· the centre of tbe 
discussion but the subject, the _doer ~ho is th~- focus of 
the debate. Thus the confession Jesus extracii i~· 'Th~ 
. ... ·16 
one who performed an act of Mercy'. The stre~s ~s. thus 
laid on the hearer, and his du~ies to all, not on an 
erudite definition of who the neighbour is. 
There is ··:however,· the contrasting danger of .-using .the 
Love Commandment to ~void the inspired type: 6t action the 
Pa~able of the Gooa ~amaritan wishe~ to enc~uiage ~nd this 
.needs illustration. 
. . . . : . .. . . .. :. 
casuistry dominated. by rat ionali ~t. d~in-~nd~' t"l;ta t· love ought 
to conform to a certain ideal of ~eas()n, such that th~ 
·efuotions _have nQ role .. An ~xample o~t~ia _iendenci,.albeit 
now not .so much in vogue,· is the- Anglo-:-Catholic. 
R. c. Mortimer Is book' The EZemen ts of Mora z Th,eo Zog_y ': in a 
chapter entitled 'Love'. Mortimer 6qt1i~es St; ~homas' 
three degrees of love: .firstly, iove t6 avoid sin and 
. . 
opposition to the w:lll .of God, th~t is. to re_sist temp~ation; 
secondly; .to increase love by. seeking out :love·; and ·thirdly, 
. . 
'there i_s only one object of this_ iove~ to:cleive to dod and 
to enjoyhim. So love beginsby turning from the ~orlQ..and 
.self, increases· by dra~ing men· to God and 1s perr"ected by 
firiding and resting_. iri God •17 ·. 
-' 
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Aquinas' portrayal do~~ show just how ideals of what 
love is have ~hanged. Very few contemporary philosoph~rs 
~auld feel able t~ his ~nalysis. Yet from 
the Christia~ •iewpoint it is ~6 be com~ended, in lirikin~ 
love not just to the private emotional life but to the 
ontological structure of.the world. It is thi~ approach 
th~t is fundamental to making sense of love as tommandm~n~. 
But is thi~ to erect an utter di~ide between love as·an 
explicative category of the universe and its role ~n the 
emotions? Although Ki~rkega~rd was at pa~ns to stress the 
priority of love as willing the neighbour's good, he does 
at least grant that affecitive· love can be. harmonised with 
ne~ghbour love. He argues that one has to remove all 
distirictioris of ~reference in order t? love the neighbour, 
. . 
. . . 
but that thi~ is precisely not to ceas~ loving the beloved 
bu~.to iriclude all in the same categorj.of love as the 
18 
beloved. This has to be done, or else'there aris~s the 
very problem of neighb·our love being rio lciv·e. Kierkegaard' s 
' bogey is .the language of preference: the poetic; love which 
is ~ love of friendship lacking any ethical content, but 
having overcome this, he is prepared to. allaw·human warmth 
. 19· 
~n love a place. 
Mortimer; however, having cnncluded from Aquinas that 
. . . 
Chrisiian love is not ~o much intensity of feeling but 
. . 
rather a judge~~rit of v~lue, translated into action·, and 
that being told to love God is a qu~stion of aaopting· the 
. . I 
will to put him utterly first, ~hen goes on to drive a 
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wedge between l6yirtg ~swill arid loving as.emotion. This 
. . . . . : 
1s despite the~£act that Aquinas himself avoided this:pitfall~ 
He wrote_ that 'l6v~ i~ ~h~ source of ~11 the ~motions_~; and 
goes as far as ~o ~ai that --~joy ~nd dilight are in G;d_. 
Therefore i~ God there is love•. 20 Yet Mortimer, instead of 
' . 
choosing to put ·one before the other, to regard will as more 
reliable than feelirig while riot disparaging~feeling ·as 
valueless~ ~ppo~es the two. He _1s ~ed thii way by his 
stress on ratio~ality ag~inst which em~tion is the force:of 
chaos, Hence n~ighbciu~ love_is described by Mo~ti~er as 
I love for him as a. rational creature I .-21 Against the 
wholeness of man; his rationality, .his emotions, his body. 
: . - . . 
• and his spirit, _one faculty- alone is singled ouf. 
Significantly a cat~gory like_ JOY ha~ nowhere·be~~-discussed 
and the problem 1s reinforced by Mortimer' s· dis-cus~ion of 
. . 22 Jesus' comments on love of enem1es. 
He ·states that it is 
,. . 
~ 
'cl~ai th~s has nbthin~ tci d6 
es~entially witb any feeiing of liking or ~tfection t6watds 
them' • This_ type of statement must evacuate all meaning 
. . 
from the wor~ 16v~. It adds weight to those who 6bject 
that Christian love is just a self-righteous moralism. 
Morti~er ~o~i~ hold that the affections have no ·inyol~ement· 
. . . 
becauie what is demarided is simpiy willing fhe best for the 
other, in thi~ ~as~.an enemy~ As has be~n argued at times, 
it may well be best for your ~nemy's soul if you burn him. 
at the _stake. The coriception of love allowed here is 
' purely intellectual. N6w it ii not desirable to dispense 
. ., .. 
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with the reasonable element of man; on the contrary,lacking 
it love w~uld be. formless ·undiscipline~ p~ssiD~, but.~e~son 
. . . .· ~ . 
h~s to operate_with love wit~out being_equate~vith it~ 
There has to be as an ideal, a role for ~h~. affections t~­
play in the Christian conception of love~-or else there is 
an identification of love and reas.on in the ideal. This 
would create a purely cer~bral God-and Heaveri .. 
Mortimer makes no distinction between an enemy 
poss~ssing certain tr~its and having the poteritial for· them. 
The s~me may be said of the believer .. Hence ±t:~ighi be 
said that if an enemy is loved in accdrdance with Je~~s' 
demand~, on~ will, agreeing with Mortimer, wish_him ·the best 
for hi~ _own sake. Alongside Mortimer it is ~l~o accepted. 
that attraction and friendliness may not d~ fa~to be felt 
towards him and vice versa. However, against Morti~~r, the_ 
hope should be allowed 6f the potentiaT for m~tual- attrac-
tion and friendship, if it is Christian\ove that is being-
offered. The accent then is on future potent.ial, since ·-as 
Aquinas said with reference to the· love of ~riemies~ 'th~y 
are loved inasmuch as they are creatu~es df to~, made to 
his image and capable of enjoying hi~' . 2 i Particular affec-
. . . . 
tions or pref~rential love a~e not being·t~lked of- here. 
Rather if Christiari love ini6lves t~e whole ma~~- it must 
have a role fpr the-affections, not just a·: cerebral content. 
If so, then this ideal will involve neighbour love and so 
too ~nemy ·l?ve. A distinction is .thus essential between 
the _pos~essi~n of.affection; vhich may:~ot be exercised at 
a given moment,· ~nd the pOteritial f6r af~ection. ana 
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friendship a~ a~ ideal, which must-be present in every 
Chri~tian rel~tlonship and ;hich is n~t present ~n 
.5:13 
Mortimer's analysis. It could be said that the approach to 
this issue reflects the manner b~ heavenly communiori anti-
cipated by the. subject. Another distinction M6rtimer might 
ha~e ma~e would ha~e been between love b~ing .governed. by 
emotion~iism, which:is agreed to be und~sirable~-a~d lo¥e 
being separate frbm em6tion. Mortimer se~ms to hold that 
for love not tote governed by em6tionalism, it h~s'to be 
. . 
separated from _emotion and ciosely identified with our 
~~tional faculties .. It maj,however,be held that the former 
does not necessitate the latter .. 
In order.to believe 1n a. God conceined for the whole. 
. . 
man as createa and n6t just. the rationality beloved of some, 
then it. mu,st be concluded that o.ur enemi.es and thus all men 
hav~ the pot~ntiai to be lovable because th~y afe God's 
creatures. Hence there must always be t;he open po.ssibility 
for ~fiectibnate warmth bei~g offered by the Christian if· 
Chiistianity is to avoid giving cause to its detractors. 
An author who.is alive to th~ d~ngers of too weak a 
presentation of neighbour love, simply as general concern, 
and aware that commanding love is both problematic and 
abused is D. Zi Phillips. He has the assumption that ·it 1s 
' . . . - . 24 v~ry difficult.to def1ne love. There are, at least in 
., 
peopl~'~mind~; a very wide variety bf. 'loves',·of whi6~ the 
Christia~ neig~bour lo~e command is erie in particular~. ~he 
logical contradiction potentially involved in the Love 
Commandment is.best illustrated by ~sking whet~er it is 
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possible to have a· duty to love? For Kant duty is t·he 
highest motl.ve but it makes no sense to say that a cou.pie 
fall· i~ iov~ out ~f duty~ To say that neighbour 16ve ·is ·a 
duty ~ight ~ot~be t~ ~ave at ~11. Nei8hbour ·love to be 
intellig~bie heeds to ~e sep~rated form nther loves ~nd if 
it is a duty, th~t needs explanatiori. I~deed Christians 
d6 justify the duty of neigbb~ur love, though not ifi .. terms 
of duty, but as a consequence of their world view. Men ·are 
members of th~ creation of the God of 16ve and thus ·duty 
h~s to be s~en in terms of.God and not merely in itself. 
. . 
. . . . 
Neigh~our love as a 6ommand cannot be understood 
witho~t God~ it; rationale is n6t self evident, hence its 
connection by. Jesus to the· first commandment. ·It cannot be 
conceived of without tl:ie command to love God or els.e the 
logical problem mentioned 1s created. Of the many other 
loves, they all depend on the parti~ularity of the·r~lation-
. . . 
ship, e.g. wife, friends, and pets. H~wev~t Christia~ity 
.. 
commands. that. all men b.e ioved' bee a use of. the . c ammon 
feature that all men share, namely that they are all :the 
. . 25 
children of God.. The theology of creation is ·here acting 
as the basis of ~hrisiian nei~hbour love. Neighbour ~nd 
-particular love act at diffe~ent levels, yet each·is-love 
understood as.~· warm concern and attachment. ·Pe.rsonal love 
. . . 
values this person ~uch that.the loss thereof produces 
. . 
·despair, ~her~~s. neighb~ur love values being. Both are 
~ssential yet different, if there is to b~ i b~l~nced view 
o~ love, fre~-of the despair of isol~tion that .we sh~li 
note 1n Dostoyevsky~. It·is the same point Kierkegaard made, 
' ~ . 
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~n saying that,-. 'the neighbour ~s your equal, th~ neighbour 
~s not your beloved. for whom you have a passionate· 
pa~tiality', artd, 'he is your n~ighbour throu~h-~quali~y 
. .. 
with you before God'. 26 Likewise Jesus not only·c~~manded 
neighbour love, he commended particular relation~, 'and 
the two shall become one flesh, so that theY are no more 
two but . 27 one'. 
_Phillips ~s also at pa~ns to recognlse the ·str~rigth of 
objections to neighbour love. . . . . He quotes Camu~ on·Scheler, 
'Humanity is loved in g~neral, ~n order to avoid.lo~ing. 
. . 28 . 
anybody in part~cular'. He commends Kant's assessm~rit of 
men not 'merely as meanS' but ~n every case_ 'ai ends ~n 
thems elves I • 29 Phillips holds tha:t to 6btai:n an i~t er-
pretation of Christian neighbour lo~e ai~ed at this end 
an,d free of the objections mentioned, !D-UCh that·has previously_ 
·passed for neighbour love has to be dispen~ed with. His 
. ;,. 
basis for t~is judgement is to arg~e that if.men ar~ 
rieighbours through equality with Christ, theri this has not 
been very evident iri the relationship between the believer 
and the non-believer. In his. c onside.rat ion though, he d·oes 
not distinguish between the performanc'e of the church and the 
teaching of Jesus, If the church c~n be shown to be failin~ 
in its devotion io Jesus' teaching~ then it i~ not just a 
new interpret~ti~n that is. requir~d but a ~e~urn t6 .the 
,. 
words of .. the Lord. To say . this is. s il!lple, but the problem 
is ~ne o? great antiqu~ty.- Along~ide the radical statements. 
and actioris recorded by the Synoptics, 1n the later work of 
.·_·l 
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John, the ~xclusivist element appears in the translation of 
neighbour love into love of the brethren. 
It dhould have been clear throughout the argument-that. 
. . . 
it is the different conceptions of iove,_ by which pe.opie· 
analyse the Love Commandment that produce the ·differing 
assessments of it. Th~ clasi of objection ~een brought· 
against· it today that have just been discussed would. not 
have made any. sense to the Jew listening to Jesus, brought 
up,with a very different world picture. First, associa.:... 
~icins made ~ith love in today's society might safely be 
said to be romantic love, whereas in Jewish society they 
.with 
would h~ve ~een I Go~ the Father, for theirs ~as' a theocficy~ 
Thus a major element now· to be discussed, is· the link'bet~een 
. . 
love as commandment ~nd the·conception·of God's sovereignty· 
known to the Jews and ·presented by Jesus. 
Furnish 1n his book ~tresses the link as. does 
T. W. Manson 1n Ethics. and the Gaspe Z. "Furnish in his 
conclusion, having shown how significant.for the commendation 
of love 1s that it is commanded, then shows how the rationale 
of that command lies in its being the sovereign_ command of 
a so~ereign lord. The. notiori of the ·Kingdom of God both in. 
Jesus' and the Jew's use 1s fundamental here. Since the 
Jews .saw _themselves as a community, ~reated; sustained and 
ruled by God, the ~otion of ~od's ~ommanding love made 
ready sense. Thus love of G_od and of neighbour 1s coi!li!ianded 
in the Old Testament and Jesus himself can make 1t the 
centrepoint ~this ethic. Sine~ he sees himself as.God'·s 
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earthly agent, .for hi~ to 1ssue the command to ~ove 1s 
straightforwar~: It does not invoi~~ him in the philo~ 
' . 
. . . 
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. sophic~l problems of comma~di~g l~ve that are encouptered 
. . : . . . . 
toaay. Th~ p~bblem tor J~~us and the Jews witnessed by 
the varying New Testament treatments of the ·issue is the 
relation between· Jesus' proriouncements and the Jewish_law. 
It i~ because the sovereignty of God is presuppo~ed that 
love for neighbour i~. tied to 16ve of God in the New 
Testament. In this present~tion the brotherhood of man 1s 
n6t self-evident bui foll~ws on from the Fatherhood and 
thus rule of God. It is God's sovereignty that gives 
. . 
c6hesion to.the ~hole _system, hence Paul.'~ stress on God's 
love in the redeeming death of ·christ and in his identifica-
tion of love as the gift of the Spirii:3° likewise John's 
stress .On love as the eschatological power of un1on between 
. . . 31 
F13,ther and Son. 
Just as th~ .contem~orary world vieX is unfamiliar with 
the theme of God's sovereignty, it i~ also·unfamiiiar with 
the related New Testament theme of·mankind's bondage. 
Granted the particularly Pauline preoccupation with this 
. 32 
theme, nonetheless it 1s the rationale behind such remarks 
of. Jesus as 'no-one can b~ the serv~nt of t~o masters' .33 
Man in the biblical piqture is free only in respect of 
. . . . 
choosirig which mast~r he shall s~r~e~ fr~ed6m in the New 
T~stament is ~ore a matter of liberation from sin, than 
freedom to do all. 
the present stress on it·s nature as j" . If man does 
choose God, that ·sovereign may, without ·contradiction command 
love as b~ing the style ,of life required to Serve him. Thus 
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it is the nature of the King that 1s determinative. Hence 
Manson in his s"t11dy makes much of the Semi tic idea of king-
~hip, iri which the .. ~t~eis lies n6t.so ~uch ori the ide~ of 
the kingdom as a phy~ical .realm, but mbre upon allegian~e. 
to the King as a p~~son and the c~n~~quent character 
. . 4 
necessary to win such an allegianc~.3 · Jesus is the 
Christian's king and this is built uponthe Old Testament 
background to kingshi~. _The quality_ Of the Christian 
. . . . . . . 
. ethic . is derived from: the e.ne 'who is himself its inter-
preter ·an~ exemplifier. . . It is because of the- loving nature 
of the Christian· king that the moral problem of God.' s 
sovereig~ .poyer raisedby Varistone,&s discussed earlier by 
o~rs~lv~s,is ove~come~ 
.. . 
. It has been se~n then how the context in which it is 
understood, .its ow~, or that of another era, r~nders the 
.Lo~e Cbmmandment intelligible or unintelligible. Furnish 
has ·provided ~- good example pf th~ ~rot~st~nt recovery of 
. 
. the .love ethic built ~round New T~stament study. In Roman 
_Catholic moral theology .a revival of interest ba~ ~lso 
occured. This may be ieen in ~~ch a textbook as Hiring's 
The Law of Ch~i~t~ He has a heading:under which he riotes 
that Kant and Sch~ler while starting from totally different 
premise$ reach· the same conclusion that· love cannot b~ the 
..... · . 35. 
abject of a m~~e precept. According to Hlrirrg, for Kant 
love b~i6n~s to the ~~~thological or~er'~ it. is not a mo~al 
but a sensu~l appetite, whereas with Scheler, one either· 
'does or d·oes not. possess it - it is simply futile to 
presriribe it, 'you must love' .being nonsense. This revealS 
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how both of thes~ authors have allowed their own world view 
to affect their judgement of. the. ver:f" :differ~nt bi bli"cal. 
world VJ.ew. Scheler cannot accept .·the commandment at :all 
while Kant restricts it .. Although nqt n6t~d bi ~~r~ng, Kant: 
accepts the com~andment. The proble~ 1s tha~ he terms it 
'practical love' and separates it from the emotions, and ·it 
. . . 
is this latter that Hiring questi6ns. Kant's ~osition is 
that practical or neighbour love· J.s co;mniandable, but that 
this J.s very dif~erent from the impossibil{ty .of pre.s.cribing. 
affectiona~~ feeling. Certainly the latter is ·so but need 
it then follow that the desirability_ of invoiving the· 
affections is then ~e~ied?3 6 
Hiring regards the New Testament prec~pt as nie~rii~~iul· 
. . 
. . . . 
~ecause. of ~en's God-given ability ~nd duty ~~ :1o~~. Being 
. . 
a Catholic, he.is able to use Nat~ral T~~ology to construet 
a creation ethic or world VJ. ew in which th.e. ability and · 
'.:· 
duty to lo~e are intelligible. On ~his~analy~is love-ought 
. . . - . . 
not firstly to_ be understood as sen~{merital and affective. 
. . . .·. . . . .· . . 
All are agreed this sort o~ love cannot be presciibe~, rather 
love is universally-personal before it is preferentially· so. 
. ~ . . 
This is because on this world view, love is the ground of 
. . 
all. being in God, who is himself a com~unity of .~ersons.J.n 
love. HHring. gives· four c~nsequences .following on:. fr~m. 
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encountering the Love:Comm~ndment. It is intend~d to 
remove all obstacle~ between men ind G6~'s .love. cSinc~ · 
only loye that is recognised elicits response, there -is 
• . . l. . . . . . . . 
ri~~d.for de~oiion and m~ditation upon God's love ~or us. 
The Lo.;e· Commandment :is thus ·woyen .into .the fahric. o:f ·. 
- ·, ·. ,_ ~.-' 
·'· 
'.,.·; 
worship. Without the sustenance of.worship it.ceases to be· 
-. 
a living form in the ~anner intended. That ·is, .. since.it i·s. 
a 6ommand to iove God and nei~hb6ur, the fir~t relaiicin 
w~ich sustain~.the secotid. has itself to be ri6~rished~ 
T~irdly,ihe precept bf love d~mands a £iee submission of 
the will; whi6b as a creature, created in God's im~ge, man 
is free to do. This ~s a recurrence of the bondage to the 
world or God theme: and fourthly ihe precept demands .ioving 
acts. 
In a later sectiori o~ the bobk, love towards enem1es 
38' 
as tieighbours is given prominent attention. In ~is 
judgement it is.the acid test of the attitude to ·one'.i 
neighbour, does ·love for them spr1ng out of divin~ lovet 
God's own love for .man is not just the love· cif fri·ends.hip, · 
although it lS that - 'I have called you friends'~3ibut 
. . 
it was also love for mankind as an en~my. God him~elf 
exemplifies enemy: love.4° 
. . 
The objeciiva bf the divine 
love of enem1es is the destruction of the enmity. ·God 
desires to make friends out of enemies and t~is lik~wise 
must be the aim for Christian~, in marked contrast to 
Mortime~'~ stand. Enemy lov~ is ~irected at him.not 
because he ~s ·an enemy but for th~ sake of his potential, 
as a creatu~e created for £Ommunion with God. Despite thi~ 
positive stance, there· is one comment of }Hiring' s· alB;.rmingl-y 
reminiscent of the 'old Cath~licf~m', which could·:~otentially 
justify ·many of the accusations that are labelled against 
the commandment t~ 1.ove. th~. n~~.ghbour ~ He states· that 
. -~~the ·Damned ,have ~ternally-.,.s.hut :J:;h~mselves .off .from· th.e 
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co~m~pity of fello~ship 1n the divine .lo~e. Rene~ they can 
·no ionger be the· object of our Christian neighbour love. 
. . . ! . 4'1 
·They ha~e utterly ceased to be our neigbbou~'. · doupled 
with his high vie~ ~f chur6b struc~ure this 1s a recipe for 
a dangerous partisinshi~. 
The emin~nt moralist Bishop Butler addressed himself 
to the Love Com~andment in two of his. sermons. 42 Butler's 
tenor. reflects the g·rowing rationalism of the era. He 
regards love of the neighbour as ~eing. one, with charity of 
be.nevolence. · It is an affection to the good and ha:ppiness 
of one'~ fellows. It becom~s a univer~alisable ·and there-
fore saric~i6nable disposition because Qod i~ ou~ end ~ho 
rlesiie~ this happiness. Since the human race is so. 
enormous there is this danger that universal ·love is just 
a phrase. The command, though,.was t~ love a person in the 
. . 
. . . 
· rbrm ot mj rieighbour - thus Butler emphasizes a very close 
interpretation of neighbour amongst tho&e whom we know. 
. . 
The pi6bl~m witb this exegesis of t~e Love:comm~n~ment is 
that it lack~ bite. H~ ~ommands meekness~ temp~rance and 
consi~eration of others, his good man is a Parson Woodfords 
a generous open hearted man in a well-ordered s6ciety. 
This conception of neighbour good as it is, would be 
stressed by crisis~ It does not i~pel one towards social 
~oncern at ~njustice, in the manner many have reacted to 
the commandment.· 
Our ~naly~is thus far h~s.been around the actual love 
commandment, the philbsoph:ic'al peculiarity concerning .the 
.command nature of Jesu·s '· say·ing·, .the conn~ction between the. 
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two great c~mmaridments, and. th~ debaie coricerriing the role 
of emotion arid r~~s~n in thii comm~ndment. It is instruc-
tive to turn to liter~ry examples, to two authors who ha.ve 
. . . 
p~rceived the necessi~~ and eii~tence of the universal love 
spoken of by the New Testament commandment, firstly in a 
. .4 
poem Qf W. H. Auden's written rin the eve of World War Two. 3 
The key lines are 'For··the ·error. bred in the bone of each 
w0man and each.man craves what it c~nnot have~ ~ot uriiversal 
love but to be loved alone'i and iri the last but one.stanza: 
the blunt comment' I We must love one another. or die I • . Auden 
has seen ~hat the Love Commandment i~ founded upon, that 
where particular love i~.~~t first, dissolution must follow 
on the lines show~ ~n Sa~tre's bobk Intimacy or Ana!s Nin's 
A spy in the hou~e of love~. 
In .the latter~ Sabina,· the centre figure~ struggles· tQ 
. . . 
make her aff~irs ~~lfill~ng-and increa~ingiy·finds the 
converse. At first she is. happy. that. hE!'r affairs I free. her I: 
'She opened her eye~ to contemplate .the pl. ere ing joy· of 
. . 
her liberation: she was. free·; . to enjOy" without love 
That was ~he m~anirig ot freedo~. Free bf attachment, 
dependency and the capacity for pain' .~ 4 This bringi her 
no joy and this·freedom is no freedom in the sense developed 
throughout this t:Qe~i.s; ·Yet ironically,·. (remembering 
earli~r chapters) the Greek .:P.=i,cture of God whi~h has been 
greatly 6~iti~is~d would ·sur~ly warm to th~ ~uotation·above, 
.. , -
here being ins{a~ced a~ the.incarnation of loveless freedom . 
. Certainly .Sabina .finds it .so,· ·she finds that 'sh.e had lost 
'herself. somewhere =Along the ~rontier. between her inve~tions, 
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. . . . 
her fantasies and he~ true ~elf· . . she had walked_intp 
45 -. pure chaos' Finally she is io.rced to recognise· t·hat she 
does need love; and· that all hei;' affairs do is 'to contribute 
to a tfuitles~ d{stniegrat{ori of. self. She is shown that 
love must in~olv~ th~ accepta~~e of all the ·•facei' 6f the 
- 46 . . . 
whole person. Perhaps N~n might nqt accept the thesis 
that p~rticular lo~e can only find nrder in an ac~~pt~nce 
. . - . 
of universal. l.ove, but· s·he well. shows- the cons eq_uenc e s of 
its non~acceptance. If love is ~eiely att~chment betwe~n 
individuals·, it cari· play no role iri the ethics of society· 
which is preciselj the posit{on of Popper .cited earlier. 
. . . 
Auderi com~ends ·universal loye as a nee e s sary pr io-r:l ty before 
particular love and th{~ in turn iefle6ts a world ~iew·1n 
. . 
- . : . - . -
which love ·is ~i~d to the universe's ground ~f being. 
The other. ·author whose advocation of· brotherly ·rove 1s 
to be studie(i. is Dostqyevsky in th~ _ Bro.thers :·karamazov. The 
dominant theme of the· ·chapter 'The Rus s·ian Monk-' repeated 
twice nearly void for word is that 'You must realise that 
. 47· 
everyone is re~lly responsible fot everyone and everything.' 
. . .. . --~,. 
The author devotes . s ev.eral. pages to showing how c ompet it :Lon 
in society and_concer~ for image degrade a ~an,· _iAnd really 
what h~d I done to_ deserve that anoth~r man, a ~an like me 
. . 48 
created in God's image should wait on me' . In ·this. 
ad-voc.-a t l.on of brotherly love he r~cogni ses the nee e ssi tY 
for _a spiritu~~- transformation. : Science is imp cit ent. t·o 
~nder~ak~ ~~ch·a·work'e~en if- it ~ight demonstrate the 
advan~~gei ethics t;e~ted a~ ~-humanity la~ks strength. 
. . ' . . 
DoatoyevSky,ass~s_ses the ~itu~tio~ of his·fellows: 'Fot 
., 
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tod~y everyone 1s still stiiving to keep his ind~viduality 
as far apart . (he.) . still wishes to expe~ie~ce· 
th f 11 f 1 • f . • h • ·. lf 1 I 49 . • I e u ness o ·.1 e 1n 1mse a one r . .Th1s leads to 
~he fullness cif self-destructidn for in~tead of full self-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
real1sat1on they relapse 1nto·complete 1~olat1on'. 
Wherever universal love. does not precede pariicular: love ~ 
.. · . . . . 
n6t to the latter~s destructio~~ but for the l~tter's ~roper 
orientation~ then, iin our age·_all. men are separated into 
self-contairied ·units, everyone crawls into his own hole, 
· ·· • • . • . I 51 
everyone separates hunself :from hls ne1ghbour . And, 
'For he is used to relying on himself alone and has 
. . 52 
separated hims~lf as a self-~ontained unit'. 
In this npvel Dostoy~vsky has given· gr~at weight tb 
emphasizing neighbour love as a nece~sity against_ contemporary 
trends to individualism. These make l~ve unintelligible and 
the~efore not comciandable outside private relations or eyen 
within them! Yet in the marriage contra't:!t one chooses· 
freely to ac~ept an obligation to ~o~e o6eis spouse. Earlier, 
the New Testiment'~ presentation of freedom ~as ihown as a 
choice of masters and Dostoyevsky notes this too. 53 He 
characterises the worid's view of freedom ~s freedom to have 
arid not to serve, it seeks t6 give the freest possible 
express1on t~. desire rather than to self-cbntro1 and 
temperance. So he st~tes that 'It is no wondei that instead 
of Baining fie~d6m they h~ve fallen into slavery and· i~stead 
of .serving the cause of brotherly •iove . . sink into 
·s"epara t ion and isolation '.: 54 · ·That he thinks that without 
the divine ·sanction of ·love .t'his ,collapse .. is inevitable is 
5:25 
clear: 'And why they aie ~{ght a~cording to thejr v1ew for 
if you hav~ no tod then why vorty about·crime?'_55 
By contrast Richard.R.obinson 1n·An Atheist"'s VaZu~s 
. . . . . . - . . . 
~ives an atheistic att~mpt to as~~ss the Christian ~om~enda-
.. . 
. . 56 
t ion o-f love. 
_This is -~o~cerne~ not ~it~ d~bun~ing p~r se 
but is an endeavour to achieve ~s positive an assess~ent 6f 
value as one can from an atheistic standpoint. In his 
analysis lov~ ±s significantly pliced after the univ~rsal 
values of 'truth' and 'reason'~ Much of what he. says_ mi~ht 
be commended. Love the virtue is-to be ~he right habitual 
conduct of loYe the eriotion: He allows th~t histotically 
the New Testament is r~sponsible £o~ elevating love into 
a moral virtue. It 1s charaeterised negati~ely as the 
withering of hate, 'love jout en~~ies', .and·positively as 
the creation of pleasant amiable converse between friends~ 
. . . 
He makes much of 'Greater l6~e hath 6o~man . 'and·1ts 
rel~tion t~ friendship. What he le~ves then is the 
commendation of pleasant friendship ·as~ a good thing, which 
it is, but he goes·_no further. There is·no manner·inwhich 
love is universal, neither is .. it. the key to morals, and the 
Love ~ommandment is simply not merition~d. If a loving 
force beyond men cannot be ~~oken of, th~n th1s commendation 
of love as amiability is as· far as. can be got. Love as 
. . 
commandment depends ~pon love ha~ing an ontologica~ ~eality· 
greater than just individuil. friend~hip. 
Perhaps the overid~ng conclusion of this study;is·that 
the Lo~e .Commandment does only make sense to the converted. 
dne~s. ontoiogy or world view control~ whethe~ one can 
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' under~tand its rationale or hot. In order to make it 
in~elligible, th~ assumption of a variety 6f for~s pf lo~e-· 
has to be ·made, of which passionate particular love·:is just" 
. . 
· 6ne ,· and not necessarily the most important one. ·Most 
important is the need to hold that love is ~-constit~tive 
element of the universe and God. The Love Commandment is 
. . 
thtis derivat~ve, it certainly is ~· s~ 1n the New· Teitamerit 
where it is the second commandment after the first. The 
commandment's intelligibility comes from the beliets it. 
presupposes concerning God and of his sovereignty·b~er his 
creation .. Thi~ also shows how difficult it is to anaiy~e 
it. in its owri terms:: it requires study of the theology:~f 
creation &nd a philosophical study of the ttpes.:ot lo~e. 
Briefly speakirig this latter involves us in .the role of 
relation within ·the being of man and God, and hence· stu~"y 
of the Trinity. It may well be this. latter that is the 
ultimate rationale behind the sense of t":he Love Comman.dment -
~ut that is to be returned to wher~ this work started~ 
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